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Introduction 
It is a well-known result that education is positively correlated with the main 
indicators of economic and social wellbeing: higher educated individuals have 
better occupational opportunities, earn higher wages, have more stable families, 
are more healthy, live longer, commit fewer crimes and participate more in civic 
and political activities (Hout 2012). These are among the reasons why the process 
of educational expansion that has taken place in all developed countries in last 
decades has been supported and praised by policy-makers, scholars, and the 
public opinion: educational expansion brings to society both economic and extra-
economic positive effects. However, starting from Freeman’s pioneering work 
The Overeducated American (1976), concern has been raised about the 
unexpected and unattended consequences of a huge increase of (highest) 
educational levels: educational expansion can have also negative undesired effects 
if it outpaces the increase in the demand for higher levels of education. If the 
supply of higher educated workers far outmatched the corresponding demand, the 
author argued, the risks of graduates being forced to accept traditionally non-
graduate jobs and of the wage premium associated with a tertiary degree strongly 
declining become real. 
The publication of Freeman’s work has been followed by a growing body of 
literature on overeducation. This term, roughly speaking, refers to the situation in 
which the amount of skills acquired in education exceeds the level required by the 
individual’s job. As will be discussed in the following, this concept is much more 
complex than it could appear at first sight. Indeed, it entails a relation between 
education and skills which is hard to disentangle: even though commentators 
often use the terms education and skills interchangeably, education is far from a 
perfect measure of individual skills. 
So far, the leitmotiv of research on overeducation has been that this 
phenomenon is not simply the result of a frictional mismatch between labour 
demand and supply. The most recent research has indeed refuted the hypothesis of 
overeducation being merely due to an excessive supply of higher educated 
workforce: not only there is international evidence of skill shortages at the tertiary 
level, but the wage premium for tertiary education has remained stable or has even 
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increased over the past decades, while it should have decreased in case of an 
oversupply of university graduates (OECD, 2011). Rather, overeducation is 
proven to be a relevant and persistent phenomenon, which deserve policy concern: 
according to OECD estimates, about one worker out of four is overeducated 
(OECD, 2011). To a similar conclusion arrive Leuven and Oosterbeek (2011) in a 
recent meta-analysis: summarising results from the main studies on overeducation 
they found that, on average, 30% of the working population is overeducated. 
Moreover, when analysing the evolution over time of the phenomenon, the 
authors point out that, after a decline in reported overeducation from the 1970s 
(40%) to the 1990s (24%), in 2000s there appears to be a sharp increase (39%). 
What is even more topical, lots of studies have addressed the consequences of 
overeducation, suggesting the relevant impact that the phenomenon has—not only 
from an economic point of view—on individuals and on the whole society. 
Overeducation is usually considered the result of a twofold failure: of education 
systems—not able to provide students with useful and marketable skills—and of 
labour markets—inefficient in sorting school leavers into the available jobs. These 
institutional failures are proven to have detrimental effects on workers, firms and 
economic systems. Overeducated individuals are found to earn less than 
individuals with the same educational level who match job requirements (Duncan 
and Hoffman, 1981; Cohn and Khan, 1995; Hartog, 2000)
1
 , to be less productive 
(Tsang, 1987)
2
 and less satisfied with their jobs (Tsang et al., 1991; Battu et al., 
2000). Overeducation can also be very costly for the economy, not only because it 
is likely to restrict productivity growth (McGuinness, 2006), but also because, as 
education is often largely funded by the States, it can represent a waste of 
                                                 
1
 Leuven and Oosterbeek (2011) estimate that on average the return to one year of schooling is 
around 0.09, while the return to one year of overeducation is about half of that (0.043). 
2
 Using data from companies in the US, Tsang (1987) estimates that a one-year reduction in 
surplus schooling would increase output by more than 8% translating into an additional gain of almost 
five billion dollars. 
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resources since it implies unproductive investments on human capital (Maier et 
al., 2003)
3
.  
An influential body of research on overeducation has thus addressed the 
institutional causes of overeducation, in order to both shed light on the 
mechanisms driving the mismatch and identify possible policy interventions to 
tackle this widespread and lasting phenomenon. Comparative research has indeed 
explained cross-country differences in overeducation—and in other indicators of 
labour market entrance, such as unemployment, occupational status attainment 
and job-search duration—as a result of different institutional characteristics of 
education systems and labour markets. On the one side, stratification, 
standardization and vocational specificity of education are found to affect the 
goodness of the matching between workers’ education and jobs (Di Stasio et al., 
2015; Levels et al., 2014; Wolbers, 2003); on the other side, labour market 
rigidities are shown to roughen labour market entrance of school leavers (Scherer, 
2004; Wolbers, 2007). 
The most recent research on school-to-work transition—and, in particular, the 
literature on overeducation—has focused on labour market entrance of university 
graduates. Following the process of educational expansion that has taken place in 
all developed countries in last decades, in fact, an in-depth examination of the 
transition of tertiary graduates to the labour market is essential in order to better 
understand the processes of social reproduction that are still at work despite the 
generalized increase in educational levels (Müller and Gangl, 2003; Shavit et al., 
2007). The expansion of education and the focus on tertiary graduates evidently 
posit new questions about a new source of differentiation, namely the horizontal 
stratification of educational qualifications. It is in fact a well-established result 
that different returns are associated with the field of study individuals graduated 
from. The best performing graduates—in terms of wages, occupational 
opportunities, job prestige, and so on—are those from technical and job-oriented 
                                                 
3
 It could be argued, in this regard, that public investment in education does not respond only to 
economic reasons, but that it could and should contribute to social progress, by promoting equal 
opportunities for active citizenship. Extra-economic returns to education are the topic of a wide strand 
of research (see Campbell 2006 for an exhaustive review of the literature), which is still debating 
around the causal nature of this association. Despite the relevance of this argument, it goes beyond the 
scope of this dissertation to assess whether extra-economic factors compensate for the lack of 
marketability of educational degrees. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, no study exists that links 
these two phenomena. Thus, we are not able to assess whether extra-economic consequences of 
education are the same for overeducated and non-overeducated individuals. 
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fields (such as Medicine, Engineering, and Law), while the worst results are 
usually found among graduates from the Humanities and Social Sciences (Kim 
and Kim, 2003; Reimer et al., 2008). This general pattern is found to be valid also 
when speaking about overeducation. While overall graduates’ overeducation 
appears to be a not negligible phenomenon in all developed countries (Humburg 
et al., 2012), field of study differentials are also worth noting: the more generally 
oriented is the study programme, the less likely are graduates to find a good match 
at the beginning of their job careers (Chevalier, 2003; Ortiz and Kucel, 2008; 
Verhaest and Van der Velden, 2013).  
The aim of this study is to link these two strands of research in order to assess 
if and how institutional features are likely to shape fields of study differentials in 
the overeducation risk. This topic has received, in fact, little attention, even if 
there exists studies suggesting that differences across fields are likely to be 
influenced by different trends in demand and supply growth (Reimer et al., 2008), 
and by a set of institutional factors, on both the demand and supply sides of 
qualified labour (Ortiz, 2006; Ortiz and Kucel, 2008; Verhaest and van der 
Velden, 2013). Analysing in depth these differentials might serve a twofold 
function. On the one hand, it could shed light on the mechanisms linking 
education to labour market returns. On the other hand, by enhancing our 
understanding of the drivers of field of study differentials, it could suggest 
instruments to improve the equality of graduates’ opportunities in the labour 
market. 
In the following chapters, this issue will be addressed with two different 
perspectives. First, in Chapter 4, we will comparatively analyse how the 
differential incidence of overeducation among graduates from different fields of 
study is affected by labour market institutions. While researchers have often 
focused on the role of the educational system, less attention has been devoted, in 
the overeducation literature, to the possible determinants of the phenomenon on 
the demand side. Even more ignored has been their role in shaping the 
differentials between fields of study. In the following analyses, three labour 
market features will be taken into account, whose relevance will be depicted 
below: the level of labour market regulation, the regulation of the access to liberal 
professions, and the level of public employment. Because they are known to alter 
the number and the quality of available job vacancies and to affect the structure of 
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labour demand, they are likely to impact on both the overall incidence of 
overeducation and on the differential distribution of the phenomenon among 
graduates from different fields of study. 
Then, in Chapter 5, the effect of the university reform dictated by the 
guidelines of the Bologna Process on tertiary graduates’ risk of overeducation will 
be evaluated. Italy is selected as a relevant case study for these analyses since, in 
comparison with other developed countries, it displays both low graduation rates 
and modest returns to tertiary education. This peculiar combination has been 
explained with characteristic features of the Italian labour market and economic 
structure, which above all require less qualified workers to be trained on the job. 
Graduates’ overeducation might have been further enhanced by the introduction in 
2001 of the Bologna university reform. By both increasing the number of 
individuals accessing to HE and enlarging the social base of participation to 
tertiary education, this reform might have even worsened graduates’ risk of 
mismatch and altered the pattern of fields of study differentials. The evaluation of 
the impact of the reform is by definition restricted to a single case study; however 
it sheds new light on the role of HE systems in shaping graduates’ opportunities at 
labour market entrance and suggests the necessity of analogous research on the 
reform’s effect in other countries. 
Preliminary to these analyses, after a review of the theoretical literature on 
overeducation (Chapter 1), Chapters 2 and 3 provide an insight in the 
aforementioned issue of how to properly define and measure the phenomenon. 
After a review of the existing literature (Chapter 2), an empirical comparison 
between different indicators of overeducation is provided in Chapter 3. Findings 
will show that different indicators of overeducation often lead to different results. 
Thus, the possibility that different indicators may not exactly measure the same 
phenomenon will be discussed and the necessity to employ more than one 
measure will be suggested. Not only these results are propaedeutic to the analyses 
presented in Chapter 4 and 5, but they also represent a contribution per se to the 
methodological literature on overeducation, since they show how different 
indicators are likely to measure different features of the phenomenon, namely 
educational and skill mismatches.  
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1. Theoretical framework 
1.1 Why does education (sometimes) pay off? 
In spite of the huge body of research on overeducation, there is no clear 
agreement in the literature on how to interpret the occurrence and persistence of 
the phenomenon. In the next Chapter the longstanding problem of properly 
defining and adequately measuring overeducation will be addressed. Suffice it 
now, in order to theoretically frame the phenomenon, to say that overeducation 
occurs whenever the amount of individuals’ educational skills exceeds the level 
required by their jobs. 
Scholars have tried to explain this phenomenon in the light of the various 
theoretical frameworks usually applied to the analysis of labour market returns to 
education, which also provide different accounts for the nature, existence, and 
returns to overeducation. These theories can be grouped into three main 
categories
4
 based on the three different mechanisms they assume connecting 
education to labour market outcomes (Van de Werfhorst, 2011). The first group 
includes the approaches based on human capital theory (Becker, 1964; Mincer, 
1958) that consider education as an indicator of productive skills. The second 
comprehends the perspectives that look at education as a positional good (Spence, 
1973; Stiglitz, 1975). Finally, in the third group are comprised the theoretical 
frameworks that suggest that education may serve as a means for social closure 
(Weber, 1920). 
The following paragraphs briefly discuss these theoretical approaches and 
their contribution to the explanation of the occurrence of overeducation, without 
pretending to establish the superiority of one mechanism over the others. It is 
definitely useful to theoretically distinguish the possible mechanisms driving the 
(mis)match between workers and jobs. However, since they represent ideal types, 
we do not expect any of them to fully explain the existence of the phenomenon 
under investigation. 
                                                 
4
 These categories have to be intended as groups of theories, which exhibit a certain degree of 
internal heterogeneity. However, it goes beyond the scope of this dissertation to present in detail the 
internal differences of the three approaches. 
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1.1.1 Education as an indicator of productive skills 
According to the standard neo-classical approach, education pays off because 
it provides individuals with productive skills. The economic tradition of the 
human capital theory (HCT henceforth) claims that a direct link exists between 
human capital, productivity and wage: more precisely, individuals’ productivity is 
directly proportional to their level of human capital, and workers are paid 
proportionally to their marginal productivity. Education, providing marketable 
skills and abilities relevant to job performance, is the main source
5
 of human 
capital (Becker, 1964). 
Rationality and efficiency are the core concepts of HCT. One the one side, 
individuals rationally decide to invest in education in order to increment their 
human capital and, consequently, their future job opportunities and salaries. On 
the other side, employers rationally select applicants on the basis of educational 
credentials and differently reward schooling levels. 
The existence of the phenomenon of overeducation seems to completely 
contrast with a strict interpretation of HCT: if labour markets were efficient, we 
would not observe any form of over- or under-education, except those due to 
short-term disequilibria. It is possible, indeed, to observe a temporary and 
frictional mismatch, due to the firms’ necessity to adjust the production process in 
response to any changes in the supply of skilled labour. The empirical evidence is, 
however, inconsistent with this hypothesis, at both the micro and the macro levels. 
Several studies suggest that overeducation is often a permanent condition in 
workers’ careers (Dolton and Vignoles, 2000; Mavromaras and McGuinness, 
2012). Verhaest and Van der Velden (2013), for example, estimate than on 
average
6
 one tertiary graduate out of four is overeducated in the first job. Five 
years after graduation the incidence of the phenomenon is lower (16%), but the 
persistence in the condition of overeducation is high (43%). Moreover, if 
overeducation were the result of a frictional mismatch between labour demand 
                                                 
5
 Human capital corresponds to any stock of knowledge and skills that contribute to the worker’s 
productivity. This broad definition does not include only years of schooling, but also training and work 
experience. Therefore, HCT recognizes the possibility that workers with the same level of education 
differ in terms of productivity. We will come back on this issue at the end of this paragraph. 
6
 Data from fourteen countries are analysed, namely: Spain, United Kingdom, Italy, Japan, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Czech Republic, Austria, Norway, Finland, France, Switzerland, Germany 
and Portugal (see Tab. 2.1).  
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and supply—due to transitory economic shocks—over time we should observe 
picks in the otherwise low and flat distribution of the phenomenon. Empirical 
results show, on the contrary, that over the last four decades overeducation has 
always been a high-incidence persistent phenomenon in the advanced economies 
(Leuven and Oosterbeek, 2011; McGuinness, 2006). 
An important contribution which in some way recognizes the limits of 
classical HCT, but adopting a similar approach, is the Career Mobility model 
proposed by Sicherman and Galor (1990), which seems consistent with the 
phenomenon of overeducation. In this theoretical frame education is still 
considered as a fundamental provider of relevant skills, but the authors 
hypothesize that workers may decide to temporarily work in jobs which provide 
them with competencies to be used later in higher-level jobs. This way, it might 
be the optimal choice, for some individuals, to spend a limited amount of time in 
jobs for which they are overeducated. This hypothesis is supported by data: 
overeducated workers are found to have a higher probability to move to a higher-
level job than workers with the required level of education (Sicherman, 1991). 
Alternatively, some authors suggest that persistent overeducation may be 
consistent with HCT if the heterogeneity of workers’ skills is taken into account. 
In other words, it is possible to observe a long-lasting mismatch between attained 
and required schooling when individuals’ skills are not adequately represented by 
their levels of education. In particular some studies underline that formal 
education and on-the-job training (or experience) may be substitutes in the 
competencies production function. This means that individuals with more 
schooling may be compensating for a lack of other forms of human capital, such 
as experience or on-the-job training (Alba-Ramírez and Blázquez, 2003). The lack 
of data on individuals’ skills makes it difficult to test the correspondence between 
formal education and workers’ competencies. Recent empirical research has, 
however, identified various methods to capture at least part of the unobserved 
heterogeneity among individuals holding the same level of education. The 
analysis of longitudinal data (Lindley and McIntosh, 2009), the use of indicators 
of personal ability such as the IQ (Hartog and Jonker, 1998), and instrumental 
variable techniques (Dolton and Silles, 2008) go in this direction. For example, 
Cainarca and Sgobbi (2012) have recently analysed data collected among 
employees of Italian private firms and have highlighted that only part of their 
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results can be attributed to differences in individual human capital endowment, 
thus not justifying an explanation of overeducation merely based on the 
heterogeneity of workers’ competences. 
1.1.2 Education as a positional good 
The second approach, which considers education as a positional good, moves 
from a substantial critique to one of the core assumption of HCT, that is, that 
individuals compete in a free and perfect competitive market, in which there is 
perfect information on both the demand and supply sides. This second theoretical 
framework, on the contrary, assumes that employers have to select workers under 
uncertainty, because they do not know potential employees’ level of productivity. 
According to the signaling theory (Spence, 1973), during the selection 
process employers do not possess perfect information on applicants’ productive 
skills and abilities, nor they have any guarantee of obtaining this information in 
the short run. In other words, when employers decide to hire workers they are 
making an investment under uncertainty. Since acquiring information on 
individuals’ skills and abilities is costly, employers will make hiring decisions on 
the basis of inexpensive information, which will allow them to estimate workers’ 
future productivity. Among this information, Spence (1973) distinguishes between 
indexes—that is to say individuals’ innate characteristics, such as sex and race—
and signals. The latter are characteristics which may change over time and which 
can be manipulated by individuals: among these characteristics, the individual 
level of education plays a crucial role. Modifying this signal is costly, and 
individuals decide whether to make this kind of investment or not on the basis of 
the expected returns. 
Educational choices are assumed to be directly correlated to individual 
ability: abler individuals will be more prone to invest in education, since the costs 
will be repaid by higher returns. Consequently employers will tend to hire more 
educated individuals, assuming that the educational system is able to screen 
individuals on the basis of their pre-existing ability (Stiglitz, 1975)
7
. In other 
words, this approach shares with the previous one the hypotheses that individual 
                                                 
7
 Signaling and screening theories ultimately differ in that the former refers to the supply side, that 
is, to the behaviour of employees, while the latter refers to the demand side, that is, to the behaviour of 
employers (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1990). 
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investment in education is driven by the rational comparison between costs and 
benefits and that employers aim at maximizing future productivity. But while 
HCT claims that education actually enhances individuals’ productivity, this 
approach states that schooling does not need to provide workers with a set of 
skills directly usable on the labour market, but that it primarily signals their 
unobservable motivation and ability to employers
8
. Job-relevant competences will 
be indeed learned through on-the job training, and employers select applicants on 
the basis of their educational qualifications in order to save on training costs. 
Thence, individuals may decide to make a bigger investment in education, in 
order to enforce this signal; this would lead to an increase in the educational level 
of the labour force, above and beyond jobs’ requirements (Tsang and Levin, 
1985).  
Similar to the signaling and screening theories, the job competition model 
formulated by Thurow (1975) also underlines the positional function of education. 
It suggests that individuals compete in the labour market in order to win the 
existing job opportunities. According to this approach, individuals invest in 
education to increment their competitiveness in the labour market, that is to say, 
to advance on the job queue. Even if school does not provide students with job-
specific skills, it enhances individuals’ trainability: thus, the more individuals are 
educated, the lower training costs they signal, and the more they are likely to be 
selected by employers. Also in this case, thus, the competition for available jobs 
creates an incentive for job seekers to acquire more and more education in order 
to stay ahead of the labour queue. Indeed, since education functions as a 
positional good, it is not its absolute value that matters, but the level of 
educational attainment relative to that of other job seekers. 
Overeducation is entirely consistent with the approach of education as a 
positional good. Both the signaling theory and the job competition model assume 
the existence of pressures that would induce individuals to acquire more 
education, possibly leading to processes of credential inflation. When the number 
of educated individuals in the economy increases, indeed, acquiring more 
education becomes increasingly necessary to protect one’s own place in the job 
                                                 
8
 According to Psacharopoulos (1979) it is possible to distinguish a weak and a strong versions of 
the screening hypothesis. In the strong version, education is merely a signal, since it does not provide 
students with productive skills. In the weak version, on the contrary, schooling not only provides a 
signal but also augments productivity. 
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queue. Thus, the individual decision to overinvest in education may be rational, 
since it increases the probability of obtaining vacancies. What is more, according 
to this theoretical framework, overeducation is likely to be a persistent 
phenomenon in the labour market, since highly educated individuals are always 
preferred to workers with lower levels of education, regardless of the level of 
schooling required by the job. 
1.1.3 Education as a means for social closure 
The last approach – which considers education as a means for social closure – 
suggests that differentials in occupational outcomes for differently educated 
individuals depend on restrictions of the supply side in specific areas and on a 
regulation of the demand of the corresponding occupations. This approach 
significantly differs from the previously outlined theoretical frameworks: while 
the former approaches interpret labour market returns to education as a 
consequence of workers’ actual or potential level of productivity, the present one 
suggests that they merely are the effect of a process of social exclusion. 
Moreover, while the theories discussed above set the mechanisms linking 
education to labour market opportunities at the individual level, social closure 
theory, on the contrary, suggests that the process of social stratification happens at 
the level of the social group. 
Some important contributions to the social closure approach come from neo-
Weberian theorists, such as Parkin (1979) and Collins (1979), who analyse the 
conditions under which educational credentials and qualifications serve as 
instruments of exclusion and social stratification, thus strictly regulating the 
access to specific occupational positions. This idea primarily refers to Weber’s 
analysis of class conflict: social closure occurs when, among groups competing 
for possession and control of profitable opportunities, some are able to 
monopolize the advantages deriving from these opportunities. The main way in 
which these groups implement social closure is by limiting the access to outsiders 
by binding it to visible characteristics, such as educational credentials. Social 
groups formed around certain labour market positions build and defend legal, 
formal, or social boundaries that ensure the maintenance of high standards of 
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members’ remuneration, at the expense of social groups excluded from these 
positions (Weber, 1920). 
The Weberian closure theory has lot in common with the Marxist accounts of 
exploitation, which can be defined as the process by which one class obtains an 
economic advantage at the expense of another class. The main source of 
inequality does not reside in the skills and efforts of the incumbents of social 
classes, but rather in the relation between classes. Exploitation refers to inequality 
generated by the ownership of rent-producing assets, which guarantee an 
advantage to the owner at the expense of non-owners. The labour market is one of 
the main arenas of reproduction of inequality: employment rents are created when 
the access to occupational position is closed to outsiders by the collective action 
of unions, by the requirement of legal certification of professions or by other 
forms of professional licenses. Thus, educational credentials may create rents for 
individuals possessing them when they are used as rationing devices for specific 
jobs (Grusky and Sørensen, 1998; Sørensen, 2000). 
This approach has been largely ignored by the economic literature, whilst it 
has received lot of attention by sociologists interested in the analysis of returns to 
education (van de Werfhorst, 2011). According to this perspective, educational 
qualifications serve as formal entry requirements that regulate the access to 
occupations. In other words, what matters to employers is the match between 
specific qualifications and specific occupations, rather than individuals’ skills. As 
will be discussed in the following, this approach is particularly useful when the 
focus is on horizontal differentiation of occupational opportunities, the basic idea 
being that different fields of study prepare students for more or less regulated 
professions.  
1.2 Why do certain types of education pay off more than others? 
The outlined theoretical frameworks have been mainly applied to the analysis 
of the returns to different levels of education. As previously underlined, however, 
scholars’ attention has recently shifted on returns to different types of education. 
Also the literature on overeducation has followed this strand of research, by 
analysing the differential diffusion of the phenomenon among tertiary graduates 
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from different fields of study. Results generally show that graduates from 
technical and job-oriented fields are less at risk of overeducation than graduates 
from generalist fields, such as the Humanities and Social Sciences (Barone and 
Ortiz, 2011; Verhaest and Van der Velden, 2013). This finding can be interpreted 
recurring to the aforementioned approaches, which provide different account for 
the differential incidence of overeducation among individuals with the same level, 
but different types, of education. In each case, however, we need to assume that if 
a limited number of graduate-jobs is available and that graduates who do not 
succeed in obtaining these vacancies will prefer to accept non-graduate jobs rather 
than remaining unemployed. It has to be acknowledged, indeed, that, the 
phenomenon of overeducation is associated to qualitative or quantitative 
disequilibria between supply and demand of highly qualified labour, while the 
different theoretical frameworks predict different mechanisms acting in cases of 
supply-demand disequilibria. 
Applying a human capital approach to the analysis of returns to different 
types of (tertiary) education requires assuming that different educational tracks 
provide individuals with different kinds and levels of skills. In particular, some 
studies have underlined how skills provided by different disciplinary areas may 
differ in terms of specificity. Van de Werfhorst and Kraaykamp (2001) suggest in 
this regard that different fields of study provide students with different levels of 
four types of resources: cultural, economic, communicative, and technical. 
According to the authors, when individuals choose the disciplinary area of their 
studies, they differentially invest in these resources, which are more or less 
marketable and thus have different impacts on labour market outcomes. Also 
Reimer and colleagues (2008) suggest that graduates from different fields of study 
possess skills at diverse levels of specificity; in particular, graduates from 
technical and scientific fields possess more productive and occupation-specific 
skills than graduates from the Humanities. Assuming that the main employers’ 
aim is to maximize profit, the lower training costs required by more specialized 
individuals will be a good incentive to hiring applicants with more specific 
knowledge (Ortiz and Kucel, 2008). According to this approach, we may thus 
expect graduates from scientific and technical fields to be more protected from the 
risk of overeducation than graduates from generalist fields of study because of the 
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different level of specificity—and consequent marketability—of the skills they 
have acquired through tertiary education. 
Horizontal differences in returns to education can be also interpreted in the 
light of the second theoretical framework, assuming that graduating from some 
fields of study depends more from pre-existing ability than others. Consequently, 
the corresponding qualifications are better evaluated, and thus rewarded. In other 
words, according to this approach, fields of study are more or less selective 
according to their level of difficulty: more motivated and abler individuals will 
prefer more challenging disciplinary areas, while the less talented students will 
choose the less demanding ones. As employers try to assess the distribution of 
individuals’ ability among fields of study, and to estimate their future training 
costs, they are expected to better remunerate the harder ones, that is to say, those 
in which a successful completion depends more on pre-existing individuals’ 
ability; thus, these fields of study will send more powerful signals to the labour 
market (Reimer et al., 2008). Also from this approach descends the hypothesis 
that graduates from technical and scientific disciplines will perform better on the 
labour market, while the risk of overeducation will be higher among students from 
the so-called soft fields of study. This prediction, though, descends from a 
different mechanism: while in the perspective of education as an indicator of 
productive skills, the former are in a better position because of the occupation-
related nature of their studies, in this second perspective their advantage derives 
from the fact that the fields they graduated from are expected to be more selective, 
thus signaling higher levels of ability and motivation and lower on-the-job 
training costs. 
Finally, according to the social closure approach, graduates from some fields 
of study—such as medicine, architecture and law, for instance—might perform 
better in the labour market because the corresponding groups of interest are more 
able than others to keep the supply of graduates low. For example, social closure 
may take the form of the imposition of stringent entry requirements or of higher 
tuition costs. As in the classical economic theory, this restriction on the number of 
graduates in specific fields origins a price increase—that is to say wages—and, 
consequently, it enhances the competition for those study places. Those who are 
most favoured in this competition are those with the greatest resources, tangible or 
intangible, that is to say those who have greater financial resources or better 
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personal skills. Such a selection could, therefore, produce an increase in the 
average level of skills of students from fields of study affected by this process, 
thus increasing the market value of the acquired qualification. 
It is worth noting, at this point, that while there is a substantial overlap 
between the predictions descending from HCT and signaling frameworks, the 
same might not be true for the social closure approach. In the former case, in fact, 
fields of study are more or less exposed to the risk of overeducation according to 
the job-oriented nature of the fields of study they graduated from. In the latter, 
instead, graduates’ occupational outcomes are functions of the bargaining power 
of the corresponding social groups. 
1.3 How does the institutional setting affect graduates’ overeducation? 
While a great part of research has directed its efforts to test which of the 
aforementioned approaches best fits the empirical evidence, recent studies have 
suggested that returns to education are unlikely to be explained entirely by just 
one of these three models. Also for what concerns overeducation, it is surely 
useful to distinguish the various mechanisms which can influence the matching 
between workers and jobs; it is, however, quite unlikely that this process exactly 
follows one of those theoretical models. Instead of trying to assess the theoretical 
superiority of one interpretation over the others, thus, the priority should be to 
understand under which conditions each mechanism tends to prevail over the 
others: indeed, not only the strength of the association, but also the mechanism 
relating education to labour market outcomes are likely to vary significantly 
across contexts (Bol, 2013; Van de Werfhorst, 2011). In particular, the literature 
on school-to-work transition suggests that the allocation of job seekers into the 
labour market is significantly affected by characteristics pertaining both to the 
supply and the demand sides of the labour force—such as the structure of the 
educational system, the institutional mechanisms that regulate the match between 
demand and supply, and labour markets’ characteristics. These institutional 
characteristics are indeed likely to affect the individuals’ process of decision 
making, by altering the set of options they have. 
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1.3.1 The role of the educational system 
On the supply side, especially three dimensions of educational systems have 
been widely analysed in the literature.  These are standardization, stratification 
and vocational specificity. The first dimension indicates how much schooling 
systems comply with national standards; the second refers to the extent to which 
educational systems differentiate school tracks in a more or less early and rigid 
way; the third regards the degree of occupational orientation of educational 
curricula (Allmendinger, 1989; Kerckhoff, 2001; Shavit and Müller, 1998). 
Research suggests that the more stratified, vocationally specific, and standardized 
is the educational systems, the stronger will be the education payoff 
(Allmendinger, 1989; Bol and Van de Werfhorst, 2011; Shavit and Müller, 1998): 
while high levels of stratification and vocational specificity allow employers to 
select workers with specific vocational qualifications, high levels of 
standardization make the signals provided by education more reliable. Cross-
country differences in the structure of educational systems are also found to be 
significantly correlated with differences in the incidence of overeducation. 
Particular emphasis has been put on vocational specificity, which is hypothesized 
to ease the match between workers and jobs, especially at the very beginning of 
the work career (Di Stasio et al., 2015). According to Bol (2013), these larger 
returns to education in vocational systems are more likely to be explained by the 
role of educational degrees rather than by the level of accumulated human capital: 
educational credentials are indeed likely to be more effective as occupational 
closure strategy in countries characterized by a more vocational and highly 
tracked educational system. 
Additionally, several authors underline the connection between educational 
systems and labour markets, which are particularly likely to affect the pattern of 
school-to-work transition. One influential discussion on the institutional setting 
shaping school-to-work transition is that proposed by Maurice and colleagues 
(1986) who discriminate between «qualificational» and «organizational» spaces. 
These two ideal types are well represented, according to the author, by Germany 
and France, respectively. The qualificational space is characterized by high 
educational differentiation and vocational tracking; the vocationally oriented 
educational system provides students with occupation-specific skills that are, later 
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on, evaluated by employers when making hiring decisions. The organizational 
space, on the contrary, is less standardized, less stratified, and less vocationally-
oriented; skills are learnt on-the-job and education acts primarily as a screening 
device. Similar to this dichotomy is the one that contrasts systems of internal 
labour markets (ILMs) with systems of occupational labour markets (OLMs) 
(Marsden, 1986: Eyraud et al., 1990). Also in this case, the main difference lies in 
the presence of a system of education and training which provides occupationally 
specific skills: in OLMs, jobs are mainly defined by their contents, and since 
vocational programs already provide the essential training, skills are easily 
transferable between jobs within the same occupation. In ILMs, on the contrary, 
firms—and not jobs—are the central units of the labour market and, since 
education mainly provides students with general skills, most of the training takes 
place on-the-job within the firm. The effect of education on labour market 
outcomes is thus likely to be weaker in ILMs than OLMs, since, as suggested by 
Gangl (2003, p. 110), «to the extent that educational credentials do little to reflect 
job applicants’ potential capabilities for a particular job, employers will be more 
likely to assess individual skills from past work records. In turn, if training 
systems provide qualifications that are meaningful indicators of skills at 
particular jobs, employers should be more likely to use this inexpensive signal of 
individual capabilities».  
The dimensions described so far provide sound explanations for cross-
country variability in returns to education: in countries with a high level of 
tracking and vocational specificity the risk of unemployment is lower (Müller and 
Gangl, 2003; Breen, 2005), the length of school-to-work transition is shorter (Van 
der Velden and Wolbers 2003; Wolbers, 2007), the link between education and 
occupational status is stronger (Andersen and Van de Werfhorst, 2010), job 
stability increases (Allmendinger, 1989) and the risk of overeducation decreases 
(Levels et al., 2014). Moreover, qualificational spaces show a tighter link between 
educational attainment and occupational status than organizational spaces (Shavit 
and Müller, 1998). However, these institutional features are primarily associated 
with pre-tertiary education. When research focuses on tertiary graduates 
additional factors deserve consideration. Van de Werfhorst (2004), in this respect, 
suggests that it is worth taking into account also the level of stratification of the 
systems of Higher Education. In particular, some countries have a highly 
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vocationally oriented tertiary education system in the vocational colleges (e.g. the 
Fachhochsculen in Germany and the Hoger Beroepsonderwijs in the 
Netherlands), which are specifically designed to develop job-oriented skills in 
specific subjects. Additionally, Müller and Wolbers (2003) distinguish between 
tertiary education systems characterized by «parallel» segmentation and 
«sequential» systems, where tertiary education is made up of two or three cycles 
and where the access to the next-higher cycle is dependent on the successful 
completion of the preceding one. Different structures of tertiary education systems 
are stated to influence returns to tertiary education, since they are likely to affect 
the transparency of the signals provided by educational qualifications in higher 
education. These factors are also found to have a relevant effect on overeducation: 
among the most recent studies, Allen and de Weert (2007) show a better 
education-job match in countries where tertiary education is strongly geared to the 
labour market, such as Germany and the Netherlands. Similarly, Verhaest and 
Van der Velden (2013) analyse the determinants of graduates’ overeducation in 
13 European countries plus Japan, and find that the risk of mismatch is lower in 
countries with a vocational tertiary education system. 
As will be discussed in the next paragraph, in this general framework it 
acquires particular relevance the investigation of the effect of the recent Bologna 
Process on tertiary graduates’ occupational outcomes. With the aim of making 
European Higher Education institutions attractive and competitive worldwide, 
indeed, the Bologna Process has contributed to the development of a European 
system of comparable academic titles and to the promotion of mobility by 
European students and scholars. Despite the complexity of the Bologna Process, a 
lot of attention has been devoted to the changes it has entailed in the degree 
structure of many European countries. Indeed, while for some countries, such as 
the UK, the reform merely implied a soft rescheduling of the existing HE 
structure, in others it involved a major restructuring. In Italy and Portugal, for 
example, the implementation of the reform required to move from the former 
unitary structure of HE towards a two-tier system, consisting of a three/four-year 
Bachelor’s degree (BA, hereafter) plus a one/two-year Master’s degree (MA). 
Even though this structure—which is typical of countries as the UK, the US, 
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Canada and Australia—is known to guarantee a high level performance9 (Jacobs 
and van der Ploeg, 2006), its implementation has led to some controversy. On the 
one hand, such a system is arguably more transparent, reduces the time to labour 
market entrance, and thus enhances graduates’ employability. On the other hand, 
concern has been raised about both the academic contents of the new curricula 
and the adequacy of the skills acquired in a shorter period for the labour market, 
which might undermine the match between individuals’ education and jobs. 
1.3.2 The role of labour market institutions 
Less studied in the overeducation literature is, instead, the correlation 
between the phenomenon and labour market institutions, notwithstanding the huge 
body of literature arguing that returns to education are widely influenced by these 
factors, since they alter the transaction costs employers have to bear, thus shaping 
their hiring decisions. 
The only relevant exception is the level of labour market regulation, usually 
measured by the level of employment protection legislation (EPL). Wide variation 
is registered across European countries in the regulation of hiring procedures, in 
the terms and conditions of work, and in the restrictions to individuals and 
collective dismissal: through the regulation of labour contracts and the protection 
of employment relationships, the level of labour market regulation is likely to 
affect the size of labour demand, in particular of young workers (Breen, 2005; 
Scherer, 2005; Wolbers, 2007). Mixed results exist, however, on the effect of 
labour market regulation on labour market opportunities for new entrants.  On the 
one side, it can be argued that, in countries with a stricter labour market 
regulation, lower workers’ mobility is accompanied by stronger difficulties for 
school-leavers in entering the labour market (Nickell, 1997). Several studies find 
that in countries with a high level of employment protection, the placement of 
students in the labour market takes longer (Müller and Gangl, 2003; Müller, 2005; 
Wolbers, 2007), and the risk of falling into unemployment after formal education 
is higher (Ryan, 2001; Breen, 2005). In fact, by reducing the number of available 
                                                 
9
 In the list of top 50 universities of the Times Higher Education World University Ranking 2015, 
which judges universities on the basis of teaching, research, knowledge transfer and international 
outlook, 41 institutions have an Anglo-Saxon system of HE. 
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job vacancies, job security provisions reduce employment opportunities for the 
unemployed. Unemployment is thence likely to heap on specific demographic 
groups, like school leavers entering the labour market for the first time. It has 
been also argued, however, that EPL has the effect of extending the duration of 
first job spells (Wolbers, 2007). This, in turn, might have the effect of boosting 
human capital accumulation, which is likely to improve youngsters’ labour market 
opportunities (Noelke, 2011). The evidence is mixed also for what concerns the 
specific risk of overeducation. On the one side, a high level of employment 
protection might reduce firms’ ability to adapt to technological change and this 
would induce overeducation through two different mechanisms. First,  “firing 
restrictions may discourage firms to immediately upgrade the level of the 
workforce in response to rapid changes in technologies” (Di Pietro, 2002, p. 893). 
Second, “as a consequence of their inability to fully take advantage of upward 
changes in skilled workforce availability caused by strict employment protection 
legislation, firms are unlikely to adopt new technologies” (ibidem). On the other 
side, recent empirical evidence suggests a high level of employment protection 
not to be associated with a higher incidence of overeducation (Verhaest and van 
der Velden, 2013), a possible explanation for this being that, since a high level of 
EPL leads employers to rely more on internal promotions for new vacancies, this 
factor is also likely to ease the transition from overeducation into a good match. 
Other factors, almost ignored in the literature, are likely to influence school-
to-work transition via their impact on the structure of labour demand. Among 
these, the regulation of access to liberal professions is particularly likely to shape 
the labour market entrance of tertiary graduates. Italy presents—together with 
Eastern and Southern European countries—a stringent regulation of professional 
services; less restrictive is, instead, the regulation in Northern countries, such as 
Sweden and Denmark (Paterson et al., 2003). Typically, such a regulation takes 
the form of restrictions to both the access to the professions and to the free 
competition among incumbents of these occupations. These two kinds of 
restrictions may have opposite effects on graduates’ labour market prospects 
(Barone and Schindler, 2014). The former (e.g. numerus clausus for access to 
tertiary education or high tuition fees) reduces the number of students from the 
matching fields, thus lowering the risk of oversupply of graduates and improving 
their labour market prospects. On the contrary, the latter (e.g. long periods of 
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postgraduate training, selective entry examinations to the professions) constrains 
the access to these professions also for graduates from the matching fields, thus 
possibly lowering the connected occupational rewards. These forms of regulation 
have been addressed by recent studies that have particularly analysed their impact 
on economic growth (Paterson et al., 2003; Barone and Cingano, 2010). It has 
remained almost unexplored, on the contrary, their role in shaping the entrance of 
new workers in the labour market: to the best of our knowledge, the sole relevant 
result concerns the role of this regulation on the intergenerational transmission of 
prestigious occupational positions in the liberal professions (Basso and Labartino, 
2011).  
Another factor that is likely to affect the structure of labour demand is the 
role of welfare state as employer. Also in this case, a wide differentiation is 
registered across European countries. Particularly Scandinavian countries have 
expanded public employment since the 1960s. While this expansion has been 
primarily guided by egalitarian concerns—distinctive feature of social democratic 
regime—, it has surely functioned also as a means for promoting employment 
(Esping-Andersen 1990). This factor has received little attention in the 
overeducation literature. However, Barone and Ortiz (2011) suggest that countries 
like Norway, Finland and the Netherlands display lower incidence of graduates’ 
overeducation, despite the prominent expansion of higher education. According to 
the authors, a factor that might contribute to the explanation of this empirical 
evidence is the success of these countries in creating a large share of skilled 
employment in the public sector (i.e. managerial professions and professional 
employment). 
1.4 Research questions and overview of the next chapters 
In this chapter a review of the theoretical literature providing explanations for 
returns to education has been outlined. Different theoretical frameworks have 
been presented, which differ for the mechanisms they assume relating education 
to labour market outcomes, and the role of the institutional context—both on the 
supply and demand side—has been addressed. Finally, the contribution of these 
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approaches to the interpretation of the occurrence of overeducation has been 
discussed.  
What in the literature has received less attention is the way in which 
horizontal differentials in graduates’ overeducation can be explained. Though for 
different reasons, all the theoretical approaches previously presented arrive at the 
conclusion that graduates from vocational and job-oriented fields of study are 
more protected from overeducation than graduates from generalist fields, and this 
conclusion is supported by lots of studies (Barone and Ortiz, 2011; Ortiz and 
Kucel, 2008; Verhaest and Van der Velden, 2013). However, it has remained 
almost unexplored the role of institutions in shaping field of study differentials. 
The main aim of this dissertation is to fill this gap: the micro and the macro levels 
are linked, both from theoretical and empirical points of view, and the way in 
which the institutional context shapes the distribution of overeducation risk 
among graduates from different fields of study is analysed. What we are going to 
hypothesize is that the institutional context is likely not only to reduce or augment 
the gap between graduates from different fields, but also to affect the mechanism 
by which graduates from some fields of study are more protected from the risk of 
overeducation than others. 
In Chapter 4, comparative data on European tertiary graduates will be 
analysed by means of multilevel modelling to assess the role played by labour 
market institutions in determining differentials in the overeducation risk for 
graduates from different fields of study. The three labour market institutions 
discussed above will be taken into account, namely the level of employment 
protection, the regulation of the access to liberal professions and the level of 
public employment. Specific hypotheses on the role of these factors will be 
presented in that chapter.  
In Chapter 5, the analysis will instead focus on the role of the recent 
restructuring of European tertiary education system established with the Bologna 
Process. Italy is selected as a case study for both methodological and substantive 
reasons. On the one side, the peculiar rules settled by the Bologna reform in 
Italy—which, as will be described, exclude some courses from the 
implementation of the new “3+2” structure—and the existence of nationally 
representative repeated cross-section data allow us to convincingly adopt a 
counterfactual approach in order to estimate the causal impact of the reform on 
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graduates’ risk of overeducation, both overall and across fields of study. On the 
other side, Italy represents an interesting case of study since, notwithstanding its 
below-average participation to Higher Education, it is one of the European 
country with the highest incidence of overeducation.  
These two chapters are preceded by an in-depth discussion of the definition of 
overeducation and the measurement of the phenomenon (Chapter 2). The claim 
that it is advisable to distinguish between different features of the phenomenon, 
namely educational and skill mismatches, is presented and supported by data 
analysed in Chapter 3. On the basis of these findings, this distinction is adopted in 
Chapters 4 and 5. 
37 
 
2 On overeducation’s definition(s) and measurement(s) 
So far, theoretical interpretations for the occurrence, persistence and 
differential incidence of overeducation have been provided. It remains to be 
explored a crucial issue, that is the one concerning the definition and 
measurement of overeducation. In the research process, one should first provide a 
clear definition of the phenomenon to be analysed, and then indicate how this 
concept can be measured. As will be suggested, however, the concept of 
overeducation is so ambiguous and open to various interpretations that it is 
difficult to find a well-suited indicator of the phenomenon. Moreover, data 
constraints often force scholars to choose one measurement criterion over the ones 
proposed in the literature, with limited awareness of the distance between the 
ideal concept of overeducation and the actual operationalization of the 
phenomenon. 
For these reasons, it seems worth to intertwine conceptual and practical 
issues, in order to account for the actual pace of research. Thus, after a brief 
definition of overeducation, we will go through the more utilized measurement 
criteria and indicators. After having underlined the criticisms of each 
operationalization, we will discuss how the different indicators actually describe 
just a part of the phenomenon. This way, we will basically try to define the 
concept by assessing what the various indicators do or do not point out. 
2.1 What is overeducation? How can we measure it? 
Despite the growing interest in overeducation, a univocally acknowledged 
measure of this phenomenon does not exist. Generally speaking, this term 
indicates a mismatch between individual education and job requirements. As 
pointed out by Verhaest and Omey (2006a) the lack of a uniform measurement 
criterion derives from a conceptual confusion around the meaning of this 
mismatch. On the one side, overeducation can be conceptualized as an 
overinvestment in education: it refers to a situation in which the returns to 
education are lower than workers’ investment in education. On the other side, this 
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term can refer to the underutilization of educational skills, that is to say, a 
situation in which workers have acquired through education more skills than they 
can employ in their job. While underutilization of skills often entails lower returns 
to education, it is not necessary the contrary: indeed, lower wages may simply be 
the consequence of an oversupply of educated workers. Thus, it seems 
conceptually more adequate to define overeducation as an underutilization of 
educational skills. 
Formally, we can say that an individual i is overeducated (OEi) if his or her 
educational skills (ei) exceed those required by his or her job (ri): 
 
𝑂𝐸𝑖 ≡ {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑒𝑖 > 𝑟𝑖
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑒𝑖 ≤ 𝑟𝑖
 
 
This kind of definition clearly raises problems about how to measure acquired 
and required educational skills. The greatest part of the literature has overcome 
the first issue by simply using educational levels as proxies for educational skills: 
be it expressed in terms of years of schooling or in terms of educational 
qualifications, this information is, in fact, usually collected in the main surveys 
and is available to the researcher. Several commentators have, however, argued 
that qualifications are only a poor proxy for skills, since they do not take into 
account the eventual heterogeneity of individuals’ skills within each educational 
level. In order to take into account the imperfect correspondence between 
education and skills, several suggestions have been advanced. In one of the former 
discussion around this topic, Chevalier (2003) introduced a distinction between 
genuine and apparent overeducation
10
, the basic idea being that graduate workers 
holding a non-graduate job might be only apparently overeducated, if they are 
                                                 
10
 In order to distinguish between apparent and genuine overeducation, Chevalier combines two 
indicators. First, JA is used to define graduate jobs. Then, for graduates in non-graduate jobs, a question 
about their level of (dis)satisfaction with the match between their work and their qualifications is used 
to disentangle the genuineness of their status of overeducated workers. This way, overeducated workers 
who are satisfied with the match between their education and their work are defined as apparently 
overeducated, whereas those who are dissatisfied are considered as genuinely overeducated. A similar 
strategy is adopted by Verhaest and Omey (2006a) who substitute SAp for JA indicator, and refer to the 
following question: «Do you have a level of education which is, according to your own opinion, too 
high, too low, or appropriate for your job?». This distinction is pretty sound and persuasive; however it 
is clear that, in order to be operationalized, it implies some assumptions on the validity of indicators. In 
fact, in spite of how the genuineness of overeducation is measured, the distinction between the two 
groups of overeducated workers is based on the assumption that the employed indicator really captures 
the concept of overeducation. 
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provided with a low endowment of skills. When scholars assume homogeneity of 
workers, indeed, they inevitably end up overestimating the true incidence of 
overeducation, especially as the expansion of higher education has increased the 
heterogeneity of the skills of new graduates entering the labour market. Another 
well-grounded distinction between overeducation-related concepts is the one 
between educational and skill mismatch (Allen and van der Velden, 2001). The 
first term refers to the formal mismatch between educational credentials and job 
requirements, while the second concerns the actual mismatch between the 
knowledge acquired through formal education and the skills necessary to perform 
a job. This distinction is close to the one between overqualification and 
overskilling (Green and McIntosh, 2007; Quintini, 2011): in the first case, we are 
dealing with the formal correspondence between the individual level of education 
and the qualification required to get a job, while in the second case reference is 
made to the effective use of skills and abilities in the workplace. These two 
similar dichotomies present relevant theoretical implications. On the one side 
(educational mismatch or overqualification), we are mainly dealing with the 
signaling value of the educational credentials; on the other side (skill mismatch or 
overskilling), what is under discussion is the possibility, for workers, to fully 
employ on the job the human capital they have gained through education. It is 
worth noting that, even though the two phenomena have been shown to be 
somehow correlated, educational mismatch does not necessarily indicate a lack of 
demand for individuals’ skills per se. In fact, increasing demand for advanced 
competencies may be the result of technological and organisational changes that 
require more advanced skills for performing a job. 
Several strategies have been, instead, adopted to measure the second element 
of the equation, namely job requirements (ri). As described in the following 
paragraphs, a review of the existing literature suggests three feasible ways to 
measure these requirements and, consequently, overeducation (Chevalier, 2003). 
2.1.1 Subjective indicators 
The first way to measure overeducation consists in using a subjective 
indicator, based on workers’ self-assessment (SA, hereafter) of (minimal) job 
requirements (ri), which are then compared with individuals’ skills and/or 
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qualifications (ei). Formally, this definition can be exactly expressed by the 
formula reported above. 
Since the exact phrasing of questions varies substantially across studies, 
various SA of overeducation have been used in the literature. In particular, it is 
worth distinguishing between indicators that refer to the level of education 
required to get the job (SAg hereafter), on the one side, and those that refer to the 
educational level required to perform the job (SAp), on the other side. The former 
originate from questions such as «What was the minimum formal qualification 
required for entering this job?» (Dolton and Vignoles, 2000), or «If they were 
applying today, what qualifications, if any, would someone need to get the type of 
job you have now?» (Green and Zhu, 2010). The latter derives from questions 
such as «With respect to your current job, do you feel that having a university 
degree is excessive, adequate or insufficient?» (Di Pietro and Urwin, 2006). Some 
studies try to capture more directly the conceptualization of overeducation as 
underutilization of skills by employing indicators based on workers’ self-
assessment of their making use on the job of the skills acquired through education 
(SAsk). In the simplest case, this kind of indicator is based on questions such as 
«To what extent do you use the knowledge and skills acquired at university in 
your current job?» (Di Pietro and Urwin, 2006). Alternatively, individuals are 
required to express their (dis)agreement with statements as «My current job offers 
me sufficient scope to use my knowledge and skills» or «I would perform better in 
my current job if I possessed additional knowledge and skills» (Allen and van der 
Velden, 2001). Sometimes scholars have used detailed information on a set of 
skills acquired at school and on their usage on the job (Barone and Ortiz, 2011). 
Allen and de Weert (2007), for example, have constructed a SAsk indicator on the 
basis of individuals’ answers to the following question, which referred to a set of 
18 skills: «Please, state the extent to which you had the following competencies at 
the time of graduation and to what extent they are required in your current job». 
As it will be discussed in the following (see also Tab. 2.1), these three kinds of 
SA indicator are not interchangeable, since they are likely to produce very 
different results. 
Finally, the most recent literature—devoted to the analysis of the incidence, 
the determinants and the returns to overeducation in the tertiary graduates’ labour 
market—has often recurred to SA measures that aim at grasping the horizontal 
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match (SAhm) between the discipline individuals have graduated from and the job 
they hold. These indicators derive from questions asking graduates which field of 
education is most appropriate for their job, the possible answers generally being 
«Only my own field of education», «My own or a related field», «A completely 
different field of education», «For this job no specific field is required/exists» 
(Allen and van der Velden, 2001). In this case the reference to the specific 
disciplinary skills acquired at university is made clearer; it still remains, however, 
the possibility—discussed later on—that respondents confuse the formal and the 
substantive job requirements. 
2.1.2 Objective indicators 
An alternative way to measure overeducation is to use an objective indicator, 
based on information provided by job analysts (JA, hereafter) and collected in 
occupational classifications. This objective approach is based on a systematic 
study conducted by external job experts: each job is analysed in terms of work 
performed and worker characteristics, and a classification of jobs according to the 
required level and type of education is included (Miller et al., 1980). These 
classifications can then be converted into requested years of schooling (or 
schooling dummies) which can be compared with individuals’ acquired education 
(Rumberger, 1987). 
In order to understand how this classification can be used to measure 
overeducation, we can consider as examples the two best-known job 
classifications, which are the Standard Occupation Classification System, 
developed in the UK (Alpin et al., 1998), and the Dictionary of Occupational 
Titles from the US (McGoldrick and Robst, 1996). In the British case, jobs are 
classified according to the concepts of «skill level» and «skill specialisation», that 
refer, respectively, to the length of training and to the field of knowledge required 
to competently and efficiently perform job-related activities. Similarly, in the US 
dictionary, a level of «general educational development» and a degree of «specific 
vocational preparation» are attributed to each job: the former refers to the 
necessary education of a general nature, while the latter makes reference to the 
occupation-specific training needed for average performance in the job. In both 
cases, typical entry routes and associated qualifications are identified for each 
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occupation, on the basis of the information collected in the classification. This 
datum can be compared with individuals’ level of education, and workers can be 
defined as overeducated if they have attained more schooling than what it is 
required. 
Formally: 
 
𝑂𝐸𝑖 ≡ {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑒𝑖 >  𝑟𝑗
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑒𝑖 ≤  𝑟𝑗
 
 
where rj indicates, for each job, the level of education required to adequately 
perform job-related activities, as identified by the job classification. 
2.1.3 Statistical indicators 
The third way of measuring overeducation consists in recurring to an 
empirical indicator that is constructed using information on realized matches 
(RM) within occupational categories. 
In this case, required education is inferred from the distribution of schooling 
years within a given occupation, which is then compared with individual 
education. The criterion most often adopted to define overeducation is to consider 
an individual as overeducated if his or her amount of attained schooling years is 
one standard deviation (σ) or more above the mean (RMmn) of all individuals in 
that occupation (Verdugo and Verdugo, 1989). Formally: 
 
𝑂𝐸𝑖 ≡ {
1 𝑖𝑓 (𝑒𝑖 − ?̅?𝑗) > 𝜎
0 𝑖𝑓 (𝑒𝑖 − ?̅?𝑗) ≤ 𝜎
 
 
where ?̅?𝑗 indicates the average years of education in each job category. 
Naturally, the mean cannot be used when individual education is defined by a 
categorical variable, such as schooling level
11
. This is usually the case when the 
focus of the analysis is the incidence of overeducation among tertiary graduates. 
In this case researchers have used the mode (RMmd) (Kiker et al., 1997; Alpin et 
                                                 
11
 A feasible way to employ the mean as a reference point also when the only available 
information is the individual education level is to transform this level into the minimal years of 
schooling that are needed to reach this level (e.g. Verhaest and Omey, 2006a). 
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al., 1998; Mendes de Oliveira et al., 2000), instead of the mean, or other 
conventional points of the distribution, such as the median or the 80
th
 percentile 
(RMpct) (Ortiz and Kucel, 2008; Barone and Ortiz, 2011). 
2.2 Critiques to the indicators of overeducation 
The pros and cons of the three presented measurement criteria are well 
established in the literature (McGuinness, 2006; Leuven and Oosterbeek, 2011). 
Nevertheless, they are often considered as a matter of fact because data 
constraints do not allow avoiding criticisms deriving from their use. However, a 
critical discussion of the arguments in favour or against the use of these measures 
is essential in order to have a clearer insight in their degree of validity and 
reliability. 
The main criticism of SA lies exactly in its subjective nature. Even though 
respondents possess all relevant information to indicate job requirements, they 
lack a uniform criterion to assess them (Verhaest and Omey, 2006b), which may 
affect the reliability of this kind of measure (van der Velden and van 
Smoorenburg, 1997). Not only the formulation of questions may partially differ 
over studies (Green et al., 1999), but individuals may also consider different 
factors when answering them, such as the formal requirement to obtain the job, 
the level of education necessary to actually perform it, or the typical educational 
level of similar workers (Dolton and Vignoles, 2000). SA indicators also have to 
deal with the possible reticence of individuals (Hartog, 2000), and with the fact 
that workers employed in different contexts may be more or less able to assess the 
matching between their educational levels and job requirements (McGuinness, 
2006): for example, workers of small and scarcely structured firms may find it 
difficult to identify the reference level to establish which are the requirements in 
their job place. Moreover some studies have remarked that the level of 
overeducation is likely to be underestimated when measured through SA, since 
individuals may be inclined to overestimate the educational requirements or to 
equate them to their own level of education, thus affecting the validity of the 
measurement instrument (Hartog and Jonker, 1998). According to some 
commentators, however, subjectivity has to be praised, since it enables the 
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researcher to capture nuances of overeducation that objective indicators are unable 
to grasp (van der Velden and van Smoorenburg, 1997; Leuven and Oosterbeek, 
2011). As described in the following, indeed, occupations are often a poor proxy 
for job requirements (Quintini, 2011), since not all jobs included in a given ISCO 
code require the same level of education and/or skills. 
JA measures are often considered very instructive, since they specifically 
address the knowledge and skills required to perform job’s tasks (Hartog, 2000), 
thus reflecting the basic idea of overeducation as underutilization of skills. 
Unfortunately, this kind of measure is only available in a small number of 
countries, which inevitably reduces the possibility to utilize it. However, two main 
objections can be raised to this way of measurement (Halaby, 1994; van der 
Velden and van Smoorenburg, 1997). First, JA ignores, by definition, the 
variability of job levels within occupational categories. Since variation in 
educational requirements within a given occupation may be appreciable, the 
measurement instrument could suffer from a loss of reliability. Second, the 
allocation of the levels is determined by job analysts on the basis of descriptions 
of the tasks and of the nature of required knowledge and skills. However, while 
these are subject to change, dictionaries of occupations are seldom updated and, 
thus, they are not able to take into account modifications in the value assigned to 
educational levels in the labour market. It might result in a systematic 
overestimation or underestimation of the level of certain occupations, which 
affects the validity of the measurement instrument. 
RM is similar to JA in that it does not take into account the variation in 
educational requirements within a given occupation, with the additional limit 
given by the arbitrary nature of the cut-off point (σ) by which it is established 
whether a worker is overeducated or not. What is even more important is that this 
measurement instrument is very sensitive to changes in labour market conditions, 
which alter the validity of the indicator. For example, in case of excess of supply, 
employers will be more likely to hire individuals with a higher level of education 
than is actually required, and overeducation will be underestimated (Van der 
Velden and Van Smoorenburg, 1997; Mendes de Oliveira et al., 2000). For these 
reasons, RM measures are often considered the less adequate to measure 
overeducation (Hartog and Jonker, 1997). 
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2.3 Are SA, JA and RM sound indicators of overeducation? 
The criticisms previously outlined raise doubts on the capability of the 
measurement instruments to actually capture the concept to be measured. A brief 
review of the existing literature shows, in fact, a not negligible divergence 
between results obtained with different indicators. Significant discrepancies in the 
estimates of both the incidence of, and the economic returns to overeducation, a 
weak correlation among these estimates and different patterns of determinants of 
the phenomenon are found across measures (Groot and Maassen van den Brink, 
2000; Rubb, 2003). In order to depict the divergence between indicators, Table 
2.1 provides a summary of the most recent studies on graduates’ overeducation12. 
Focusing on the analysis of the Italian case, for example, it can be observed that 
the incidence of overeducation among graduates ranges from 8.9%, estimated by 
Barone and Ortiz (2011) recurring to a RM indicator, to 38.3%, as reported by Di 
Pietro and Urwin (2006) on the basis of a SA indicator. Additionally, as reported 
in the table, the employment of different indicators may lead to the identification 
of different determinants of, and returns to, overeducation. For example, Alpin 
and colleagues (1998) register a higher incidence of overeducation among women 
when using a JA indicator, while they find the phenomenon to be more 
widespread among men if measured through RMmd. Similarly, Allen and de 
Weert (2007) analyze the returns to overeducation comparing SAhm and SAsk 
indicators, and they find the phenomenon to be a good predictor for wage, job 
satisfaction and job-search only if measured through the former measure.  
A limited body of literature, mainly from the UK (Battu et al., 2000), the 
Netherlands (Van der Meer, 2006; Van der Velden and Van Smoorenburg, 1997) 
and Belgium (Verhaest and Omey, 2006a; 2006b; 2006c; 2010), has assessed the 
consistency of the existing measurement instruments by directly testing the degree 
of validity and reliability of the various indicators. 
                                                 
12
 When the analysis includes many countries, estimates are reported only for some selected cases. 
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Tab. 2.1 Synopsis of the selected studies 
Author and Year Data, period, countries Indicator of overeducation Incidence of overeducation 
Individual determinants of 
overeducation 
Returns to overeducation 
Allen and de Weert (2007) Cheers (1998). 
Graduates of the A.Y. 
1994/1995. 
ES, DE, NL, UK, JA. 
SAhm ES: 6.0%; DE: 10.4%; NL: 
11.1%; UK: 18.6%; JP: 
24.2% 
  Negative association with 
wages and job satisfaction. 
Positive association with 
search for other work. 
SAsk ES: 16.0%; DE: 18.5%; NL: 
12.1%; UK: 18.2%; JP: 
27.3% 
No significant association 
with wages, job satisfaction, 
and search for other work. 
Allen and van der Velden 
(2001) 
Higher education and 
Graduate Employment in 
Europe (1998). 
Graduates from the A.Y. 
1990/1991. 
Netherlands. 
SAhm 56% among higher vocational 
education graduates; 50% 
among university graduates 
 Negative association with 
wages; no significant 
association with job 
satisfaction and on-the-job 
search. 
 SAsk 16% among higher vocational 
education graduates; 14% 
among university graduates. 
 Negative association with 
wages and job satisfaction; 
positive association with on-
the-job search. 
 SAsk 46% among higher vocational 
education graduates; 53% 
among university graduates 
 No significant association 
with wages; negative 
association with job 
satisfaction; positive 
association with on-the-job 
search. 
Alpin et al. (1998) Labour Force Survey 
(1995).Individuals aged 21 to 
60.Great Britain. 
JA 27% Gender (higher probability of 
overeducation for women), 
ethnicity, age, field of study. 
 
RMmd 37.70% Gender (higher probability of 
overeducation for men), age, 
field of study. 
 
     
 
(continue) 
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Author and Year Data, period, countries Indicator of overeducation Incidence of overeducation 
Individual determinants of 
overeducation 
Returns to overeducation 
Barone and Ortiz (2011) Reflex (2005). 
Graduates of the A.Y. 
1999/2000. 
IT, ES, AT, DE, NL, FI, NO, 
CZ. 
SAp IT: 12.4%; ES: 17.1%; DE: 
12.6% 
Gender; social origin; upper 
secondary graduation mark; 
type of tertiary degree; field 
of study  SAsk  IT: 11.6%; ES: 19.2%; DE: 
9.2% 
 RMpct IT: 8.9%; ES: 24.8%; DE: 
3.8% 
 Battu et al. (2000) Survey organized by the 
University of Birmingham 
(1996). 
Graduates from the A.Y. 
1985 and 1990. 
United Kingdom. 
SAg 40%  Negative association with 
wages and job satisfaction. 
The strength of the 
association varies with the 
employed indicator. 
SAp Around 35-41% or 15-21% 
depending on the cut-off 
point. 
 
RMmn Between 15 and 20% for 
males; between 24 and 28% 
for women. 
 
Betti et al. (2011) AlmaLaurea (2011). 
Graduates of 2004 from the 
University of Siena (Italy). 
SAp 74% Gender, field of study, work 
experience during higher 
education, employment sector 
(public or private), firm size 
 Multidimensional SA It identifies, for each 
individual, a ‘degree’ of 
overeducation 
Caroleo and Pastore (2013) AlmaLaurea (2010). 
Pre-reform graduates of 2005. 
Italy. 
SAsk 16.5% one year after 
graduation 
11.5% five years after 
graduation 
Gender, social origin, field of 
study, graduation mark, time 
to degree, geographical area 
Negative association with 
wages. The strength of the 
association varies with the 
employed indicator. 
SAg 13.2% one year after 
graduation 
8% five years after graduation 
(continue) 
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Author and Year Data, period, countries Indicator of overeducation Incidence of overeducation 
Individual determinants of 
overeducation 
Returns to overeducation 
Cutillo and Di Pietro (2006) Istat (2001) Graduates' 
Employment Survey. 
Graduates of the A.Y. 1998. 
Italy. 
SAg 32.20% Gender; field of study; 
graduation mark; type of 
contract; firm size 
 Di Pietro and Cutillo (2006) Istat (2001) Graduates' 
Employment Survey. 
Graduates of the A.Y. 1998. 
Italy. 
SAg M: 31.3% 
F: 34.0% 
Field of study; university 
quality; type of contract; 
employment sector (public or 
private) 
 Di Pietro and Urwin (2006) Istat (2001) Graduates' 
Employment Survey. 
Graduates of the A.Y. 1998. 
Italy. 
SAg 32.30%  Negative association with 
wages and positive 
association with on-the-job-
search. The strength of the 
association varies with the 
employed indicator. 
SAp 17%  
Sahm 4.60%  
SAsk 38.30%  
Dolton and Vignoles (2000) National Survey of High 
school and Tertiary Graduates 
(1980). 
Graduates interviewed six 
years after graduation. 
United Kingdom. 
SAg 38% in the first job; 30% six 
years after graduation 
Type of degree, graduation 
mark; further education; field 
of study; firm size. 
Negative association with 
initial and actual wages. 
Ferrante et al. (2010) AlmaLaurea (2009). 
Pre-reform graduates of 2004. 
Italy. 
Combination of SAp and SAsk 11% Social origin; upper 
secondary education; field of 
study; graduation mark; time 
to degree; further education 
after HE, length of first job 
search; type of contract; 
geographical area. 
 
     
 
(continue) 
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Author and Year Data, period, countries Indicator of overeducation Incidence of overeducation 
Individual determinants of 
overeducation 
Returns to overeducation 
Ferrante et al. (2010) Reflex (2005). 
Graduates of the A.Y. 
1999/2000. 
AT, BE, CZ, EE, FI, FR, DE, 
IT, NL, NO, ES, PT, UK. 
SAp IT: 23% in the first job. 
13% five years after 
graduation. 
Prestige of the degree, 
economic sector, public or 
private employment, firm 
size.  
 
SAsk IT: 21% in the first job. 
11% five years after 
graduation. 
Green and Zhu (2010) Employment in Britain 
(1992) and Skills Survey 
(1997, 2001, 2006). 
Individuals aged 25 to 60. 
United Kingdom. 
SAg 1992 - M: 21.7%; F: 23.8%; 
1997 - M: 23.0%; F: 25.2%; 
2001 - M: 27.0%; F: 23.4%; 
2006 - M: 33.2%; F: 32.1% 
 
The negative association with 
wages increases over time for 
both men and women. 
Negative association with job 
satisfaction. 
The strength of the 
association varies with the 
employed indicator. 
 SAsk 1992 - M: 15.4%; F: 12.2%; 
2001 - M:12.8%; F: 12.0%; 
2006 - M:15.4%; F: 12.7% 
 Humburg et al. (2012) Reflex (2005) and Hegesco 
(2008). 
Graduates of the A.Y. 2000 
and 2003. 
AT, BE, CZ, EE, FI, FR, DE, 
HU, IT, LT, NL, NO, PO, ES, 
SI, CH, UK. 
Sap IT: 14.7% 
ES: 18.5% 
DE: 5.9% 
Gender; social origin; 
duration of first job search; 
work experience during 
higher education; skill level. 
 
Kler (2005) Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (1996) Households 
Sample File. 
Graduates aged 20 to 64. 
Australia. 
JA 21% for both men and 
women. 
Gender, age Returns to overeducation are 
positive, but lower than 
returns to required education. 
The strength of the 
association varies with the 
employed indicator. 
RMmn M: 46%; F: 38% Gender 
     
 
(continue) 
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Author and Year Data, period, countries Indicator of overeducation Incidence of overeducation 
Individual determinants of 
overeducation 
Returns to overeducation 
McGuinness and Sloane 
(2011) 
Reflex (2005). 
Graduates from the A.Y. 
1999/2000. 
United Kingdom. 
SAp 36% in the initial job; 14% in 
the current job. 
 Negative association with 
wages. 
No significant association 
with job satisfaction. The 
strength of the association 
varies with the employed 
indicator. 
SAsk 33% in the initial job; 14% in 
the current job. 
 
Ordine and Rose (2009) Istat (2004) Graduates' 
Employment Survey. 
Graduates of the A.Y. 2001. 
Italy. 
SAg  Gender; social origin; age; 
marital status; upper 
secondary graduation mark; 
field of study; university 
quality; employment sector; 
type of contract. 
 
Quintano et al. (2008) Data collected by the 
Department of Mathematics 
and Statistics of the 
University of Naples 
‘Parthenope’ (2005). 
Graduates of 1999 and 2002. 
Combination of SAg and 
SAsk. 
46% Gender; graduation mark; 
access channel to the job; 
employment sector; 
geographical area. 
 
Terraneo (2010) Istat (2007). 
BA or pre-reform graduates 
of 2004. 
Italy. 
Combination of SAg and 
SAsk. 
26.7% Gender; type of degree; field 
of study 
Negative association with 
wages and with some features 
of job satisfaction. 
Positive association with job 
search. 
Verhaest e Van der Velden 
(2013) 
Reflex (2005). 
Graduates of the A.Y. 
1999/2000. 
IT, ES, AT, DE, NL, FI, NO, 
CZ, FR, UK, NO, PT, BE, 
JA, CH. 
SAp IT: 38% six months after 
graduation; 19.3% five years 
after graduation. 
ES: 45%; 26.7%. 
DE: 15.1%; 13.8%  
Gender; age; field of study; 
graduation mark. 
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In order to identify which measure best indicates the phenomenon, these 
studies compare the indicators along four axes: 
i. Comparison of the incidence of the phenomenon obtained with 
different indicators; 
ii. Analysis of the correspondence and correlation between measures; 
iii. Estimation of the determinants of the phenomenon across measures; 
iv. Investigation of the predictive value of the measurement instruments 
for one or more relevant criteria (usually wages, job satisfaction, 
mobility and training participation). 
It is hard to summarize results from these studies, since the analysed data 
differ with respect to both the country and the year(s) of reference. However, it is 
possible to outline the main findings and to identify similarities and differences 
across studies. 
The first undeniable result is the measurement sensitivity of the estimated 
incidence of overeducation. On average, RM indicators are found to deliver the 
lowest estimates of overeducation, while JA seems to overestimate the 
phenomenon. SA indicators fall in between, with SAg generally overcoming SAp. 
Even though a gap across measures is always found, its magnitude varies across 
studies. One main element seems to contribute to the variability of results, namely 
the sample selection. We can distinguish between studies that refer to the whole 
labour force (usually one cohort of school leavers is selected, regardless of the 
individual level of education) and studies that refer to a specific subset of the 
working population, that is, the one of tertiary graduates. It is within the former 
group that the hugest differences are found across measures. For example, in one 
of the most systematic studies on this topic, Verhaest and Omey (2006a) use the 
2001 cohort of the Flemish SONAR survey about school-to-work transition to 
estimate the incidence of overeducation among school-leavers on the basis of six 
indicators of the phenomenon (three SA, two RM and one JA). The authors find a 
substantial divergence among the estimates of the incidence of overeducation, 
which, on average, ranges from 7.9% on the basis of RMmn to 50.6% on the basis 
of JA. When it comes to the estimation of the incidence of overeducation across 
levels of education, the authors find the largest gap among individuals with lower 
secondary education: from 0% according to the two RM indicators to 82% on the 
basis of SAg. Definitely smaller is the divergence across measures when 
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overeducation is estimated among tertiary graduates: from 22% on the basis of 
SAg (with the other two SA delivering similar results) to 54% on the basis of JA, 
passing from the 49% estimated through RMmd. The magnitude of this gap is 
similar to the one found by Battu and colleagues (2000), who analyse the 
phenomenon among British tertiary graduates comparing two SA and one RM 
indicators. Nevertheless, the direction of the difference is opposed to the previous 
one: in the UK, the incidence of overeducation is found to be lower with RMmd 
(about 20%) than with SAg (around 40%). 
The second relevant finding is that, despite these huge differences, when the 
authors analyse the determinants of overeducation they only find small—and 
often not relevant—differences across measures. As reported in Table 2.1, 
overeducation is mainly found to be associated with some variables related to the 
educational curriculum (such as type of secondary degree, field of study, 
graduation mark and time to degree) and with job-related variables (such as firm 
size, type of contract and occupational sector). When the risk of overeducation is 
estimated through regression models, the coefficients for these variables have the 
same sign and almost the same magnitude across measures. The only relevant 
variable for which the compared measures deliver statistically different results is 
sex. Some studies find the risk of overeducation to be higher among men when 
using SA indicators, but among women when using RM measures (Battu et al., 
2000; Verhaest and Omey, 2006a). In other cases, JA delivers a higher risk of 
overeducation for women, compared to RM which indicates men to be more 
exposed to this phenomenon (Alpin et al., 1998; Verhaest and Omey, 2010). A 
closer inspection of these results, however, reveals that, in spite of statistical 
significance, the substantive relevance of such differences is questionable. The 
gender gap is in fact usually found to be around 3 or 4 percentage points with a 
relevant uncertainty around the estimates. 
Finally, turning to the examination of the criterion validity of the 
measurement instruments, overeducated workers are generally found to earn less 
than their adequately allocated counterparts (Battu et al., 2000; van der Velden 
and van Smoorenburg, 1997), to be less satisfied with their jobs (Battu et al., 
2000), to be more likely to look for a new job and to participate more often in on-
the-job training activities (Verhaest and Omey, 2006c). These results usually hold 
regardless of the employed measure. This means that, in the regression models 
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estimating the aforementioned dependent variables, the sign of the coefficient for 
overeducation is robust over different measures. However, we cannot pretend the 
same for the magnitude. In fact, some authors find statistically significant 
differences between measures. For example, Van der Velden and van 
Smoorenburg (1997) compare SAg and JA indicators and find the effect on wages 
to be larger in the second case. Similarly, Battu and colleagues (2000) use two SA 
and one RM indicators and find a bigger effect on earnings with the last measure. 
Verhaest and Omey (2006b) find a bigger effect of overeducation on mobility 
when using a RM indicator rather than SA or JA. Also in this case, however, we 
should be very careful in discussing these results: statistical significance does not 
always entail substantive relevance, since the delineated differences are often 
small in size. 
The results presented so far have been interpreted in different ways, leading 
to dissimilar conclusions about the validity of the overeducation measures. In 
some cases, the authors recognize that different indicators may produce different 
estimates of the incidence (and sometimes determinants) of overeducation. 
However, since they yield similar results about the effects of overeducation on the 
analysed relevant outcomes, scholars only suggest caution when using these 
measures (Battu et al., 2000; Verhaest and Omey, 2006b). Van der Velden and 
van Smoorenburg (1997) hypothesize that the reason behind these different results 
is that the various indicators measure essentially the same concept but differ with 
regards to the points on the scale at which there is overeducation. In particular, 
they compare SAg and JA methods and point out that the former is likely to 
provide more accurate estimates, while the latter seems to systematically 
overestimate the level of overeducation. Definitely more severe is the conclusion 
of Verhaest and Omey (2006c; 2010) who claim that the various measures do not 
capture equally well overeducation, but are likely to be indicators for related 
concepts. In particular, the authors suggest that RM is likely to capture only the 
non-structural part of overeducation within occupations, while SAg does not take 
into account that (at least part of) overeducation might result from the inflation of 
hiring requirements. Thus, the authors conclude, if overeducation is defined as the 
mismatch between the attained level of education and that required to do the job, 
measures based on JA or SAp are probably the most adequate to capture this 
concept. Still, the authors suggest a careful interpretation of results, since in the 
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case of JA a certain degree of measurement error is unavoidable, while in the case 
of SAp individuals are likely to take their expectations into account when they 
assess the quality of their match. 
As discussed at the very beginning of this Chapter, however, the lack of 
consensus around the correct way to measure overeducation is not at all just a 
methodological question, but it is, instead, also a substantive issue. A possible 
explanation for the inconsistency found between measurements is that, even if 
with the criticisms previously outlines, the indicators adopted in the literature 
actually capture different forms of mismatch.  
In particular, it should be quite clear that the indicators previously presented 
contribute in different ways to the definition of educational and skill mismatches 
(or overqualification and overskilling). Indicators based on RM consider the 
educational credentials held by workers, whilst they test neither the 
correspondence between formal qualifications and skills, nor their actual 
utilization in the job routine. Since it considers only the formal requirements of 
jobs, this kind of indicator seems to indicate which levels of education are the 
more profitable ones, given a certain distribution of qualifications in the labour 
market. What RM is surely able to point out, if available data cover a long period 
of time, is the phenomenon of inflation of educational credentials. JA, on the 
contrary, seems to provide information concerning the match between individuals’ 
skills and those required in the job place. Dictionaries of occupations are based on 
the assessment of job contents and characteristics, and on the evaluation of their 
correspondence with skills and competencies gained by individuals through 
different educational curricula. Thus, although with the previously outlined 
limitations, they seem to indicate the correspondence between individuals’ skills 
and those necessary to perform the job they hold. Finally, indicators based on SA 
may measure both educational and skill mismatch according to the way questions 
are formulated, that is to say according to the importance they attribute to the 
formal or substantial match between attained and required levels of education. 
In the following Chapter the hypothesis that different measures actually 
indicate different forms of mismatch is tested recurring to Italian data on tertiary 
graduates: results of that chapter will inform the rest of this dissertation, since 
they will guide and support the choice of indicators to be used in the subsequent 
analyses. 
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3 Methodological issues. Are SA, RM and JA valid measurement 
instruments for graduates’ overeducation? 
3.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 2 the empirical literature devoted to the validation of 
the indicators of overeducation has mainly employed data from the UK and the 
Netherlands. Notwithstanding the similarity of the employed data, results are not 
always consistent across studies. In the Italian literature, to the best of our 
knowledge, no effort has been made in this direction, and scholars have usually 
recurred to SA indicators, since JA measures are not available. Thus, this chapter 
aims at filling these two gaps: a new indicator of overeducation is developed that 
resembles the JA measure, and its validity is tested in comparison to other four 
indicators (three SA and one RM). 
These five indicators are compared following the procedure usually employed 
in the literature and described in the previous chapter. First of all, descriptive 
results are compared, by analysing the different estimates of the incidence of 
overeducation and the correspondence and correlation between the various 
measures. The second step consists in estimating the determinants of 
overeducation and assessing whether the results are sensitive to the employed 
measurement instruments. Finally, the criterion validity is investigated by 
connecting overeducation—variously defined—with three relevant outcomes, 
namely wage, job satisfaction and search for a new job. 
As already discussed, the choice of these three variables as relevant outcomes 
is supported by both theoretical reasons and existing empirical evidence. The 
greatest attention in the literature has certainly been paid to the relation between 
overeducation and earnings: a widely acknowledged finding is that returns to 
overeducation (i.e. to exceeding years of schooling) are positive, but lower than 
returns to required education. In other words, overeducated workers are generally 
found to earn more than their colleagues with the required level of education, but 
less than equally educated workers whose level of schooling matches job 
requirements. 
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The relation between job match and satisfaction—first addressed in the 
psychological literature (Vroom, 1964)—is also found to be a relevant result in 
the overeducation literature (Verhaest and Omey, 2006b). As suggested by Battu 
and colleagues (2000), we can hypothesize that the higher the individual level of 
education, the more individuals will develop expectations about their jobs. Thus, 
the eventual mismatch between actual and required education might mean the ruin 
of these expectations and could generate workers’ dissatisfaction. 
Finally, the association between overeducation and job satisfaction may also 
indirectly affect the mobility behaviour of workers, by making them more prone 
to look for a new job. But this relationship could also be the result of other 
mechanisms. For example, according to the Career Mobility theory (Sicherman 
and Galor, 1990), already discussed in Chapter 1, overeducation may be a good 
investment if the acquired experience results in higher promotion opportunities 
inside and/or outside the firm.  
3.2 Data 
The data used for the analyses come from a large-scale survey on Italian 
tertiary graduates’ employment (Indagine sull’inserimento professionale dei 
laureati), conducted about every third year by the Italian National Institute of 
Statistics (ISTAT). In particular we use data from the 2011 wave, which provide 
information on the education and labour market careers of a representative sample 
of 62,000 individuals who got a tertiary degree in 2007 (31,088 BA graduates and 
30,912 MA graduates). BA graduates who, after graduation in 2007, continued 
studying in order to obtain a MA degree are excluded from the analytical sample. 
These individuals are not comparable with the other BA graduates because of a 
different educational history (three vs. five years of tertiary education), nor with 
the MA graduates of 2007 because of a different amount of work experience. Also 
graduates who had a continuative employment during tertiary education and 
whose actual job started before the attainment of the 2007 degree have been 
excluded, since they clearly differ from other graduates in terms of tenure, job 
experience and, presumably, amount of skills learnt on-the-job.  
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Tab. 3.1 Sample composition for the main socio-demographic and education-related 
variables 
 
Bachelor Master Total 
Sex (Ref: Male) 
   Female 57.4 50.4 52.9
Age (mean) 29.9 31.2 30.8 
Geographical area (Ref: North) 
   Centre 23.6 23.2 23.3
South and Islands 23.5 28.3 26.6 
Parents' Education (Ref: Primary or Less) 
   Lower secondary 29.0 20.2 23.3
Upper secondary 45.9 43.5 44.4 
Tertiary 16.8 29.5 25.0 
NA 0.6 0.3 0.4 
Social origin (Ref: Entrepreneurs) 
   Professionals 6.4 9.7 8.5
Managers 3. 6 6.2 5.2 
Clerks 30.3 38.2 35.4 
Self-employed 15.5 13.4 14.1 
Executive workers 16.1 11.8 13.4 
Manual workers 21. 7 14.2 16.8 
NA 1.1 0.9 1.0 
Secondary graduation mark (mean) 80.2 84.4 82.9 
Matriculation Year (Ref: 1999-2000 or later) 
   1998-1999 or before 10.3 26.0 20.4
Field of study (Ref: Mathematics) 
   ICT and Engineering 9.5 21.9 17.4
Natural Sciences 3.7 5.6 4.9 
Pharmacy, Veterinary 1.3 2.2 1. 9 
Medicine - 4.6 3.0 
Medical Professions 43.3 1. 6 16.4 
Architecture 2.6 8.2 6.2 
Business, Administration, Statistics 12.6 14.8 14.1 
Social sciences 8.2 9.3 8.9 
Law 5.0 8.9 7.5 
Arts and Humanities 6.1 9.3 8.2 
Education, Psychology 6.2 7.5 7.0 
Graduation mark (Ref: 66-90) 
   91-100 34.6 20.0 25.2
101-105 19.4 17.3 18.1 
106-110 18.3 24.7 22.4 
110 cum laude 13.1 31.6 25.0 
N 9,217 16,594 25,811 
 
This way, we end up with a homogenous sample of graduates, in terms of a) 
educational experience, and b) work experience. This choice helps in reducing the 
portion of overeducation that is more likely due to the heterogeneity of individual 
skills. In other words, even though we cannot control for graduates’ unobserved 
ability, this way we reduce the possibility that individuals in the sample have 
different endowments of skills, due for example to different work experience. 
Additionally, since overeducation is conditional on employment, unemployed 
graduates and individuals who are still studying at the time of the survey have 
been excluded from the analyses. Summing up, the final sample includes 9,217 
58 
 
BA and 16,594 MA graduates. The composition of the selected sample for the 
main socio-demographic and education-related variables is reported in Table 3.1. 
3.3 Overeducation measures 
The data described above provide the opportunity to compare five indicators 
of overeducation: three of them are subjective, one is based on realized matches, 
and the fifth resembles the job analysis method. 
3.3.1 Subjective indicators 
The first subjective indicator is based on individuals’ self-assessment of the 
necessity of a tertiary degree to get their actual job (SAg). It refers to graduates’ 
answers to the question: «Was a tertiary degree a formal requirement to access 
your current job?». Being the possible answers «Yes» or «No», individuals are 
considered overeducated if they chose the second option. Formally: 
 
𝑆𝐴𝑔𝑖 ≡ {
1 𝑖𝑓 «𝑁𝑜»
0 𝑖𝑓 «𝑌𝑒𝑠»
 
 
The second indicator (SAhm) is similar to the first, but a little more restrictive, 
since it takes into account the horizontal match between individual education and 
job requirements. It is built by combining answers to the previous question with 
responses to «Was it necessary whichever tertiary degree, a degree in a specific 
disciplinary area, or exclusively your own degree?». According to this second 
criterion, individuals are considered as overeducated not only if they declared a 
tertiary degree not necessary for their job (as according to SAg), but also if they 
evaluate that whichever tertiary degree is necessary. Formally: 
 
𝑆𝐴ℎ𝑚𝑖 ≡ {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝐴𝑔𝑖 = 1
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝐴𝑔𝑖 = 0  ∩  «𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑠 𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑟𝑦»
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
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The third indicator is based on individual self-assessment of the necessity of 
the tertiary degree to perform the job (SAp). It is based on graduates’ answers to 
the question: «And to do your current job, according to your opinion, is a tertiary 
degree effectively necessary?»
13
. As in the first case, the possible answers were 
«Yes» or «No», and individuals who choose the second option are considered as 
overeducated. Formally: 
 
𝑆𝐴𝑝𝑖 ≡ {
1 𝑖𝑓 «𝑁𝑜»
0 𝑖𝑓 «𝑌𝑒𝑠»
 
3.3.2 Realized Matches Indicator 
The fourth indicator employed in this study is based on the comparison 
between individual level of education and the modal level within his/her 
occupational category
14
 (RMmd). As discussed in the previous chapter, the mode is 
preferred to the mean since we are dealing with educational levels rather than 
years of schooling. 
The modal educational level is derived from the 2011 Labour Force Survey 
(ISTAT). This survey is conducted every third months on a representative sample 
of the Italian working population. The four 2011 quarterly waves have been 
merged into a unitary dataset, containing 657,569 individuals. The analyses have 
been conducted only on the subsample of employed individuals aged from 25 to 
40 for which the ISCO code was available (N=77,826). The modal educational 
level has been computed for each 3-digit occupational category, which is the 
finest information available in the Graduates’ Survey. Due to data constraints, it 
has not been possible to distinguish between BA and MA degree. Thus, graduates 
are considered as overeducated if the modal educational level within their 3-digit 
occupational category is lower than a tertiary degree. Formally: 
 
                                                 
13
 The original formulation of the three questions in Italian was «Per accedere al suo attuale lavoro 
possedere una laurea è stato un requisito necessario?»; «Era necessaria una laurea qualsiasi, una laurea 
di una specifica area disciplinare o esclusivamente il suo tipo di laurea?»; «E per svolgere il suo lavoro, 
secondo lei, possedere una laurea è effettivamente necessario?». 
14
 The employed occupational classification is CP2011, developed by ISTAT, which resembles the 
ISCO08 classification. The correspondence table of the two classifications can be found at the link 
http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/18132. 
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𝑅𝑀𝑚𝑑𝑖 ≡ {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑗 < 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑗 ≥ 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒
 
3.3.3 Job Analysis indicator 
As previously discussed, indicators based on JA are not available in Italy. In 
order to fill this gap, we exploit the unique opportunity to develop this kind of 
indicator using the information jointly collected in 2007 by ISTAT and ISFOL 
(Institute for the Development of Vocational Training for Workers). 
Tab. 3.2 Set of competences included in the Survey on Professions 
Sub-Area Descriptors 
Business Management and Accounting Business management 
Desk work 
Economics and Accounting 
Marketing and Sales 
Customer service 
Human Resources Administration 
 
  
Production Process Production and Process 
Food production 
 
  
Engineering and Technology Computers and Electronics 
Engineering and Technology 
Technical Design 
Building and Construction 
Mechanics 
 
  
Mathematics and Science Mathematics 
Physics 
Chemistry 
Biology 
Psychology 
Sociology and Anthropology 
Geography 
 
  
Health and Personal Services Medicine and Dentistry 
Psychological Therapy and Counselling 
 
  
Education and Training Education and Training 
  
Human and Social Sciences Italian Language 
Foreign Language 
Arts 
History and Archaeology 
Philosophy and Theology 
 
  
Legislation and Public Security Civil Protection and Public Security 
Legislation and Institutions 
 
  
Transport and Communications Telecommunications 
Communication and Media 
Transports 
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During the Survey on Professions (Indagine campionaria sulle professioni), 
about 20 employees per occupational category (defined by the 5-digit coding) 
have been interviewed. The collected data cover a wide set of topic: from the 
formal characteristics of the job, to the tasks performed by workers, to the skills 
and knowledge required to do the job. It is especially the last information that has 
been used to develop a JA indicator of overeducation. Workers were asked to 
evaluate a) the importance of a set of 33 competences for the job performance on 
a scale of 1-5, and b) the level of complexity at which these competences are 
employed on the job on a scale of 1-7. Table 3.2 summarizes the set of 
competences, which were organized in 9 subareas, while the complete 
questionnaire is reported in the Appendix.  
The available data are not individual, but aggregated at the occupation level. 
In other words, for each competence, the average levels of importance and 
complexity reported by interviewees within the occupational categories are 
provided, rescaled to a 0-100 range. In order to compare this information with 
data from the Survey on Graduates, we further averaged these values to the 3-digit 
occupational categories. 
This wide set of information has been used to identify graduate and non-
graduate jobs—and, consequently, overeducated and non-overeducated workers—
following the procedure described above: 
1.  The set of 33 competences has been submitted to a little group of experts, 
who have been asked to evaluate at which level of complexity each 
competence can be considered as a «graduate competence». This question 
has been asked using the same formulation of the original questionnaire, as 
reported in the Appendix. 
2. The information collected among experts has been compared with 
workers’ evaluation, through the following steps: 
i. For each occupational category, the core competencies have been 
identified. These are the three most important competences, 
according to workers’ evaluation, provided that they score at least 
50 (theoretical mean) on the importance scale. The main 
assumption is that these competences are those necessary to 
perform the core business of the occupation. 
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ii. The average level of complexity, as evaluated by workers, is 
identified for the competences selected in the previous step. 
iii. The level of complexity assessed by workers is compared with the 
evaluation of job experts. Graduate jobs are defined by having at 
least one core competence employed at a level of complexity 
which, according to the experts, is definable as standing at a 
«graduate’s level». 
3. This information is merged with data on tertiary graduates. An individual 
is considered as overeducated if his/her job is not classified as a graduate 
job. Formally: 
 
𝐽𝐴𝑖 ≡ {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑎𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑒′𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
3.4 Empirical strategy 
In the following sections the validity of the five indicators of overeducation is 
assessed. Following the literature reviewed in the previous chapter, we estimate a) 
the measurement sensitivity of the determinants of the phenomenon and b) the 
predictive value of indicators on three relevant outcomes, namely wage, job 
satisfaction and job search.  
The determinants of overeducation (§ 3.6) are estimated by means of logit 
regression models, specified as follows: 
 
logit(p̂i) = α + βXi + εi 
 
where the dependent variable is a dummy for overeducation, measured through 
the five indicators described above, and Xi represents a vector of attributes for 
individual i that, according to the literature, are likely to affect individuals’ risk to 
be overeducated. These are both socio-demographic and educational curriculum-
related variables. Among the former, gender, age, geographical area, and parents’ 
education and social class are included. The last two variables are constructed by 
taking the maximum value recorded between parents. Among the latter, two 
variables refer to individuals’ upper secondary education, namely the type of 
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attended secondary school and the secondary graduation mark. Moreover, tertiary 
education related variables are included: matriculation year, field of study, 
graduation mark, years of graduation delay and type of tertiary degree. Finally, 
two dummies are included for having attained other formative activities after 
graduation and for having started the current job before or after graduation. 
The effect of overeducation on the selected outcomes (§ 3.7) is estimated 
through regression models (OLS for earnings and job satisfaction, logistic for job 
search) that take the following general form: 
 
yî = α + βxoei + βXi + εi 
where y represents the dependent variables, namely earnings, job satisfaction and 
job search, xoe is a dummy variable for overeducation (each time measured by one 
of the five indicators) and Xi is a vector of individual characteristics, which 
includes all the variables controlled for in the model for the determinants of 
overeducation, plus two variables for job characteristics. These are a dummy 
variable for full vs. part-time and one for stable vs. unstable job (where the 
unstable category includes fixed-term and atypical jobs). 
Turning to the operationalization of the dependent variables, earnings are 
measured through the self-reported net monthly income, which is then 
transformed into its logarithmic form. The variable for job satisfaction is an index 
derived from a factor analysis applied to individuals’ answers to the question: 
«How much are you satisfied with your current job with respect to...?». Graduates 
were asked to answer by referring to the following items: tasks, stability, 
autonomy, use of competences, wage, and career opportunities
15
. The possible 
answers go from 1 (not at all) to 4 (to a very high extent). The factor analysis 
reveals the existence of a unique underlying factor with an eigenvalue of 2.6. 
Finally, job search is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if the individual 
declares to be looking for a new job, 0 otherwise. 
The distribution of these variables within the selected sample is reported in 
the following table. 
 
                                                 
15
 The original Italian question was «Lei quanto è soddisfatto del suo lavoro rispetto a…? Le 
mansioni che svolge; la stabilità o la sicurezza del posto di lavoro; il grado di autonomia sul lavoro; 
l’utilizzo delle conoscenze acquisite all’università; il trattamento economico; le possibilità di carriera». 
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Tab. 3.3 Distribution of monthly net wage, job satisfaction and job search 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. 
Wage 1,374 526.4 333 5,000 21,168 
Job Satisfaction 0 1 -3.8 1.8 25,592 
Job search 0.2 0.4 0 1 25,811 
3.5 Descriptive results 
3.5.1 The incidence of overeducation 
The incidence of overeducation is reported in Table 3.4, which shows that 
this estimate is sensitive to the applied measurement method. Overeducation 
ranges from 29% on the basis of SAg to 43% on the basis of RMmd, with the other 
SA and JA indicators similarly delivering mid-way estimates closer to the former.  
Tab. 3.4 The incidence of overeducation by the main socio-demographic and education-
related variables on the basis of different measures (N=25,811) 
 
SAg SAhm SAp RMmd JA 
Total 28.9 32.9 31.4 43.4 31.0 
Sex 
   
 
 Males 30.0 33. 9 32.1 44.1 29.4 
Females 28.0 31.9 30.8 42.7 32.4 
Geographic Area 
   
 
 North 28.5 32.8 31.9 45.1 32.4 
Centre 29.9 33.4 32.4 43.1 31.2 
South and Islands 29.0 32.5 29.8 40.3 28.1 
Type of degree 
   
 
 Bachelor 33.2 36.4 31.4 44.6 33.4 
Master 26.6 30.9 31.5 42.7 29.7 
Field of study 
   
 
 Mathematics 16.6 19.7 23.7 33.5 17.5
ICT and Engineering 21.5 24.1 29.8 37.2 16.9 
Natural Sciences 38.9 43.7 39.3 59.0 41.4 
Pharmacy, Veterinary 13.1 14.7 17.0 19.3 14.6 
Medicine 2.9 3.7 6.1 1.4 0.8 
Medical Professions 8.2 8.9 9.4 6.0 4.7 
Architecture 23.7 25.4 25.8 29.9 17.3 
Business and Administration, Statistics 39.5 45.4 45.1 72.4 65.9 
Social sciences 51.7 60.8 52.0 67.9 58.4 
Law 30. 9 35.9 30.3 46.0 40.6 
Arts and Humanities 54.6 61.4 51.5 65.5 54.5 
 
These figures are only partially in line with earlier findings in the literature. 
In particular, two differences are worth noting. First of all, while previous 
findings usually show that RM indicators deliver the lowest estimates (Groot and 
Maassen van den Brink, 2000; Verhaest and Omey 2006a), according to our 
results RMmd seems to overestimate the incidence of the phenomenon. This 
finding reflects the distribution of educational levels within occupations and might 
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be the combined result of two peculiar characteristics of the Italian case. On the 
one side, the expansion of tertiary education has been slower than in other 
countries, so that tertiary graduates are still likely to be a minority in many 
occupational categories. On the other side, it is widely acknowledged in the Italian 
literature that some high-level occupational categories are often held by non-
graduates: this is, in particular, the case of small and medium entrepreneurs, 
which constitutes a big portion of the Italian service class (Barone and Assirelli, 
2014). 
The second important difference is that, although the various indicators—as 
expected—deliver significantly different estimates of the incidence of 
overeducation, these divergence is not as huge as the one often found in the 
literature. One reason for this difference might be the homogeneity of our sample, 
which is constituted by individuals belonging to the same graduation cohort, 
which have entered the labour market more or less in the same period, that are just 
at the beginning of their work careers, and that have acquired approximately the 
same amount of on-the-job experience.  Our results are, in fact, more similar to 
those found by Battu et al. (2000), who analyzed British data only from tertiary 
graduates. 
The other results do not always go in the expected direction. First of all, 
results concerning the distribution of overeducation across genders and 
geographical areas are ambiguous. On the one side, every indicator, with the only 
exception of JA, suggests that males are overeducated more frequently than 
females. This little difference, which is contrary to the empirical evidence on the 
disadvantaged role of women in the Italian labour market, can be explained by the 
analysed individuals being a selected sample of the population: it can be argued 
that individuals who succeed in attaining a tertiary degree are more motivated and 
able than those who do not. The same way of reasoning can be applied to the 
unexpected result found among individuals from different geographical areas: 
Northern graduates are, indeed, found to be more often overeducated than their 
Southern counterparts. These counterintuitive figures might also be the result of a 
compositional effect, due for example to the different distribution across fields of 
study of men and women and of individuals from different geographical areas. 
We will come back on this issue in the following paragraphs. 
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For what concerns the distribution of overeducation with respect to the main 
variables related to Higher Education, we observe a higher incidence of 
overeducation among BA graduates irrespectively of the applied measure, the 
only exception being the estimates delivered by SAp that show no significant 
difference between BA and MA graduates. Moreover, as we expected, fields of 
study can be easily ranked according to the risk of overeducation suffered by their 
graduates. Medicine, Medical Professions, Pharmacy and Veterinary present the 
lowest incidence of overeducation, the Humanities and Social Sciences report the 
highest risks, and the other fields fall somewhere in between. Again, this result 
seems to hold true irrespectively of the employed measure, the only difference 
lying in the punctual estimates produced by different indicators and not in the 
general pattern of results. 
3.5.2 Correspondence and correlation between different measures of 
overeducation 
Table 3.5 reports, for each combination of two measures, the percentage of 
graduates that are equally classified as overeducated. It ranges from 
approximately 50% to 100%. Not surprisingly, RMmd has the lowest 
correspondence figure with the other measures: only half of the individuals 
classified as overeducated according to RMmd are overeducated also on the basis 
of the various SA measures. RMmd has a relatively high correspondence only with 
the JA measure.  
Tab. 3.5 Correspondence percentages between different measures of overeducation 
 
SAg SAhm SAp RMmd JA 
SAg 100.0 100.0 69.0 75.7 58.1 
SAhm 88.1 100.0 66.2 74.6 58.0 
SAp 63.0 68.6 100.0 70.1 55.4 
RMmd 50.5 56.5 50.9 100.0 71.5 
JA 53.8 61.0 56.2 100.0 100.0 
 
On the one side, 71.5% of graduates who are overeducated according to 
RMmd are overeducated also on the basis of JA; on the other side, all graduates 
classified as overeducated by the JA measure are overeducated on the basis of 
RMmd. This high mutual correspondence does not surprise, since both RMmd and 
JA are occupation-based indicators, while the three SA measures are, by 
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definition, worker-based. It also comes with no surprise the high correspondence 
between SAg and SAhm, since the former, as previously described, is a sub-group 
of the latter.  
For the same reasons, results reported in Table 3.6, which shows the 
correlation between different measures, go in the expected direction: RMmd and 
JA—that are the two occupation-based measures—register a high correlation, 
such as SAg and SAhm. 
Tab. 3.6 Pearson’s correlation between different measures of overeducation 
 
SAg SAhm SAp RMmd JA 
SAg 1.00 
    SAhm 0.91 1.00 
   SAp 0.51 0.52 1.00 
  RMmd 0.42 0.44 0.37 1.00 
 JA 0.37 0.40 0.36 0.77 1.00 
 
Also the correlation between the other indicators—which is never lower than 
0.3—is, however, higher than the one usually reported in the literature.  
In order to provide a clearer insight on the level of accordance between the 
five measures, Table 3.7 reports the number of measures for which graduates in 
our sample are classified as being overeducated. 
Tab. 3.7 Percentage of graduates classified as overeducated on the basis of n indicators 
N of indicators Total Sample Bachelor Master 
0 (not overeducated) 43.2 41.9 45.5 
1 11. 6 14.0 7.3 
2 14.0 14.9 12.5 
3 10.2 10.8 9.1 
4 8.1 7.4 9.3 
5 12.9 11.0 16.3 
N 25,811 16,594 9,217 
 
More than a half of the whole sample is equally classified on the basis of all 
five measures: 43.2% of graduates are adequately educated and 12.9% are 
overeducated on the basis of each and every measure. This result confirms that, as 
shown in the previous tables, the correspondence between the five measures is not 
so low. At the same time, it supports the claim that overeducation is not a 
negligible phenomenon: it is surely relevant—both from a methodological and 
substantive point of view—that more than one graduated out of ten is 
overeducated on the basis of every measure and that almost six graduates out of 
ten are overeducated on the basis of at least one indicator. 
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Tab. 3.8  Overeducation by occupational category on the basis of different measures of 
overeducation 
Occupation SAa SAhm SAp RMmd JA N 
1.1.1 0.57 0.57 0.14 0 0 7 
1.1.2 0.21 0.28 0.16 0 0 86 
1.1.3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 1 
1.1.4 0.63 0.79 0.40 0 0 20 
1.2.1 0.73 0.77 0.48 1 0 93 
1.2.2 0.48 0.54 0.47 1 0 83 
1.2.3 0.27 0.35 0.31 0 0 49 
1.3.1 0.73 0.75 0.60 1 0 243 
2.1.1 0.25 0.27 0.31 0 0 1,174 
2.2.1 0.09 0.10 0.18 0 0 1,981 
2.2.2 0.10 0.11 0.15 0 0 820 
2.3.1 0.07 0.07 0.11 0 0 723 
2.4.1 0.02 0.02 0.06 0 0 734 
2.5.1 0.24 0.31 0.33 0 0 1,461 
2.5.2 0.04 0.05 0.06 0 0 857 
2.5.3 0.13 0.17 0.22 0 0 270 
2.5.4 0.45 0.52 0.39 0 0 327 
2.5.5 0.61 0.64 0.63 1 1 179 
2.5.6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 2 
2.6.1 0.09 0.09 0.00 0 0 12 
2.6.2 0.02 0.03 0.07 0 0 215 
2.6.3 0.10 0.13 0.11 0 0 673 
2.6.4 0.31 0.33 0.23 1 0 632 
2.6.5 0.23 0.32 0.25 0 0 480 
3.1.1 0.23 0.23 0.28 1 0 156 
3.1.2 0.43 0.47 0.44 1 0 609 
3.1.3 0.33 0.34 0.31 1 0 482 
3.1.4 0.25 0.29 0.34 1 0 64 
3.1.5 0.35 0.39 0.37 1 0 252 
3.1.6 0.47 0.53 0.55 1 0 49 
3.1.7 0.76 0.80 0.70 1 0 79 
3.1.8 0.26 0.35 0.27 1 1 225 
3.2.1 0.07 0.08 0.09 0 0 4,430 
3.2.2 0.31 0.34 0.28 1 1 159 
3.3.1 0.43 0.50 0.44 1 1 1,030 
3.3.2 0.41 0.49 0.46 1 1 1,040 
3.3.3 0.32 0.42 0.42 1 1 706 
3.3.4 0.63 0.71 0.60 1 1 408 
3.4.1 0.56 0.62 0.57 1 1 211 
3.4.2 0.46 0.50 0.36 1 0 403 
3.4.3 0.67 0.74 0.70 1 1 27 
3.4.4 0.57 0.60 0.61 1 1 94 
3.4.5 0.29 0.33 0.30 0 0 298 
3.4.6 0.50 0.50 0.40 1 0 42 
4.1.1 0.54 0.63 0.59 1 1 1,221 
4.1.2 0.58 0.65 0.75 1 1 48 
4.2.1 0.54 0.65 0.59 1 1 500 
4.2.2 0.77 0.86 0.81 1 1 340 
4.3.1 0.60 0.68 0.63 1 1 250 
4.3.2 0.52 0.60 0.58 1 1 173 
4.4.1 0.63 0.67 0.57 1 1 90 
4.4.2 0.40 0.60 0.46 1 1 35 
5.1.1 0.86 0.88 0.81 1 1 188 
5.1.2 0.87 0.90 0.84 1 1 300 
5.1.3 0.64 0.75 0.74 1 1 57 
5.2.1 0.86 0.86 0.86 1 1 7 
5.2.2 0.97 0.98 0.94 1 1 124 
5.2.3 0.77 0.83 0.56 1 1 36 
5.3.1 0.58 0.63 0.42 1 1 19 
5.4.1 0.88 0.88 0.88 1 1 8 
5.4.2 0.64 0.64 0.45 1 1 22 
5.4.3 0.75 0.75 0.56 1 1 16 
(continue) 
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Occupation SAa SAhm SAp RMmd JA N 
5.4.4 0.60 0.63 0.51 1 1 73 
5.4.5 0.50 0.50 1.00 1 1 2 
5.4.6 0.71 0.71 0.57 1 1 7 
5.4.8 0.88 0.89 0.76 1 1 80 
6.1.1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 1 1 
6.1.2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 1 3 
6.1.3 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 1 7 
6.1.4 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 1 2 
6.1.5 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 1 3 
6.2.1 0.75 0.75 1.00 1 1 4 
6.2.3 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 1 8 
6.2.4 0.80 0.80 0.90 1 1 10 
6.3.1 0.90 0.90 0.90 1 1 10 
6.3.2 0.75 0.75 0.75 1 1 4 
6.3.3 0.75 0.75 0.75 1 1 4 
6.3.4 0.50 0.50 0.50 1 1 2 
6.4.1 0.91 0.96 0.83 1 1 23 
6.4.2 1.00 1.00 0.50 1 1 2 
6.4.3 0.67 0.67 1.00 1 1 6 
6.5.1 0.88 0.94 0.94 1 1 17 
6.5.2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 1 5 
6.5.3 1.00 1.00 0.86 1 1 7 
6.5.4 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 1 2 
6.5.5 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 1 2 
7.1.1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 1 1 
7.1.2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 1 1 
7.1.3 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 1 1 
7.1.5 1.00 1.00 0.80 1 1 5 
7.1.6 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 1 1 
7.1.7 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 1 1 
7.2.2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 1 1 
7.2.3 1.00 1.00 0.50 1 1 2 
7.2.5 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 1 1 
7.2.6 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 1 3 
7.2.7 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 1 2 
7.3.2 0.80 0.80 1.00 1 1 5 
7.4.1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 1 4 
7.4.2 0.94 0.94 0.88 1 1 17 
7.4.3 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 1 1 
7.4.4 0.50 1.00 0.50 1 1 2 
8.1.2 0.50 0.50 1.00 1 1 2 
8.1.3 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 1 12 
8.1.4 0.89 0.89 0.89 1 1 9 
8.1.5 0.86 0.86 0.86 1 1 7 
8.1.6 0.93 0.93 0.86 1 1 14 
8.2.1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 1 2 
8.2.2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 1 4 
8.3.1 0.86 0.86 0.86 1 1 7 
8.4.2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 1 2 
8.4.3 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 1 7 
9.1.1 0.11 0.15 0.14 1 1 65 
9.2.1 0.79 0.86 0.57 1 1 14 
9.3.1 0.50 0.50 0.36 1 1 14 
 
Results from previous tables indicate how much indicators agree in defining 
individuals as overeducated. Table 3.8, instead, shows the level of accordance 
between different indicators in classifying an occupational category as adequate 
or not for graduates. The columns referring to RMmd and JA only present the 
values 0 and 1, where 1 indicates overeducation. On the contrary, columns 
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referring to the three SA indicators report values between 0 and 1, which 
represent, for each occupational category, the proportion of overeducated workers. 
The number of graduates in our sample per occupational category is reported in 
the last column. 
It is immediately clear that the five indicators completely agree in identifying 
as non-graduate jobs those belonging to the groups 4 (Clerical workers), 5 
(Service and Sales Workers), 6 (Craft, skilled manual workers and agricultural, 
forestry and fishery workers), 7 (Plant and machine operators) and 8 (Other 
elementary workers)
16
. The five measures generally agree also in considering the 
occupational categories included in Group 2 (Professionals) as adequate for 
graduates. The higher disagreement can be found in correspondence of the 
occupations belonging to the Groups 1 (Managers and Legislators) and 3 
(Technicians and Associate Professionals). It is interesting to note that, while in 
the former case SA indicators are the most pessimistic, in the latter case 
occupations are more often defined as not adequate for graduates on the basis of 
RMmd. JA sometimes resembles RMmd, while in some other cases offers results 
more similar to that of the various SA indicators. This finding suggest that SA 
indicators better capture the utilization of skills on-the-job, while statistical 
indicators merely represent the distribution of educational levels within 
occupational categories. In the group of technicians, in fact, we found jobs that, 
until recent years, were held by non-graduate workers. On the contrary, in the 
Group 1, we find managerial professions traditionally held by tertiary graduates. 
3.6 The determinants of overeducation 
In this paragraph the determinants of overeducation are investigated across 
indicators and the sensitivity of these estimates to the employed measure is 
assessed. In order to have comparable results across different measures, Table 
3.9
17
 reports average marginal effects instead of logit coefficients. 
                                                 
16 In these cases, the disagreement is generally attributable to the little number of graduates 
employed in the occupational category (see, for example, the occupational category 7.1.3) 
17 The same analyses have been conducted separately for BA and MA graduates (results reported 
in the Appendix). However, the general pattern of results does not change. 
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We start our discussion with results that are consistent across measures. Some 
factors are clearly not relevant for the explanation of overeducation, regardless of 
the employed measure: these are, in particular, the matriculation year and the level 
of parents’ education. Both results are not surprising: on the one side, the eventual 
association between the year of matriculation and overeducation is likely to be 
hidden by the included variable for the number of years of graduation delay 
(which is, indeed, significantly associated with the dependent variables); on the 
other side, the effect of parents’ education is likely to be mediated by the effect of 
social origin (also in this case the coefficients are indeed statistically significant).  
Tab. 3.9 The determinants of overeducation. Logit models, average marginal effects 
  
SAg SAhm SAp RMmd JA 
Sex Male Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Female -0.01 0.01 0.020*** 0.017** 0.044*** 
  
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Age 
 
0.005*** 0.006*** -0.001 -0.005*** -0.005*** 
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Parents' Education Primary or Less Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Lower secondary -0.005 -0.003 0.000 -0.005 -0.007 
  
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
 
Upper secondary -0.01 -0.003 0.006 0.005 0.003 
  
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
 
Tertiary -0.027* -0.024 -0.002 -0.008 -0.013 
  
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) 
 
NA -0.018 -0.006 -0.049 -0.033 -0.007 
  
(0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.045) (0.042) 
Social origin Entrepreneurs Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Professionals -0.054*** -0.050*** -0.024 -0.078*** -0.029* 
  
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) 
 
Managers -0.066*** -0.049** -0.02 -0.057*** -0.002 
  
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) 
 
Clerks -0.034** -0.031** 0.001 -0.045*** 0.009 
  
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
 
Self-Employed -0.027* -0.024 0.008 -0.038** 0.008 
  
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) 
 
Executive workers -0.036** -0.035** -0.002 -0.034* 0.012 
  
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) 
 
Manual workers -0.041** -0.039** 0.007 -0.033* 0.011 
  
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) 
 
NA -0.025 -0.018 0.016 -0.029 0.006 
  
(0.029) (0.03) (0.032) (0.031) (0.029) 
Area of 
Athenaeum North Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Centre 0.017* 0.009 0.017* -0.002 0.001 
  
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
 
South and Islands 0.013* 0.008 0.002 -0.026*** -0.011 
  
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Type of secondary 
degree Scientific lyceum Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Classical lyceum -0.011 -0.005 -0.008 -0.030*** -0.020* 
  
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
 
Other lyceum -0.005 -0.005 -0.007 0.039*** -0.015 
  
(0.009) (0.009) (0.01) (0.01) (0.009) 
 
Technical school 0.013* 0.016* 0.016* 0.020** 0.004 
  
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
 
Vocational school 0.018 0.019 0.014 0.041** 0.033* 
  
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) 
(continue) 
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SAg SAhm SAp RMmd JA 
Secondary 
graduation mark 
 
-0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Matriculation 
Year 1999-2000 or later Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
1998-1999 or before 0.016 0.006 0.000 -0.003 0.000 
  
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Field of study Mathematics Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
ICT and Engineering 0.007 -0.002 0.029 0.001 -0.029* 
  
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) 
 
Natural Sciences 0.172*** 0.184*** 0.121*** 0.192*** 0.215*** 
  
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
 
Pharmacy, Veterinary -0.083*** -0.100*** -0.089*** -0.219*** -0.061*** 
  
(0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.021) 
     
 
 
 
Medicine -0.177*** -0.200*** -0.178*** -0.394*** -0.204*** 
  
(0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.016) (0.014) 
 
Medical Professions -0.169*** -0.200*** -0.198*** -0.385*** -0.188*** 
  
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) 
 
Architecture 0.041* 0.023 0.004 -0.078*** -0.013 
  
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) 
 
Business, Administration, 
Statistics 0.166*** 0.188*** 0.161*** 0.300*** 0.430*** 
  
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) 
 
Social sciences 0.300*** 0.353*** 0.236*** 0.264*** 0.364*** 
  
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
 
Law 0.095*** 0.102*** 0.033 0.078*** 0.213*** 
  
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) 
 
Arts and Humanities 0.338*** 0.365*** 0.247*** 0.252*** 0.347*** 
  
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) 
 
Education, Psychology 0.109*** 0.113*** 0.023 0.158*** -0.055*** 
  
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.016) 
Tertiary 
graduation mark 66-90 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
91-100 -0.015 -0.023 -0.005 -0.007 -0.001 
  
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
 
101-105 -0.027* -0.030** -0.008 -0.017 -0.016 
  
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
 
106-110 -0.046*** -0.053*** -0.029* -0.031** -0.021 
  
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
 
110 cum laude -0.070*** -0.074*** -0.064*** -0.047*** -0.048*** 
  
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
Type of degree Pre-reform Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Master 0.014 0.024** 0.073*** -0.029** 0.036*** 
  
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
 
Bachelor 0.161*** 0.168*** 0.113*** 0.152*** 0.140*** 
  
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Graduation delay 
 
0.017*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.004 0.013*** 
  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Other formative 
activities No Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Yes -0.064*** -0.065*** -0.055*** -0.068*** -0.053*** 
  
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Current job started Before graduation Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
After graduation -0.189*** -0.174*** -0.101*** -0.058*** -0.003 
  
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.01) (0.009) 
     
 
 Pseudo R2 
 
0.165 0.177 0.106 0.234 0.239 
N 
 
25,518 25,518 25,811 25,811 25,811 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Some factors are instead found to be consistently relevant for the explanation 
of overeducation, meaning that both the direction and the magnitude of the 
association are similar across measures. These are mainly education-related 
variables. Secondary and tertiary graduation marks are found to be negatively 
associated with the risk of overeducation, which is also found to be higher among 
BA graduates. As expected, one of the main relevant variables is field of study. 
Results reported in Table 3.9 resemble the bivariate findings shown in Table 3.1: 
overeducation measures deliver almost the same ranking of fields of study on the 
basis of the corresponding risk of overeducation. On the one side, we have fields 
that yield the lowest risk of overeducation: these are Medicine, Medical 
Professions, Pharmacy and Veterinary. On the other side, the Humanities, Social 
Sciences, Education, Psychology, Natural Sciences, Economics and Statistics 
present the highest risk of overeducation. The third group, which stays in the 
middle, includes Mathematics, Architecture and Engineering. For what concerns 
the other factors, outcomes are sensitive to the employed measure. In particular, 
the compared indicators disagree in correspondence of the main socio-
demographic variables. First of all, the coefficient for women is positive and 
statistically significant on the basis of SAp, RMmd and JA, while is not significant 
on the basis of SAg and SAhm. Again, age is found to be positively correlated with 
overeducation measured by SAg and SAhm, not statistically correlated with 
overeducation measured by SAp, and negatively correlated with overeducation 
measured by RMmd and JA. Also the evidence concerning the incidence of 
overeducation across Italian regions—which does not confirm at all the bivariate 
results reported in Table 3.3—provides inconsistent results. According to SAg, 
overeducation is more widespread in the Centre and in the South of Italy, while 
RMmd delivers opposed results. The last interesting result concerns the association 
between social origin and overeducation, which is statistically significant 
according to SAg, SAhm and RMmd, but not according to SAp and JA.   
As suggested by van der Velden and van Smoorenburg (1997), the 
differences between indicators might be partially driven by objective indicators, 
such as RMmd and JA, being occupation-based, while the three SA indicators 
being, by definition, subjective. For this reason, Table 3.10 reports the estimates 
of the determinants of overeducation, measured with three new indicators: these 
are simple averages, by occupational category, of the three SA indicators. In other 
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words, each occupational category is considered not adequate for graduates if the 
majority of individuals belonging to that category are overeducated according to 
the original SA indicators (see Tab. 3.8). The general pattern of results does not 
significantly change, but, as expected, the differences between objective and 
subjective indicators slightly decrease. In particular, the coefficients for gender 
and age are now found to be more similar to the one delivered by RMmd and JA: 
women and younger individuals present a higher risk of overeducation. 
Tab. 3.10 The determinants of overeducation with dummy indicators. Logit models, average 
marginal effects 
    SAg_job SAhm_job SAp_job 
Sex Male Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Female 0.026*** 0.012** 0.029*** 
  
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Age 
 
-0.003*** -0.002** -0.003*** 
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Parents' Education Primary or Less Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Lower secondary 0.008 0.010 0.005 
  
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
 
Upper secondary 0.015 0.022** 0.012 
  
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) 
 
Tertiary 0.007 0.017 0.001 
  
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
 
NA -0.003 -0.001 -0.010 
  
(0.036) (0.038) (0.036) 
Social origin Entrepreneurs Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Professionals -0.057*** -0.067*** -0.040*** 
  
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
 
Managers -0.062*** -0.073*** -0.043*** 
  
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) 
 
Clerks -0.045*** -0.059*** -0.026** 
  
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) 
 
Self-Employed -0.028** -0.036*** -0.011 
  
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) 
 
Executive workers -0.044*** -0.054*** -0.027** 
  
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) 
 
Manual workers -0.033*** -0.045*** -0.015 
  
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) 
 
NA -0.028 -0.039 -0.010 
  
(0.026) (0.027) (0.026) 
Area of residence North Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Centre 0.014** 0.016*** 0.016*** 
  
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
 
South and Islands 0.012** 0.012** 0.015** 
  
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Type of secondary degree Scientific lyceum Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Classical lyceum -0.007 -0.004 -0.008 
  
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
 
Other lyceum -0.004 -0.023*** -0.003 
  
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
 
Technical school 0.001 0.000 0.001 
  
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
 
Vocational school 0.027** 0.033** 0.027** 
  
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
Secondary graduation mark -0.001*** -0.001*** -0,001*** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  
  
 
    
    (continue) 
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    SAg_job SAhm_job SAp_job 
Matriculation Year 1999-2000 or later Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
1998-1999 or before -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 
  
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
Field of study Mathematics Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
ICT and Engineering -0.032*** -0.039*** -0.025** 
  
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
 
Natural Sciences 0.158*** 0.160*** 0.159*** 
  
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
 
Pharmacy, Veterinary -0.010 -0.007 -0.005 
  
(0.018) (0.020) (0.018) 
 
Medicine -0.113*** -0.123*** -0.107*** 
  
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) 
 
Medical Professions -0.109*** -0.124*** -0.105*** 
  
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) 
 
Architecture 0.047*** 0.038** 0.051*** 
  
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
 
Business and Administration, Statistics 0.202*** 0.196*** 0.198*** 
  
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) 
 
Social sciences 0.298*** 0.356*** 0.291*** 
  
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
 
Law 0.123*** 0.124*** 0.128*** 
  
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
 
Arts and Humanities 0.340*** 0.428*** 0.337*** 
  
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
 
Education, Psychology 0.019 0.162*** 0.009 
  
(0.014) (0.016) (0.014) 
Tertiary graduation mark 66-90 Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
91-100 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
 
101-105 -0.020** -0.020** -0.010 
  
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
 
106-110 -0.020** -0.030*** -0.020** 
  
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
 
110 cum laude -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.050*** 
  
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Type of tertiary degree Pre-reform Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Master 0.016** 0.029*** 0.019** 
  
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
 
Bachelor 0.116*** 0.128*** 0.116*** 
  
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Years of graduation delay 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 
  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Other formative activities No Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Yes -0.046*** -0.044*** -0.044*** 
  
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Current job started Before graduation Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
After graduation -0.033*** -0.072*** -0.031*** 
  
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Pseudo R2 
 
0.183 0.198 0.180 
N  25,811 25,811 25,811 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
3.7 The effects of overeducation 
So far, we have seen that results are sensitive to the employed measurement 
instrument. The incidence of overeducation varies across indicators, whose 
correlation and correspondence are, however, a little bit higher than expected. 
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Moreover, our results suggest the pattern of determinants to be similar across 
measures, with the only relevant exception concerning the influence of socio-
demographic variables. We have shown, though, that a huge part of this difference 
derives from the different nature of the compared indicators: RMmd and JA are 
fixed within occupations, while the three SA vary individually. 
In the following, the criterion validity of the five instruments is examined, by 
investigating their predictive value for three relevant criteria: earnings, job 
satisfaction and job search. A first look at descriptive results (Fig. 3.1) confirms 
that these variables are significantly associated with overeducation: overeducated 
workers earn lower wages, are less satisfied with their jobs and look more 
frequently for a new occupation. These findings are robust over measures. 
However, SA indicators generally deliver a wider gap between overeducated and 
correctly allocated individuals. 
Fig. 3.1 Net monthly wage, job satisfaction, and job search by overeducation status 
 
3.7.1 Overeducation and earnings 
Table 3.11 illustrates the results of OLS models for the logarithm of net 
monthly income. In addition to the dummy indicator of overeducation, control 
variables are included as described in the Empirical strategy section.  
All the included covariates go in the expected direction. For what concerns the 
main socio-demographic variables, we observe, for example, that women earn 
significantly less (nearly 10%) than men and that wages tend to increase with age. 
Additionally, as expected, earnings are significantly higher in Northern than 
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Southern Italian regions, and are significantly associated with graduates’ social 
origin. Also the variables for graduates’ educational curriculum—that might be 
considered as proxy of ability and motivation—affect wages as predicted by the 
literature: on the one side, the higher the secondary and tertiary graduation marks, 
the higher wages graduates will earn; on the other side, a lower income is 
observed for graduates coming from vocational and technical upper secondary 
education, and for individuals who have delayed graduation. Finally, wages 
strongly differ across fields of study—with a net advantage of scientific and 
technical fields—and on the basis of job characteristics: unstable contracts and 
part time work guarantee lower earnings. 
Turning to the indicators of interest, we observe that, as expected, 
overeducated individuals earn less than adequately educated counterparts. 
However, this negative effect is found to be statistically significantly only when 
overeducation measured by subjective indicators: overeducated workers earn 
around 5% less than adequately matched graduates. On the contrary, the 
coefficients for RMmd and JA are found not to be statistically significant, although 
they present the expected negative sign. 
This unexpected result might somehow depend on the different nature of the 
analysed indicators. The absence of results for the occupation-based indicator—
RMmd and JA—may be partly due to  the combination of two circumstances: the 
risk of overeducation is not equally distributed among BA and MA graduates and, 
at the same time, the former are likely to hold lower-level occupational positions 
and to earn lower wages then the latter. In other words, these not significant 
findings may be the result of a compositional effect, which depends from a 
different distribution of BA and MA graduates in graduate and non-graduate jobs, 
and in high- or low-wage profile jobs. 
In order to test this hypothesis, the same models have been conducted 
separately on BA and MA graduates. As expected, results significantly change 
(see Tab. C.1 and C.2 in the Appendix). Among BA graduates we observe that 
overeducated workers earn significantly less—from about 6% to more than 9%—
than their adequately matched counterparts. Not surprisingly, the higher 
coefficient is that for SAp, which also produce a larger increase in the explanatory 
power of the model. Oddish results are instead found among MA graduates.
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Tab. 3.11 The effect of overeducation on earnings. OLS models. 
  
SAg SAhm SAp RMmd JA 
SAg 
 
-0.059*** 
    
  
(0.005) 
    SAhm 
  
-0.046*** 
   
   
(0.005) 
   SAp 
   
-0.052*** 
  
    
(0.005) 
  RMmd 
    
-0.006 
 
     
(0.005) 
 JA 
     
-0.006 
      
(0.005) 
Sex Male Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Female -0.091*** -0.091*** -0.090*** -0.091*** -0.091*** 
  
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Age 
 
0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Parents' Education Primary or Less Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Lower secondary -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
 
Upper secondary 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
 
Tertiary 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
  
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
 
NA 0.006 0.007 0.002 0.002 0.002 
  
(0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Social origin Entrepreneurs Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Professionals -0.032* -0.031* -0.031* -0.030* -0.030* 
  
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
 
Managers 0.024 0.025 0.026 0.026 0.027* 
  
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
 
Clerks -0.036** -0.036** -0.033** -0.033** -0.033** 
  
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
 
Self-Employed -0.033** -0.032** -0.029** -0.030** -0.030** 
  
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
 
Executive workers -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.048*** 
  
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
 
Manual workers -0.046*** -0.045*** -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.043*** 
  
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
 
NA -0.029 -0.028 -0.016 -0.019 -0.019 
  
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
(continue) 
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SAg SAhm SAp RMmd JA 
Area of residence North Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Centre -0.048*** -0.049*** -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.048*** 
  
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
 
South and Islands -0.097*** -0.097*** -0.097*** -0.098*** -0.098*** 
  
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Type of secondary degree Scientific lyceum Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Classical lyceum -0.011 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 
  
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
 
Other lyceum 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.011 
  
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
 
Technical school -0.012* -0.012* -0.011* -0.012* -0.012* 
  
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
 
Vocational school -0.027* -0.027* -0.025* -0.025* -0.025* 
  
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Secondary graduation mark 
 
0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Matriculation Year 1999-2000 or later Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
1998-1999 or before -0.010 -0.011 -0.010 -0.011 -0.011 
  
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Field of study Mathematics Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
ICT and Engineering 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 
  
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
 
Natural Sciences -0.100*** -0.101*** -0.102*** -0.107*** -0.107*** 
  
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
 
Pharmacy, Veterinary -0.034 -0.032 -0.036 -0.033 -0.032 
  
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
 
Medicine 0.229*** 0.230*** 0.230*** 0.234*** 0.235*** 
  
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) 
 
Medical Professions 0.056*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.066*** 0.067*** 
  
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
 
Architecture -0.131*** -0.132*** -0.133*** -0.135*** -0.134*** 
  
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
 
Business and Administration, Statistics 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.002 0.003 
  
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
 
Social sciences -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.060*** -0.070*** -0.069*** 
  
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) 
 
Law -0.113*** -0.114*** -0.118*** -0.121*** -0.120*** 
  
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
 
Arts and Humanities -0.109*** -0.111*** -0.117*** -0.128*** -0.127*** 
  
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
 
Education, Psychology -0.081*** -0.081*** -0.083*** -0.082*** -0.083*** 
  
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013)  (0.013) (0.013) 
(continue) 
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SAg SAhm SAp RMmd JA 
Tertiary graduation mark 66-90 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
91-100 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008 
  
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
 
101-105 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.012 0.012 
  
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
 
106-110 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.015 0.015 
  
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
 
110 cum laude 0.033** 0.033*** 0.032** 0.035*** 0.035*** 
  
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Type of tertiary degree Pre-reform Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Master 0.015 0.016* 0.018* 0.014 0.014 
  
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
 
Bachelor -0.004 -0.006 -0.011 -0.016 -0.016* 
  
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Years of graduation delay 
 
-0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.018*** 
  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Other formative activities No Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Yes -0.017** -0.016** -0.016** -0.013** -0.013** 
  
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Current job started Before graduation Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
After graduation -0.004 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.007 
  
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Type of contract Stable Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Unstable -0.077*** -0.077*** -0.076*** -0.077*** -0.077*** 
  
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Working time Full time Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Part time -0.464*** -0.466*** -0.469*** -0.471*** -0.471*** 
  
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Constant 
 
7.107*** 7.102*** 7.111*** 7.093*** 7.091*** 
  
0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 
R2 
 
0.326 0.324 0.326 0.322 0.322 
N 
 
20,197 20,197 21,168 21,168 21,168 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Coefficients for SAg, SAhm and SAp slightly decrease, but they still remain 
statistically significant; the coefficient for JA changes sign, though still being not 
significant; finally, the coefficient for RMmd even become positive and 
statistically significant, meaning that overeducated individuals, according to this 
measure, earn more than adequately educated workers. This result is quite 
surprising, if compared with the main findings in the literature, but is perfectly in 
line with the figures depicted in Tab. 3.8. According to the RM criterion we can 
indeed observe a prevalence of overeducation among individuals employed as 
Technicians and Associate Professionals (Group 3) and Armed Forces (Group 9): 
not only these workers are often considered as adequately educated by the other 
indicators but, as reported in Figure 3.2, they are also likely to earn relatively high 
wages. 
Fig. 3.2 Average net monthly income by 1-digit occupational category 
 
3.7.2 Overeducation and job satisfaction 
Table 3.12 reports the estimation results for the analysis of job satisfaction. 
Also in this case, the coefficients for the included covariates go in the expected 
direction: job satisfaction seems to be directly associated with the factors that, 
according to the literature, help graduates in obtaining a better job position (in 
terms of prestige of the occupation, wages, contract stability, working time, etc.). 
We can observe, indeed, that females are significantly less satisfied than males,
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Tab. 3.12  The effect of overeducation on job satisfaction. OLS models 
  
SAg SAhm SAp RMmd JA 
SAg 
 
-0.296*** 
    
  
(0.014) 
    
SAhm   
-0.279*** 
   
   
(0.014) 
   
SAp    
-0.387*** 
  
    
(0.013) 
  
RMmd 
    
-0.112*** 
 
     
(0.014) 
 
JA 
     
-0.178*** 
      
(0.015) 
Sex Male Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Female -0.122*** -0.121*** -0.115*** -0.12*** -0.114*** 
  
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Age 
 
-0.004* -0.004* -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** 
  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Parents' Education Primary or Less Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Lower secondary -0.016 -0.015 -0.015 -0.017 -0.017 
  
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
 
Upper secondary 0.018 0.02 0.022 0.019 0.02 
  
(0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) 
 
Tertiary -0.004 -0.002 0.003 0.001 0 
  
(0.031) (0.031) (0.03) (0.031) (0.03) 
 
NA 0.044 0.048 0.032 0.044 0.046 
  
(0.097) (0.097) (0.096) (0.098) (0.097) 
Social origin Entrepreneurs Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Professionals -0.057 -0.055 -0.046 -0.046 -0.042 
  
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
 
Managers -0.026 -0.02 -0.019 -0.018 -0.011 
  
(0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) 
 
Clerks -0.122*** -0.12*** -0.111*** -0.115*** -0.108*** 
  
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
 
Self-employed -0.114*** -0.112*** -0.103*** -0.11*** -0.104*** 
  
(0.03) (0.03) (0.029) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
Executive workers -0.179*** -0.177*** -0.167*** -0.17*** -0.164*** 
  
(0.03) (0.03) (0.029) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
Manual workers -0.129*** -0.127*** -0.112*** -0.117*** -0.112*** 
  
(0.03) (0.03) (0.029) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
NA -0.086 -0.083 -0.089 -0.098 -0.093 
  
(0.067) (0.067) (0.065) (0.066) (0. 066) 
(continue) 
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SAg SAhm SAp RMmd JA 
Area of residence North Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Centre -0.113*** -0.116*** -0.115*** -0.121*** -0.12*** 
  
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
 
South and Islands -0.164*** -0.166*** -0.172*** -0.173*** -0.172*** 
  
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Type of secondary degree Scientific Lyceum Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Classical Lyceum -0.021 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.02 
  
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
Other Lyceum 0.06** 0.06** 0.058** 0.065** 0.059** 
  
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
 
Technical school 0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.002 -0.003 
  
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
 
Vocational school 0.002 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
  
(0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) 
Secondary graduation mark 
 
0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Matriculation Year 1999-2000 or later Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
1998-1999 or before -0.023 -0.026 -0.025 -0.025 -0.025 
  
(0.02) (0.02) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Field of study Mathematics Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
ICT and Engineering -0.006 -0.007 0.005 -0.007 -0.013 
  
(0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) 
 
Natural Sciences -0.01 -0.007 -0.007 -0.029 -0.015 
  
(0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) 
 
Pharmacy, Veterinary 0.065 0.064 0.061 0.07 0.082 
  
(0.053) (0.052) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) 
 
Medicine 0.45*** 0.448*** 0.437*** 0.45*** 0.463*** 
  
(0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) 
 
Medical Professions 0.1** 0.099** 0.085* 0.122*** 0.126*** 
  
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) 
 
Architecture -0.207*** -0.21*** -0.211*** -0.221*** -0.215*** 
  
(0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) 
 
Business and Administration, Statistics 0.144*** 0.149*** 0.163*** 0.135*** 0.176*** 
  
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) 
 
Social sciences -0.077 0.006 0.001 -0.057 -0.024 
  
(0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) 
 
Law 0.062 0.065 0.051 0.046 0.074* 
  
(0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) 
 
Arts and Humanities 0.011 0.016 0.013 -0.046 -0.016 
  
(0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) 
       
(continue) 
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SAg SAhm SAp RMmd JA 
 
Education, Psychology 0.122*** 0.124*** 0.105** 0.121*** 0.091* 
  
(0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) 
Tertiary graduation mark 66-90 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
91-100 0.029 0.026 0.03 0.031 0.032 
  
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
 
101-105 0.018 0.017 0.025 0.026 0.025 
  
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
 
106-110 0.031 0.029 0.035 0.042 0.042 
  
(0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) 
 
110 cum laude 0.066* 0.065* 0.063* 0.081** 0.078* 
  
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Type of tertiary degree Pre-reform Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Master 0.02 0.023 0.048* 0.0116 0.026 
  
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
 
Bachelor 0.071*** 0.069*** 0.068*** 0.038 0.048* 
  
(0.02) (0.02) (0.019) (0.02) (0.02) 
Years of graduation delay 
 
-0.039*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.045*** -0.044*** 
  
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Other formative activities No Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Yes -0.03* -0.029* -0.032** -0.017 -0.019 
  
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Current job started Before graduation Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
After graduation -0.048* -0.039 -0.025 0.01 0.017 
  
(0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.03) 
Type of contract Stable Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Unstable -0.401*** -0.400*** -0.395*** -0.401*** -0.401*** 
  
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
Working time Full time Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Part time -0.324*** -0.328*** -0.325*** -0.344*** -0.343*** 
  
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
NA -0.240*** -0.243*** -0.239*** -0.251*** -0.256*** 
  
(0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) 
Constant 
 
0.360 0.0352 0.406 0.301 0.286 
  
(0.097) (0.097) (0.095) (0.097) (0.096) 
R2 
 
0.136 0.135 0.150 0.124 0.126 
N 
 
25,301 25,301 25,592 25,592 25,592 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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that job satisfaction decreases as we move from Northern to Southern Italy, and 
that social origins play a relevant role, with sons of lower classes less satisfied 
than individuals from the Service Class. Interestingly, we find that job satisfaction 
is slightly affected by graduates’ educational achievement: only the coefficients 
for secondary graduation mark and years of graduation delay are found to be 
significantly associated with, respectively, higher and lower level of job 
satisfaction. Also field of study seems not to play a relevant role in determining 
the level of satisfaction. However, we can observe some important exceptions: 
graduates from Medicine, Medical Professions, Business and Administration, 
Education and Psychology are much more satisfied with their jobs. Finally, as 
expected, job satisfaction is significantly associated with job characteristics: part-
timers and unstable workers are found to be less satisfied then, respectively, full-
time and stable workers. 
In line with earlier findings (Allen and Van der Velden, 2001; Verhaest and 
Omey, 2006c), all the coefficients for the overeducation dummies are negative 
and statistically significant, meaning that overeducated workers are less satisfied 
with their job than adequately matched individuals, regardless of the measurement 
instruments. The difference between indicators in terms of magnitude is, however, 
appreciable. In particular, as expected (Battu et al., 2000), SAp yields the biggest 
coefficient, while the lowest association with job satisfaction is recorded by 
overeducation measured through RMmd. The other indicators fall in-between, with 
SAg and SAhm indicators overcoming JA.  
3.7.3 Overeducation and job search 
We have seen that overeducation has important effects on both wages and job 
satisfaction. The following analyses try to shed light on the possibility that it also 
translates in behavioural consequences for workers. In other words, we are trying 
to understand if workers who are classified (or perceive themselves) as 
overeducated are more prone to quitting their job in favour of another one. Thus, 
in this section the effect of overeducation on the propensity of graduates of 
looking for a new job is analyzed. 
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Tab. 3.13 The effect of overeducation on job search. Logit models, average marginal effects. 
  
SAg SAhm SAp RMmd JA 
SAg 
 
0.059*** 
    
  
(0.005) 
    SAhm 
  
0.061*** 
   
   
(0.005) 
   SAp 
   
0.073*** 
  
    
(0.005) 
  RMmd 
    
0.023*** 
 
     
(0.005) 
 JA 
     
0.039*** 
      
(0.005) 
Sex Male Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Female 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 
  
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Age 
 
-0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002** -0.002* 
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Parents' Education Primary or Less Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Lower secondary 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
  
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
 
Upper secondary -0.012 -0.012 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 
  
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
 
Tertiary -0.019 -0.018 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
  
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
 
NA -0.053 -0.055 -0.053 -0.056 -0.056 
  
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
Social origin Entrepreneurs Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Professionals 0.023 0.023 0.021 0.021 0.02 
  
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
 
Managers 0.055*** 0.054*** 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 
  
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
 
Clerks 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.041*** 
  
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
 
Self-Employed 0.026* 0.026* 0.024* 0.025* 0.024* 
  
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
 
Executive workers 0.035** 0.035** 0.033** 0.033** 0.033** 
  
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
 
Manual workers 0.027* 0.027* 0.024* 0.025* 0.024* 
  
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
 
NA 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.016 0.011 
  
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0. 025) (0.025) 
(continue) 
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SAg SAhm SAp RMmd JA 
Area of residence North Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Centre 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 
  
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
 
South and Islands 0.048*** 0.049*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 
  
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Type of secondary degree Scientific lyceum Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Classical lyceum 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 
  
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
 
Other lyceum -0.019* -0.019* -0.019* -0.020** -0.019* 
  
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
 
Technical school 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 
  
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
 
Vocational school -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
  
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Secondary graduation mark 
 
-0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Matriculation Year 1999-2000 or later Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
1998-1999 or before 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 
  
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Field of study Mathematics Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
ICT and Engineering 0.024 0.024 0.020 0.024 0.025 
  
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
 
Natural Sciences 0.010 0.009 0.011 0.015 0.011 
  
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
 
Pharmacy, Veterinary -0.075*** -0.075*** -0.075*** -0.076*** -0.079*** 
  
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
 
Medicine -0.103*** -0.103*** -0.099*** -0.101*** -0.103*** 
  
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
 
Medical Professions -0.093*** -0.092*** -0.092*** -0.097*** -0.098*** 
  
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
 
Architecture -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 
  
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
 
Business and Administration, Statistics -0.038** -0.040** -0.042** -0.035** -0.045** 
  
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
 
Social sciences -0.008 -0.013 -0.010 0.003 -0.005 
  
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
 
Law -0.053*** -0.055*** -0.051*** -0.050*** -0.056*** 
  
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
 
Arts and Humanities -0.008 -0.011 -0.009 0.003 -0.005 
  
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
 
Education, Psychology -0.070*** -0.071*** -0.072*** -0.075*** -0.070*** 
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SAg SAhm SAp RMmd JA 
  
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
Tertiary graduation mark 66-90 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
91-100 -0.005 -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
  
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
 
101-105 -0.013 -0.012 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 
  
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
 
106-110 -0.016 -0.015 -0.016 -0.018 -0.018 
  
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
 
110 cum laude -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.036*** -0.035*** 
   
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Type of tertiary degree Pre-reform Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Master 0.025** 0.024** 0.021* 0.028*** 0.026** 
  
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
 
Bachelor -0.023** -0.024** -0.021** -0.016* -0.018** 
  
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Years of graduation delay 
 
0.002 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.004 
  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Other formative activities No Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Yes 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 
  
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Current job started Before graduation Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
After graduation 0.015 0.014 0.011 0.005 0.004 
  
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Type of contract Stable Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Unstable 0.110*** 0.110*** 0.107*** 0.190*** 0.109*** 
  
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Working time Full time Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Part time 0.107*** 0.108*** 0.110*** 0.115*** 0.114*** 
  
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
 
NA 0.096*** 0.097*** 0.097*** 0.101*** 0.102*** 
  
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Pseudo R2 
 
0.093 0.093 0.097 0.089 0.090 
N 
 
25,518 25,518 25,811 25,811 25,811 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(continue) 
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Results on job search (Tab. 3.13) are consistent with those regarding job 
satisfaction. Individuals who possess characteristics that are negatively associated 
with job satisfaction—women, graduates from Southern regions, individuals from 
lower social origins, atypical and part-time workers—are more likely to be 
looking for a new job. The reverse is also true: those who have been previously 
found to be more satisfied workers—principal reference here is made to the 
coefficients for fields of study—are now found to be less likely to look for new 
job opportunities.  
Also in this case, the coefficients for the indicators of overeducation go in the 
expected direction: overeducated workers are more likely to be looking for a new 
job. Again, the strongest association between job search and overeducation is 
found when the phenomenon is measured through SAp, while the lowest 
association is found in correspondence of RMmd. The other SA indicators and JA 
fall in between
18
. 
3.8 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter we have tested the validity of five indicators of overeducation, 
by comparing the estimates of the incidence and determinants of the phenomenon, 
by analysing the correspondence and correlation between measures, and by 
assessing their predictive power on three relevant outcomes, namely wage, job 
satisfaction and job search. 
First of all, we have observed that the estimates for the incidence of 
overeducation are more similar across indicators than is usually found in the 
literature: according to SA and JA indicators, about one graduate out of three is 
overeducated. Only the RM indicator delivers a higher estimate of the 
phenomenon. Also the correlation and correspondence between different 
indicators are higher than what expected on the basis of the existing empirical 
evidence. We have seen, indeed, that the five indicators agree in classifying as 
over- or adequately educated more than a half of students in our sample. The main 
differences concern individuals who are employed as managers and legislators 
                                                 
18
 Results do not change if the analyses are separately conducted on BA and MA graduates (results 
from these models are reported in the Appendix). 
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(Group 1) or as technicians and associate professionals (Group 3). In particular, 
the former are generally classified as overeducated by SAg and SAhm, while are 
considered as adequately educated by SAp and JA. On the contrary, the latter are 
classified as overeducated mainly by RM. 
Some important differences are found across indicators when the 
determinants of overeducation are estimated. In particular we have seen the effect 
of socio-demographic variables to differ across measures. According to the two 
occupation-based indicators and SAp, the risk of overeducation is higher among 
women, while no significant difference between male and female graduates is 
found by the other two subjective indicators. Moreover, SAg and SAhm differ from 
the other indicators in that they found the phenomenon of interest to be 
significantly associated with age and social origin. 
Finally, also the analysis of the association between overeducation and the 
three selected outcome variables shows interesting differences between the 
various indicators. First, the expected negative association between overeducation 
and earnings is found only with subjective indicators, with the coefficients for 
SAg overcoming those for SAhm and SAp. Second, the negative association 
between overeducation and job satisfaction is found to be robust across measures. 
However, the magnitude of the coefficients for overeducation differs. The 
coefficient for SAp is higher than those for SAg and SAhm, while JA and RMmd 
show the lowest values. A similar result is found for job search: overeducated 
workers are found to be more prone to look for a new job, but this association is 
stronger when the phenomenon is measured by SAp, followed by the other two 
subjective indicators. 
These results help in drawing some main conclusions about the validity of the 
five compared indicators. First of all, RM seems not to be a well-suited measure 
of overeducation. It tends to overestimate the phenomenon, probably because it 
identifies as non-graduate jobs some occupational positions (namely those in 
Group 3) that, on the contrary, are considered as graduate jobs by the other 
measures. Moreover, it often differs from the other indicators in both the 
significance and the magnitude of the association between overeducation and its 
determinants and effects. These results suggest that this indicator is capable, more 
than others, to represent the distribution of educational levels within job 
categories, rather than the mismatch between individuals’ educational skills and 
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the knowledge and competences required to adequately carry out job tasks. This 
finding comes with no surprise and confirms the existing evidence described in 
the previous chapters. 
Results for JA are less clear. Sometimes they resemble findings for SAp, 
suggesting that this measure approaches the concept of overeducation as 
mismatch between individual education and that required to perform the job. In 
other cases JA behaves like RMmd. The similarity between these two indicators 
probably lies in their occupation-based nature, that is to say, in the fact that they 
do not recognize the eventual heterogeneity within job categories. Thus, this 
indicator seems to be a good alternative to SAp when the subjective indicator is 
not available in the data. However, our results suggest that—whenever it is 
possible—it is recommendable to employ subjective indicators of overeducation, 
which are the most informative ones, since they are able to catch within-
occupation variability. 
Finally, when it turns to subjective indicators, a demarcation is found 
between SAg and SAhm, on the one side, and SAp, on the other. No relevant 
difference is found between SAg and Sahm; thus, the following discussion will 
focus on the comparison between SAg and SAp. Even though these indicators 
deliver almost the same estimates of the incidence of overeducation and are pretty 
highly correlated, some relevant differences have been found. More precisely, we 
have seen that the effect of socio-demographic variables on overeducation 
differs—both in terms of sign and magnitude—across measures. Moreover, we 
have observed that SAg delivers the strongest association between overeducation 
and wage, while SAp contributes more to the explanation of job satisfaction and 
job search.  These results are similar to the one found by Allen and van der 
Velden (2001) and by Green and McIntosh (2007). As discussed in the previous 
chapter these authors suggest to distinguishing between two closely related 
couples of concepts:  educational and skill mismatches (Allen and van der Velden 
2001) or overqualification and overskilling (Green and McIntosh 2007). In one 
case (educational mismatch/overqualification) we refer to the formal education-
job mismatch, while in the other (skill mismatch/overskilling) we are dealing with 
the actual mismatch between acquired and required skill. The author 
operationalize these concepts in a similar way: Allen and van der Velden (2001) 
measure educational mismatch through employees’ self-rating of the level of 
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education most appropriate for their current job, while Green and McIntosh 
measure overqualification on the basis of interviewees’ self-assessment of the 
level of education that would be required to someone wishing to get their current 
job. The variables for skill mismatch and overskilling are, instead based upon 
respondents’ level of agreement with statements as «My current job offers me 
sufficient scope to use my knowledge and skills» (Allen and van der Velden 
2001) and «In my current job I have enough opportunity to use the knowledge and 
skills that I have» (Green and McIntosh 2007). Both the quoted studies conclude 
that educational mismatch/overqualification more strongly affect wages, while 
skill mismatch/overskilling is a better predictor of job satisfaction and on-the-job 
search. 
In order to explain the differences observed between overqualified and 
overskilled workers, Green and McIntosh (2007) suggest that individuals within 
educational levels might be heterogeneous in terms of human capital. Therefore, 
they would only appear to be overqualified because some features of their human 
capital remain unobserved. Moreover, Allen and van der Velden (2001) underline 
that screening theory offers a sound explanation for the differential effects of 
educational mismatch/overqualification and skill mismatch/overskilling on wages. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, according to this approach, individuals are sorted in 
the labour market (and rewarded) not on the basis of their productivity, but rather 
on the basis of easily observable indicators of productivity, such as education, 
gender, and social background. If the other indicators are differently distributed 
within levels of education, a relevant portion of workers will end up in jobs which 
do not match their education and will earn less than those working at their own 
level, irrespective of their actual amount of knowledge and skills. Allen and van 
der Velden (2001) also emphasize the relevance of results relating to job 
satisfaction and on-the-job search: skill mismatch/overskilling is found to be an 
important cause of job dissatisfaction, which encourages workers to look for other 
work. This finding suggests that adjustments in the labour market are driven by 
the relation between job content and individual skills, rather than by the material 
rewards provided by work. 
All these results suggest being very careful when measuring overeducation 
with different indicators. The best choice seems to be, whenever it is possible to 
employ more than one measure of the phenomenon, being aware of the fact that 
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they are likely to indicate different but closely related concepts. For these reasons, 
in the following chapters we accept the suggestion of the aforementioned studies, 
supported by our results, of distinguishing between educational and skill 
mismatches. Both in the comparative and in the diachronic analyses that will 
follow we will employ SA indicators. They are the most suitable for an analysis 
that aims to compare the incidence of overeducation across countries and over 
time since, by definition, they are not affected by the differential distribution of 
educational levels in the labour market. Moreover, they also have been proven to 
be more valid than the other occupation-based indicators since they take into 
consideration variability within occupational categories. 
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4 Educational and skill mismatches among tertiary graduates: The effect 
of labour market institutions on fields of study differentials in 18 
countries 
4.1 Introduction 
As discussed in the Introduction, following the overall increment in 
educational attainment in developed countries the most recent literature on 
overeducation has paid particular attention to the analysis of the relationship 
between the horizontal stratification of higher education and the incidence of the 
phenomenon. Scholars generally agree in finding a smaller risk of overeducation 
among tertiary graduates from technical and scientific fields and a substantially 
higher incidence of the phenomenon among graduates from the Humanities and 
Social Sciences (Barone and Ortiz 2011).  
However, despite the growing interest for the phenomenon, in the 
overeducation literature some questions still remain unanswered. In particular, 
while the existing literature has widely documented the effect of the educational 
system on horizontal and vertical mismatches between individuals’ educations 
and jobs (Levels et al., 2014; Ortiz 2006), less is known about the effect of 
particular labour market features. What has been seldom investigated, in 
particular, is whether these factors affect not only the overall incidence of the 
phenomenon among tertiary graduates, but also its distribution among different 
fields of study. 
The main purpose of this chapter is to fill this gap by analysing the influence 
of labour market institutions on the differential risk of overeducation among 
graduates from different fields of study. In particular, data from two comparative 
surveys—REFLEX and HEGESCO—are employed to assess the impact of three 
elements that, as discussed in Chapter 1, are likely to affect not only the incidence 
but especially the distribution of overeducation among graduates: the level of 
employment protection, the regulation of access to the so-called liberal 
professions, and the propensity of welfare states to hire skilled workers. 
Moreover, on the basis of the literature reviewed in Chapter 2 and on the 
results presented in Chapter 3, in the following analyses a distinction is drawn 
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between educational and skill mismatches. As previously discussed, this 
distinction has important theoretical and methodological implications, and the 
empirical results that will be presented in the following confirm its heuristic 
value.  
4.2 Research questions and hypotheses 
It has been widely documented that field of study matters in determining 
graduates’ occupational opportunities (Kim and Kim 2003; Reimer et al. 2008), 
and the incidence of overeducation is consistent with this assessment. Graduates 
from more generalist fields of study are exposed to the highest risks of mismatch, 
whereas overeducation is less likely in vocationally oriented technical and 
scientific fields (Wolbers, 2003; Ortiz and Kucel, 2008). As discussed in Chapter 
1, these variations in the incidence of overeducation have been interpreted in light 
of theoretical approaches that differ with respect to the mechanisms connecting 
education to labour market opportunities (van de Werfhorst, 2011). 
First, in a human capital framework, education is considered as an indicator 
of productive skills (Becker, 1964). If we assume that a worker’s productivity is a 
function of both the amount and type of skills acquired through education and that 
graduates from occupation-specific fields are generally more productive, we can 
expect that overeducation is less widespread in technical and scientific fields than 
in the generalist fields of the Humanities and Social Sciences (Reimer et al. 
2008).  
Second, education may be considered as a positional good, i.e., a signal of 
motivation and ability used by employers to predict the productivity of potential 
workers in contexts of imperfect information (Spence 1973; Stiglitz 1975). 
According to this approach, employers prefer graduates from technical and 
scientific fields because these fields are perceived as more selective. 
Third, education may function as a means for social closure. Educational 
qualifications may serve as instruments of exclusion, as they strictly regulate the 
access to specific occupations (Collins 1979; Parkin 1979). As discussed above, 
this framework is particularly useful to interpret horizontal differentiation in 
occupational opportunities, since graduates from several fields—such as 
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Medicine, Architecture, Engineering and Law—are intended to prepare for 
specific highly regulated professions. 
Although most literature on overeducation has assessed which approach best 
fits the empirical evidence, recent studies have suggested that overeducation is 
unlikely to be entirely explained by only one of these three models. Instead, 
scholars tend to focus on the macro conditions under which one mechanism tends 
to prevail over the others. The institutional context is likely to affect not only the 
strength of the educational effect on labour market opportunities for job seekers, 
but also the mechanism through which individual education affects occupational 
outcomes (van de Werfhorst 2011). 
This chapter focuses on three labour market features that are likely to affect 
both the overall incidence of educational and skill mismatches among graduates 
and the patterns of differences between fields of study: the level of employment 
protection, the extent to which access to some professions is regulated by the 
requirements of specific credentials, and the role of the welfare state as an 
employer. These factors may affect the occupational opportunities of graduates, 
by influencing both the number and the quality of job vacancies and the job 
screening process. 
Scholars have mainly focused on the influence of employment protection on 
unemployment rates, with ambiguous findings. The stricter the employment 
protection, the more difficult it is for employers to dismiss workers, but also the 
lower is employers’ willingness to hire workers (Breen 2005). Whether the 
strictness of employment protection also affects the incidence of overeducation 
remains unclear. Although some studies indicate a positive association (Di Pietro 
2002), others do not find any significant effect (Verhaest and Van der Velden 
2013). It may be expected that employment protection affects educational 
mismatches among graduates from different fields of study, but not the 
distribution of skill mismatches (Hypothesis 1). The stricter the employment 
protection, the more fields of study do affect the risk of educational mismatch. 
Since dismissing workers in these contexts implies higher costs, employers have a 
greater incentive to select graduates from fields of study that send more powerful 
signals of applicants’ abilities and motivations, i.e., scientific and technical fields. 
In other words, employment protection is likely to enhance the signaling value of 
technical education rather than its skill content. 
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The second institutional factor taken into account is the regulation of liberal 
professions, usually promoted by professional orders. This kind of regulation 
takes the form of restrictions to the access both to fields of study and, in a 
subsequent stage, to the corresponding professions. These two kinds of 
restrictions may have opposite effects on graduates’ labour market prospects 
(Barone and Schindler, 2014). The former (e.g. numerus clausus for access to 
tertiary education or very high tuition fees) reduces the number of students from 
the matching fields, thus lowering the risk of oversupply of graduates. Since 
overeducation, in terms of both educational and skill mismatches, is primarily due 
to a gap between demand and supply of graduates, reducing the number of 
graduates could improve their labour market prospects, in terms of both the 
analysed phenomena. On the contrary, the latter type of regulation (e.g. long 
periods of postgraduate training or additional selective entry examinations to the 
professions) constrains the access to these professions also for graduates from the 
matching fields, thus possibly lowering the connected occupational rewards. 
Graduates who do not succeed in accessing the corresponding professions (e.g. 
graduates in Law that do not succeed in becoming lawyers) are likely to end up in 
jobs that do not require nor their tertiary degree nor the skills they have acquired 
at university. Summing up, we can expect the regulation of liberal professions to 
affect the risk of both educational and skill mismatches for graduates from the 
corresponding fields of study (Hypothesis 2). However, the direction of these 
associations strongly depends on the prevalence of one of the two aforementioned 
types of restrictions. Indeed, if access to professions is regulated more strongly 
than access to the corresponding education, this can easily result in a oversupply 
of graduates that could end up being overeducated. 
Finally, the existing literature suggests that the match between workers and 
jobs may be affected by the capacity of the welfare state to employ skilled 
workers. As some studies suggest, the risk of overeducation is lower in the public 
than in the private sector (Wolbers 2003). In developed countries, substantial 
shares of graduates are employed in the public sector, particularly in services (i.e., 
Medicine, Social Services, and Education) and public administration, which 
means that the public sector can absorb graduates who are at greater risk for 
overeducation, such as those from the Humanities and social sciences. Therefore, 
the higher the capacity of the public sector to absorb graduates, the smaller the 
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differentials between fields of study will be in terms of both educational and skill 
mismatches (Hypothesis 3). Because a higher level of education is formally 
required for several managerial positions in public bureaucracies, we expect that 
the larger the public sector, the more graduates from generalist fields—such as the 
Humanities and Social Sciences—will improve their labour market prospects. The 
public sector generally comprises professions requiring specific competencies, 
such as education, social and Health services. Therefore, we hypothesise that 
graduates from these fields of study will be at less risk of skill mismatch in 
countries with a higher rate of public employment. 
4.3 Data and empirical strategy 
4.3.1 REFLEX and HEGESCO Data 
The analyses are based on data from two comparative surveys conducted on 
representative samples of graduates from ISCED 5A (Bachelors and Masters or 
equivalent) that report detailed comparable information on individuals’ 
educational careers, occupational status, job experience before and after the 
conclusion of tertiary education, and family background.  These are the REFLEX 
(Research into Employment and Professional Flexibility) and HEGESCO (Higher 
Education as a Generator of Strategic Competencies) survey. 
The first dataset (REFLEX) includes 34,347 individuals from thirteen 
European countries (Italy, Spain, France, Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom, Finland, Norway, the Czech Republic, Portugal, Belgium and 
Estonia) and Japan who graduated between 2000 and 2001 and were interviewed 
in 2005. The second study, (HEGESCO), is based on the methodology developed 
in the REFLEX study and was conducted approximately three years later. It 
includes 8,742 graduates of the 2002/2003 academic year from Slovenia, Turkey, 
Lithuania, Poland, and Hungary. 
The size of the national samples varied according to the anticipated response 
rate and the targeted number of respondents in each country. To increase the 
efficiency of the sample, stratified sampling was used. The strata used were 
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dependent on the national context, but usually comprised type and field of higher 
education, and in some countries also region and gender
19
.  
The following table contains an overview of the number of available 
respondents and the response percentage per country. 
Tab. 4.1 Number of respondents and response percentage per country 
Country 
Number of respondents  
First level Second level Total Response % 
REFLEX Countries     
Norway 1,397 804 2,201 50 
Finland 1,187 1,489 2,676 45 
The United Kingdom 1,470 108 1,578 23 
Germany 544 1,142 1,686 36 
Austria 122 1,699 1,821 38 
Switzerland 1,578 3,304 4,882 60 
The Netherlands 2,291 1,134 3,425 35 
Belgium-Flanders 403 871 1,274 22 
France 1,053 599 1,652 32 
Italy 255 2,884 3,139 30 
Spain 1,566 2,346 3,912 22 
Portugal 167 477 644 12 
The Czech Republic 1,177 5,586 6,763 27 
Estonia 820 139 959 18 
Total REFLEX 14,030 22,582 36,612 31 
HEGESCO countries     
Slovenia 2,681 238 2,919 49 
Turkey 1,852 310 2,162 36 
Lithuania 680 310 1,199 16 
Poland 393 806 1,199 20 
Hungary 886 586 1,472 30 
Total HEGESCO 6,492 2,250 8,742 30 
     
Total REFLEX + HEGESCO 20,522 24,832 45,354 31 
Source: Allen J. and van der Velden R. (2009) 
 
Only data from Lithuania are excluded from this analysis because not all 
aggregate indicators that are used in this study (see next section) are available for 
it. Consequently, this study reports findings for 17 European countries plus Japan. 
The analysis is restricted to individuals who were employed at the time of the 
interview. Thus, the analytical sample includes 34,955 individuals. 
4.3.2 Variables 
In this study both educational and skill mismatches are defined on the basis of a 
SA of the match between workers’ education and jobs held five years after 
graduation. The indicator of educational mismatch is based on responses to the 
                                                 
19
 More detailed reports on the research design and data collection can be downloaded from the 
projects websites (www.reflexproject.org; www.hegesco.org).  
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question «What type of education do you feel is most appropriate for this work?». 
The possible responses are: a) PhD; b) Other postgraduate qualification; c) 
Master; d) Bachelor; e) Lower than higher education. Educational mismatch 
occurs when individuals feel that a level lower than higher education is most 
appropriate for their work. 
The indicator of skill mismatch is based on graduates’ responses to the 
question: «To what extent are your knowledge and skills utilized in your current 
work?». The possible answers range from 1 (not at all) to 5 (to a very high extent). 
Skill mismatch occurs when the response is 2 or below. It is worth underlying 
that, when answering, individuals might refer to skills not acquired through 
education. However, because the respondents are new entrants in the labour 
market, their job experience is assumed to play a less relevant role than the 
competencies acquired during university studies. 
The main independent variable, at the individual level, is field of study, 
classified as follows: Education; Art and Humanities; Social Sciences; Business 
and Administration; Law; Natural and Applied Sciences; Mathematics and 
Statistics; Engineering and Architecture; and Medicine. Each model – specified as 
described in the next section – also includes all the antecedent variables relevant 
for the outcomes of interest, which are known to affect both the choice of field of 
study and the labour market chances. These are gender, age, country of birth, 
parents’ level of education, type of upper secondary education completed, final 
examination mark at the end of secondary education, type of tertiary study 
programme completed (whether it provides direct access to doctoral programmes), 
involvement in further education after graduation, and work experience before 
and during higher education. The distribution of these individual-level variables is 
summarized in Table 4.2.  
At the country level, three main variables are taken into account, whose 
distribution is reported in Table 4.3. The first variable is the OECD index Overall 
Strictness of Employment Protection, which is constructed by combining 21 items 
in three main categories: i) protection of regular workers against dismissal, ii) 
regulation of temporary employment, and iii) specific requirements for collective 
dismissals (see Venn, 2009 for further details). The possible values range from 0 
(least stringent) to 6 (most restrictive). The second variable is the OECD index 
Professional Services Regulation, which indicates the extent to which access to 
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some professions is regulated by particular credential requirements; the scale 
ranges from 0 to 6 (from least to most restrictive).  
Tab. 4.2 Descriptive statistics of individual level covariates 
Variable % 
Gender (Ref: Male)  
Female 57.70 
Age (Ref: <30)  
31-40 31.62 
>40 6.12 
Birth country (Ref: Home country)  
Other country 2.78 
No answer 9.21 
Parents’ Level of Education (Ref: High)  
Medium 37.65 
Low 20.17 
No answer 2.68 
Type of upper secondary education completed (Ref: General)  
Vocational 24.13 
Other 3.84 
Upper secondary graduation mark (Ref: High)  
Medium 43.58 
Low 24.66 
No answer 4.17 
Field of Study (Ref: Education)  
Art and Humanities 9.81 
Social Sciences 14.86 
Business and Administration 16.70 
Law 5.22 
Natural and Applied Sciences 9.37 
Mathematics and Statistics 3.71 
Engineering and Architecture 18.71 
Medicine 9.91 
Tertiary programme (Ref: Providing direct access to PhD)  
Not providing direct access to PhD 48.10 
No answer 0.52 
Further education after graduation (Ref: No)  
Yes 37.53 
Work experience before and during higher education (Ref: No)  
Experience not study related 31.49 
Experience study related 49.46 
No answer 1.02 
N 34,955 
 
This indicator measures regulatory conditions in professional services, 
covering entry and conduct regulation in the legal, accounting, engineering, and 
architectural professions (see Conway and Nicoletti, 2006 for information about 
its composition and its advantages and disadvantages)
20
. The reference year for 
both indexes is the year in which the survey was conducted in each country. 
Finally, the third variable is employment in general government as a percentage of 
the labour force, provided by OECD and referring to 2008. Moreover, some 
                                                 
20 Unfortunately, we can use only a general indicator of professional services regulation, which 
does not distinguish among different professional sectors. Further research could use more detailed, 
field-specific indicators. 
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country level covariates are added to control for both the economic structure and 
cycle, namely GDP per capita and unemployment rates (World Bank). Finally, we 
control for tertiary graduation rates (UNESCO). 
Tab. 4.3 Distribution of country-level covariates. 
 
Overall 
Strictness of 
Employment 
Protectiona 
Professional 
Services 
Regulationa 
Rate of Public 
Employmenta 
GDP per 
Capitab 
Unemployment 
Rateb 
Tertiary 
Graduation 
Ratec 
IT 1.82 3.74 14.3 30,479 7.7 22 
ES 2.98 2.36 12.3 26,056 9.2 33 
FR 3.05 1.90 21.9 33,819 8.9 37 
AT 1.93 3.14 11.4 37,076 5.2 16 
DE 2.12 3.01 9.6 33,543 11.1 18 
NL 2.12 1.60 12.0 39,122 4.7 37 
UK 0.75 1.05 17.4 38,122 4.6 39 
FI 2.02 0.95 22.9 37,319 8.4 43 
NO 2.56 1.14 29.3 65,767 4.6 40 
CZ 2.09 2.83 12.8 12,706 7.9 14 
JA 1.43 1.99 6.7 35,781 4.4 33 
PT 3.46 2.71 12.1 18,186 7.6 35 
BE 2.18 2.30 17.1 36,011 8.4 18 
EE 2.10 2.11 18.7 10,330 7.9 10 
SL 2.51 3.33 14.7 27,015 4.4 19 
TU 3.72 3.39 11.0 10,298 11.0 13 
PL 1.90 2.66 9.7 13,886 7.1 44 
HU 1.65 3.14 19.5 15,365 7.8 32 
Source: aOECD, bWorld Bank, cUNESCO 
 
To account for the structure of the educational system, we first included 
different indicators of the level of stratification (e.g., the age of first selection into 
educational tracks) as control variables in the models. However, the inclusion of 
this variable did not affect the pattern of results concerning labour market 
institutions, nor were its coefficients statistically significant. The role of 
educational institutions is not a major focus of this study, particularly because 
several previous studies have documented it extensively. The finding that age of  
tracking does not matter does not contradict these studies once we consider that 
the models presented here control for graduation rates. In other words, this effect 
is explained by this variable, suggesting that early tracking affects overeducation 
mainly by restricting the supply of graduates. Thus, we decided not to include this 
control variable in the final models to preserve more degrees of freedom. 
4.3.3 Analytical strategy 
To analyse the determinants of educational and skill mismatches, a sequence 
of multilevel logit models is estimated that reflects the nested structure of the data 
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and assesses how much of the overall variance in educational and skill 
mismatches is attributable to country differences. A two-level structure is 
employed, in which individuals i are nested in countries c. The models have the 
following general form: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑐 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑐 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑐 + 𝑈𝑖𝑐 + 𝑉𝑐 
 
where y is the dependent variable of interest, X is a vector of characteristics of 
individual i, C is a vector of characteristics of country c, and U and V are random 
error terms. Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods are used to compute 
estimation (Browne and Draper 2006), that provide more accurate results than 
those derived by classical likelihood-based frequentist methods
21
. 
The baseline model (Model 1) consists solely of an intercept and additional 
random effects at the country level. In Model 2, the covariates measured at the 
individual level are added, while Model 3 also includes the variables measured at 
the country level. Finally, Model 4 includes interaction terms between country 
level variables and field of study to test whether different institutional settings 
affect the distribution of educational and skill mismatches among graduates from 
different fields
22
. 
Before presenting multivariate results, the following section describes the 
descriptive evidence on the distribution of educational and skill mismatches 
across countries and fields of study and on the association between the 
phenomena and the above described labour market characteristics. 
                                                 
21 Frequentist methods find maximum likelihood point estimates for the parameters of interest in 
the model by iterating between two deterministic steps until two consecutive estimates for each 
parameter are sufficiently close together, thus achieving convergence. Conversely, MCMC methods are 
simulation-based procedures, which are run for many iterations, each of which produces an estimate for 
each unknown parameter. These estimates are not independent because, for each iteration, the estimate 
for the last iteration is used to produce the next estimate. Thus, these methods produce accurate interval 
estimates, from which it is possible to calculate the posterior mean and standard deviation (Browne 
2003). 
22 Some robustness checks have been conducted by excluding the country-level control variables 
and adding the interaction terms one by one. The results do not substantively change. 
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4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Educational and skill mismatches across countries and fields of study 
The incidence of educational and skill mismatches by country is reported in 
Figure 4.1. 
Fig. 4.1 The incidence of educational and skill mismatches by country 
 
The average incidence of both educational and skill mismatches five years 
after graduation across the 18 countries studied is approximately 10 per cent. 
However, Figure 1 indicates that significant differences exist in the incidence of 
the phenomena among countries and that the correlation among the two is far 
from perfect. The highest incidence of educational mismatch is observed in Japan 
(18.9), followed by Spain (16.8), Hungary (15.4) and the United Kingdom (14.7); 
the lowest incidences are recorded in Finland (5.6), Poland (3.9) and Estonia 
(1.7). The diffusion of skill mismatch also differs by country to a significant 
extent. The highest value is again observed in Japan (21.4), but Poland and 
Estonia score higher than before (13.8 and 7.1, respectively); the lowest incidence 
of skill mismatch is observed in Norway (4.5) and Portugal (2.8). The correlation 
between the two measures at the country level is 0.69. However, their average 
correlation at the individual level is only 0.36, with great variability among 
countries, spanning from 0.07 in Estonia to 0.50 in Japan (Tab. 4.4). 
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Tab. 4.4 Correspondence and correlation between educational and skill mismatches by 
country 
 
Only Educational 
Mismatch 
Only Skill 
Mismatch 
Educational and 
Skill Mismatch 
Correct 
Allocation 
Correlation 
IT 8.4 6.2 4.1 81.3 0.28 
ES 7.8 5.3 9.0 77.9 0.50 
FR 6.9 6.2 5.9 81.0 0.40 
AT 6.5 3.8 4.2 85.5 0.40 
DE 4.1 5.7 3.1 87.1 0.33 
NL 3.2 5.0 3.6 88.2 0.42 
UK 6.9 5.8 7.8 79.5 0.48 
FI 3.2 3.8 2.4 90.6 0.37 
NO 6.4 2.7 1.8 89.1 0.26 
CZ 4.0 6.5 2.7 86.8 0.29 
JA 11.0 13.5 7.9 67.6 0.24 
PR 4.0 0.7 2.1 93.2 0.49 
BE 5.6 5.4 2.9 86.1 0.29 
EE 1.3 6.8 0.4 91.5 0.07 
SL 5.1 5.4 3.7 85.8 0.36 
TU 5.7 7.1 5.4 81.8 0.39 
PL 1.2 11.0 2.8 85.0 0.33 
HU 9.7 5.3 5.7 79.3 0.35 
Total 5.7 6.0 4.3 84.0 0.36 
 
The aggregate distribution of educational and skill mismatches among 
graduates from different fields is reported in Figure 4.2. 
Fig. 4.2 The incidence of educational and skill mismatch by field of study 
 
Significant differences are observed among fields of study in the incidence of 
both educational and skill mismatches. A substantial risk of educational mismatch 
is faced by graduates from Art and Humanities (15.51) and Social Sciences 
(13.13). The incidence of this phenomenon is lower among graduates from 
technical and scientific fields, such as Engineering and Architecture (7.23), 
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Mathematics and Statistics (6.4), and Medicine (3.81). The distribution of skill 
mismatches is partially different. The highest values are observed among 
graduates from Natural and Applied Sciences (14.25), followed by graduates from 
Art and Humanities (13.62). The lowest incidence of skill mismatches is found 
among graduates from Medicine (3.84). Additionally, when considering different 
fields of study separately, the correlation between educational and skill 
mismatches is far from perfect (Table 4.5). 
These descriptive results provide prima facie evidence that educational and 
skill mismatches do refer to different situations: not only their distribution across 
countries and fields of study substantially differ, but also their correlation is rather 
weak. Thus, these findings preliminarily support the (substantive before than 
methodological) choice to distinguish between the two phenomena. 
Tab. 4.5 Correspondence and correlation between educational and skill mismatches by field 
of study. 
4.4.2 The association between educational and skill mismatches and labour 
market features 
Before presenting the main findings of the multivariate analyses, Figure 4.3 
represents the association between educational and skill mismatches and the three 
labour market characteristics previously described. 
The only variable which seems to be significantly associated with both 
educational and skill mismatches is the rate of public employment: the incidence 
of the two phenomena in fact decreases as the amount of individuals employed in 
the public sector increases. On the contrary, nor the level of employment 
protection nor the regulation of professional services seem to be significantly 
associated with educational and skill mismatches. 
  
Only 
Educational 
Mismatch 
Only Skill 
Mismatch 
Educational 
and Skill 
Mismatch 
Correct 
Allocation 
Correlation 
Education 5.35 3.98 3.86 86.82 0.40 
Art and Humanities 7.87 5.98 7.64 78.51 0.44 
Social Sciences 7.70 6.47 5.43 80.40 0.35 
Business and Administration 6.19 5.89 4.97 82.95 0.38 
Law 4.94 5.65 4.17 85.24 0.38 
Natural and Applied Sciences 6.10 8.61 5.65 79.65 0.35 
Mathematics and Statistics 4.32 6.17 2.08 87.42 0.23 
Engineering and Architecture 4.37 7.49 2.86 85.28 0.27 
Medicine 2.74 2.77 1.07 93.42 0.25 
Total 5.66 6.00 4.30 84.04 0.36 
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Fig. 4.3 Educational and skill mismatches by country-level variables 
 
The main aim of this chapter is, however, not to establish whether these 
institutional features affect the overall incidence of educational and skill 
mismatches, but to assess whether these labour market characteristics somehow 
shape the distribution of educational and skill mismatches among graduates from 
different fields of study. Thus, the next paragraph presents the results of the 
multilevel analyses. 
4.4.3 Do labour market institutions affect the distribution of educational and 
skill mismatches across fields of study? 
The results on the risk of educational and skill mismatches five years after 
graduation are reported in Tables 4.6 and 4.7, respectively.  
These results are obtained by controlling for the main socio-demographic 
variables and for some indicators of educational and working experience of 
graduates, as previously indicated. The coefficients of these covariates are 
statistically significant and consistent with results of previous studies, but they 
will not be discussed here. 
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Tab. 4.6 The risk of educational mismatch. Multilevel logit estimates 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept  -2.377 
(0.092) 
-3.263 
(0.185) 
-3.384 
(0.146) 
-3.239 
(0.251) 
Individual Level      
Sex  Male  Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 Female  0.235*** 
(0.042) 
0.232*** 
(0.039) 
0.233*** 
(0.043) 
Age <30  Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 31-40  0.049 
(0.049) 
0.045 
(0.048) 
0.058 
(0.046) 
 >40  -0.080 
(0.087) 
-0.082 
(0.087) 
-0.086 
(0.084) 
Birth Country Home Country  Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 Other Country  0.128 
(0.112) 
0.133 
(0.112) 
0.125 
(0.106) 
 No answer  -0.391** 
(0.191) 
-0.334 
(0.209) 
-0.390** 
 (0.188) 
Parental Education High  Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 Medium  0.178*** 
(0.047) 
0.177*** 
(0.047) 
0.163*** 
(0.045) 
 Low  0.289*** 
(0.052) 
0.285*** 
(0.053) 
0.272*** 
(0.054) 
 No answer  0.452*** 
(0.108) 
0.434*** 
(0.112) 
0.434*** 
(0.112) 
Type of secondary school Generalist  Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 Vocational  0.492*** 
(0.051) 
0.492*** 
(0.051) 
0.484*** 
(0.053) 
 Other  -0.136 
(0.106) 
-0.139 
(0.111) 
-0.105 
(0.116) 
Grade (secondary school) High  Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 Medium  0.274*** 
(0.053) 
0.278***  
(0.050) 
0.267*** 
(0.050) 
 Low  0.569*** 
(0.055) 
0.575*** 
(0.053) 
0.553*** 
(0.053) 
 No Answer  0.498*** 
(0.097) 
0.501*** 
(0.098) 
0.482*** 
(0.097) 
Type of tertiary degree Direct Access to Phd  Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 No Direct Access to Phd  0.671***  
(0.049) 
0.675*** 
(0.045) 
0.693*** 
(0.051) 
(continue) 
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  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 No answer  0.848*** 
(0.225) 
0.847*** 
(0.225) 
0.877*** 
(0.222) 
Further Education No  Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 Yes  -0.308***  
(0.040) 
-0.309*** 
(0.041) 
-0.309***  
(0.040) 
Work experience before/during study No  Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 Experience not study related  0.117** 
(0.053) 
0.117** 
(0.055) 
0.113** 
(0.049) 
 Experience study related  -0.348*** 
(0.055) 
-0.347*** 
(0.056) 
-0.363*** 
 (0.052) 
 No answer  0.005 
(0.171) 
0.020 
(0.168) 
0.050 
(0.169) 
Field of Study Education  Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 Art and Humanities  0.700*** 
(0.072) 
0.694*** 
(0.073) 
0.721*** 
 (0.081) 
 Social Sciences  0.430***  
(0.068) 
0.420*** 
(0.071) 
0.431***  
(0.074) 
 Business and Administration  0.279***  
(0.065) 
0.271*** 
(0.071) 
0.293***  
(0.078) 
 Law  0.032 
(0.099) 
0.019 
(0.096) 
-0.067 
(0.116) 
 Natural and Applied Sciences  0.387***  
(0.078) 
0.382*** 
(0.079) 
0.422*** 
 (0.081) 
 Mathematics and Statistics  -0.252* 
(0.130) 
-0.265** 
(0.128) 
-0.272** 
 (0.137) 
 Engineering and Architecture  -0.164** 
(0.074) 
-0.174** 
(0.077) 
-0.157*  
(0.081) 
 Medicine  -0.863***  
(0.098) 
-0.871*** 
(0.105) 
-1.048***  
(0.124) 
Country Level      
Strictness of Employment Protection    -0.210 
(0.224) 
0.041 
(0.234) 
Professional Services Regulation    0.349 
(0.290) 
0.674***  
(0.188) 
Rate of Public Employment    -0.003 
(0.028) 
-0.038 
(0.038) 
GDP per Capita    0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Unemployment Rate    0.046 
(0.076) 
0.138**  
(0.058) 
      
(continue) 
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  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Graduation Rate    0.017 
(0.013) 
0.022 
(0.015) 
Cross-Level Interaction      
Strictness of Employment protection * Education    Ref. 
 Art and Humanities    -0.076 
(0.121) 
 Social Sciences    -0.101 
(0.113) 
 Business and Administration    0.007 
(0.115) 
 Law    -0.225 
(0.168) 
 Natural and Applied Sciences    -0.159 
(0.127) 
 Mathematics and Statistics    -0.564***  
(0.190) 
 Engineeringand Architecture    -0.543***  
(0.134) 
 Medicine    -0.538***  
(0.187) 
Professional Services Regulation * Education    Ref. 
 Art and Humanities    -0.303***  
(0.113) 
 Social Sciences    -0.299*** 
(0.104) 
 Business and Administration    -0.225** 
(0.103) 
 Law    -0.102 
(0.147) 
 Natural and Applied Sciences    -0.175 
(0.120) 
 Mathematics and Statistics    -0.227 
(0.186) 
 Engineeringand Architecture    0.127 
(0.106) 
 Medicine    -0.325**  
(0.154) 
               
        
        
             
(continue) 
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  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Rate of Public Employment * Education    Ref. 
 Art and Humanities    -0.009 
(0.016) 
 Social Sciences    -0.015 
(0.014) 
 Business and Administration    0.021 
(0.017) 
 Law    -0.052** 
(0.025) 
 Natural and Applied Sciences    0.037** 
(0.016) 
 Mathematics and Statistics    0.014 
(0.029) 
 Engineeringand Architecture    0.077***  
(0.015) 
 Medicine    0.071***  
(0.022) 
Random Part      
Level: Country      
Cons.  0.388 
(0.160) 
0.450 
(0.189) 
0.410 
(0.188) 
0.471 
(0.230) 
Level: Individual      
Cons.  1.000 
(0.000) 
1.000 
(0.000) 
1.000 
(0.000) 
1.000 
(0.000) 
-2*loglikelihood:       
DIC:   21963.91 20800.07 20800.12 20701.23 
pD:   17.44 44.41 44.63 68.20 
Units: paese  18 18 18 18 
Units: case  34,955 34,955 34,955 34,955 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Consistent with the previous descriptive analyses, results demonstrate that 
field of study matters. Model 2 suggests that Humanities graduates are the worst 
performers, whereas those from technical and scientific fields enjoy much better 
labour market prospects. Interestingly, comparing the results for educational and 
skill mismatches reveals that the relative position of different fields changes. 
Educational mismatches seem to be distributed according to the distinction 
between more-or-less specific and vocationally oriented fields of study (Tab. 4.6). 
However, the distribution of skill mismatches presents some interesting 
exceptions to this rule (Tab. 4.7). For instance, graduates from Engineering and 
Architecture and from Mathematics and Statistics are among those at least risk of 
educational mismatch, but they do not perform as well in terms of skill 
mismatches. These findings may somehow account for the actual demand for 
specific skills in the labour market. If comparable repeated cross-sectional data 
were available, it would be of real interest to assess how educational and skill 
mismatches do react to changes in graduation rates from different fields of study. 
Model 3 includes country-level covariates. Consistent with the descriptive 
results reported above, the coefficients for the level of employment protection and 
for the rate of public employment are negative, while the one for the regulation of 
professional services is positive. However none of these covariates appear to be 
statistically associated with the overall risks of both educational and skill 
mismatches. Moreover, the inclusion of country level variables does not change 
the significance or the magnitude of the individual level coefficients. Because we 
were interested in assessing whether these country-level variables affect field of 
study differentials in overeducation, in Model 4 we add interaction terms between 
these variables and field of study.  
Our first hypothesis concerning the effects of employment protection is 
confirmed. Model 4 in Table 4.6 suggests that fields of study can be divided into 
three groups, according to graduates’ risk of educational mismatch. On the one 
side, we have technical and scientific fields, which are associated with a lower 
risk of mismatch: these are Medicine, Engineering and Architecture, Mathematics 
and Statistics. On the other side, we find fields with a higher risk of educational 
mismatch: Arts and Humanities, Social Sciences, Business and Administration 
and Natural Sciences. Education, which is the reference category, and Law stay in
114 
 
Tab. 4.7 The risk of skill mismatch. Multilevel logit estimates 
    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept  -2.250 
(0.109) 
-2.740 
 (0.143) 
-2.752 
(0.167) 
-2.741 
(0.173) 
Individual Level      
Sex Male  Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 Female  0.060 
(0.041) 
0.062 
(0.042) 
0.063 
(0.041) 
Age <30  Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 31-40  -0.038 
(0.047) 
-0.032 
(0.045) 
-0.035 
(0.049) 
 >40  -0.208** 
(0.089) 
-0.202** 
(0.087) 
-0.206**  
(0.09) 
Birth Country Home Country  Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 Other Country  0.210* 
(0.108) 
0.210**  
(0.106) 
0.202* 
 (0.107) 
 No answer  0.056 
(0.172) 
-0.031 
(0.175) 
0.010 
(0.187) 
Parental Education High  Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 Medium  0.188***  
(0.043) 
0.188***  
(0.042) 
0.180***  
(0.042) 
 Low  0.166***  
(0.055) 
0.164***  
(0.055) 
0.156***  
(0.054) 
 No answer  0.154 
(0.119) 
0.169  
(0.12) 
0.150 
(0.115) 
Type of secondary school Generalist  Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 Vocational  0.079 
(0.050) 
0.079 
(0.051) 
0.085* 
(0.050) 
 Other  0.129 
(0.094) 
0.122 
(0.091) 
0.110 
(0.095) 
Grade (secondary school) High  Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 Medium  0.055 
(0.046) 
0.059 
(0.047) 
0.056 
(0.048) 
 Low  0.225***  
(0.051) 
0.225***  
(0.051) 
0.224*** 
(0.051) 
 No Answer  0.285***  
(0.098) 
0.288***  
(0.099) 
0.288***  
(0.098) 
Type of tertiary degree Direct Access to Phd  Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 No Direct Access to Phd  0.183***  
(0.048) 
0.195***  
(0.048) 
0.201***  
(0.048) 
       
 
 
(continue) 
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    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 No answer  -0.784**  
(0.351) 
-0.785**  
(0.364) 
-0.773**  
(0.360) 
Further Education No  Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 Yes  -0.187*** 
(0.038) 
-0.184***  
(0.039) 
-0.188*** 
(0.040) 
Work experience before/during study No  Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 Experience not study related  0.161***  
(0.051) 
0.175***  
(0.052) 
0.161***  
(0.055) 
 Experience study related  -0.405***  
(0.052) 
-0.391***  
(0.053) 
-0.404***  
(0.056) 
 No answer  0.056 
(0.159) 
0.074 
(0.163) 
0.063 
(0.168) 
Field of Study Education  Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 Art and Humanities  0.580***  
(0.084) 
0.578***  
(0.087) 
0.623***  
(0.083) 
 Social Sciences  0.400***  
(0.078) 
0.401***  
(0.084) 
0.456***  
(0.076) 
 Business and Administration  0.347***  
(0.08) 
0.352***  
(0.086) 
0.411***  
(0.076) 
 Law  0.162 
(0.105) 
0.164 
(0.110) 
0.179*  
(0.109) 
 Natural and Applied Sciences  0.595***  
(0.082) 
0.596***  
(0.093) 
0.672***  
(0.081) 
 Mathematics and Statistics  0.078 
(0.123) 
0.076 
(0.128) 
0.103 
(0.120) 
 Engineering and Architecture  0.257***  
(0.081) 
0.262***  
(0.087) 
0.314***  
(0.078) 
 Medicine  -0.652***  
(0.11) 
-0.64***  
(0.118) 
-0.603***  
(0.107) 
Country Level      
Strictness of Employment Protection    -0.168 
(0.185) 
-0.153  
(0.198) 
Professional Services Regulation    0.188 
(0.204) 
0.414**  
(0.199) 
Rate of Public Employment    -0.029 
(0.026) 
-0.049*  
(0.026) 
GDP per Capita    0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Unemployment Rate    0.011 
(0.095) 
0.071 
(0.068) 
       
 
 
(continue) 
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    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Graduation Rate    0.011 
(0.013) 
0.007 
(0.012) 
Cross-Level Interaction      
Strictness of Employment protection * Education    Ref. 
 Art and Humanities    -0.163 
(0.156) 
 Social Sciences    -0.123 
(0.145) 
 Business and Administration    -0.074 
(0.150) 
 Law    -0.168 
(0.194) 
 Natural and Applied Sciences    -0.120 
(0.148) 
 Mathematics and Statistics    -0.127 
(0.196) 
 Engineeringand Architecture    -0.254* 
(0.149) 
 Medicine    -0.154 
(0.209) 
Professional Services Regulation * Education    Ref. 
 Art and Humanities    -0.336***  
(0.114) 
 Social Sciences    -0.233**  
(0.108) 
 Business and Administration    -0.273**  
(0.110) 
 Law    -0.279**  
(0.140) 
 Natural and Applied Sciences    -0.207*  
(0.113) 
 Mathematics and Statistics    -0.577***  
(0.182) 
 Engineeringand Architecture    -0.272**  
(0.110) 
 Medicine    -0.233 
(0.151) 
        
 
 
          
             
         
(continue) 
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    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Rate of Public Employment * Education    Ref. 
 Art and Humanities    0.022 
(0.020) 
 Social Sciences    0.020 
(0.019) 
 Business and Administration    0.031 
(0.021) 
 Law    -0.008 
(0.024) 
 Natural and Applied Sciences    0.040** 
(0.020) 
 Mathematics and Statistics    -0.001 
(0.029) 
 Engineeringand Architecture    0.025 
(0.019) 
 Medicine    0.029 
(0.026) 
Random Part           
Level: Country      
Cons.  0.254 
(0.102) 
0.176  
0.082) 
0.253 
(0.177) 
0.215 
(0.143) 
Level: Individual      
Cons.  1.000 
(0.000) 
1.000 
(0.000) 
1.000 
(0.000) 
1.000 
(0.000) 
-2*loglikelihood:       
DIC:   22695.66 22168.86 22168.88 22182.41 
pD:   17.52 44.22 44.75 68.77 
Units: paese  18 18 18 18 
Units: case   34,955 34,955 34,955 34,955 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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between the two categories. The level of employment protection seems not to be 
statistically associated with the overall risk of educational mismatch, but it 
influences the distribution of this risk across fields of study. A stricter 
employment protection, indeed, seems to further reduce the already low risk of 
educational mismatches for graduates from fields of study that prepare students 
for specific professions, such as Engineering and Architecture and Medicine, and 
from scientific fields, particularly Mathematics and Statistics. In other words, 
technical fields seem to provide a clearer signal, which is likely to guarantee 
better occupational opportunities to graduates especially in context where EPL is 
high. At the same time, it leaves unaltered the risk for graduates from the other 
fields of study. In short, the stricter the employment protection, the greater the gap 
between graduates in terms of the risk of educational mismatch. Conversely, 
consistent with our hypothesis, we find that strictness of employment protection 
does not significantly affect the overall risk of skill mismatch, nor its distribution 
among graduates from different fields (Table 4.7). 
The empirical evidence partially supports also the second hypothesis, 
concerning the regulation of professional services. Model 4 in Table 4.6 suggests 
that a higher level of regulation is associated with an overall higher risk of 
educational mismatch. Moreover, the interaction terms indicate that in contexts 
with a stricter professional regulation we find a lower risk of educational 
mismatch for graduates who do not have to comply with these additional 
requirements to access the profession, such as graduates from the Humanities or 
Social Sciences. At the same time, we find no alteration of the risk of educational 
mismatch for graduates who are subjected to this kind of regulation, such as 
graduates from Engineering, Architectures and Law. Thus, we end up with a 
reduction of the comparative advantage for graduates from such fields of study. 
The only relevant difference is the one of graduates from Business and 
Administration, whose risk of educational mismatch is found to be lower in 
countries with a stricter regulation of professional services. On the other side, 
results reported in Table 4.7 suggest that the regulation of professional services 
does not influence the distribution of the risk of skill mismatch among graduates: 
the main effect is positive and statistically significant, but it is counterbalanced by 
the interaction terms, which all appear negative and significant.  
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The findings on the role of the public sector as an employer partially support 
our hypothesis. As expected, the higher the rate of public employment, the smaller 
the gap between more and less job-oriented fields of study with respect to 
educational mismatches. The results reported in Table 4.6 suggest, indeed, that a 
higher rate of public employment reduces the relative advantage of more 
occupationally oriented fields, such as Engineering, Architecture and Medicine. 
We find, however, public employment not to significantly affect the risk of skill 
mismatch (Tab. 4.7). Even though the main effect of the rate of public 
employment is negative and statistically significant, the interaction terms are not 
significant, suggesting that this factor is not capable of affecting the differential 
risk of graduates from different fields of study. 
4.5 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, we have deepened the existing knowledge around the 
association between some labour market institutions and the diffusion of 
overeducation among tertiary graduates, by distinguishing between two forms of 
sub-optimal allocation of workers in the labour market: educational and skill 
mismatches. In a context of widespread educational expansion, the distinction is 
not of minor importance: individuals may possess formal qualifications higher 
than those required by their jobs, but actually perform jobs for which their skills 
are well suited. Consistent with previous findings, we have found important 
differences in the overall incidence of the two phenomena and a weak correlation 
between them at the individual level. Also the distribution of educational and skill 
mismatches among graduates from different fields have been shown to differ to a 
significant extent, even though both phenomena seem to be more widespread 
among graduates from generalist fields, such as the Humanities and Social 
Sciences. 
The analyses presented in this chapter have mainly focused on the variation 
across countries of fields of study differentials in terms of both educational and 
skill mismatches. While the literature has mainly explained differences across 
countries as the result of different educational systems, we have investigated the 
role of labour market and welfare institutions. In particular we have analysed 
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three institutional factors that are likely to affect the number and the quality of the 
available vacancies: the strictness of employment protection, the level of 
professional services regulation, and the capacity of the welfare state to hire 
skilled workers. 
The first result is that these institutional factors do not affect educational and 
skill mismatches similarly: they have been shown to mainly affect the match 
between individual educational credentials and job, rather than the actual 
utilization of skills on the workplace. This finding, together with the descriptive 
evidence that they happen to be weakly correlated at the individual level and 
across fields, further supports the claim that we need to trace a distinction between 
the two phenomena. 
The way in which these institutional factors affect fields of study differential 
is far from homogenous. The level of employment protection is found to augment 
the differential in terms of educational mismatch, by further reducing the already 
low risk for graduates from more vocationally oriented fields of study. 
Employment protection, on the contrary, seems not to affect the match between 
individual skills and those required on-the-job. In other words, this factor seems to 
enhance the marketability of some credentials—the «stronger» ones, in fact—
without altering the capacity of employers to fully recognize and use graduates’ 
competencies.  
The second analysed factor—the regulation of professional services—is 
found to create rigidities to the individual-job match. Graduates who have to 
comply with these additional requirements, such as those from Architecture, 
Engineering, Law or Medicine, seem in fact not to be advantaged at all by this 
form of closure: on the contrary, in contexts with a stricter regulation of 
professional services, it appears to be harder for graduates from the matching 
fields to access these professions. 
Finally, the level of public employment seems to play a beneficial effect on 
the gap between fields of study, at least in terms of educational mismatch. In 
contexts with a higher rate of public employment, indeed, we have found a 
reduction of the differential between generalist fields of study and those more 
vocationally oriented, probably due to the welfare state being able to employ 
graduates with less marketable credentials, such as those from the Humanities or 
Social Sciences. 
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5 Is short better? The impact of the Bologna university reform on 
graduates’ risks of educational and skill mismatch in Italy. 
5.1 Introduction 
This last chapter aims at evaluating the impact of the recent Bologna Process 
on tertiary graduates’ employability by providing an estimate of the effect of the 
reform on the risk of overeducation, both overall and across fields of study. 
Indeed, while a huge body of literature has addressed the role of educational 
systems in shaping occupational opportunities for tertiary graduates entering the 
labour market, as described in the previous Chapters, to the best of our knowledge 
no study has addressed so far the effect of the Bologna university reform. 
However, the existing empirical evidence and several theoretical reasons that are 
going to be discussed suggest that the risk of mismatch might have increased as a 
result of the university reform. Also in this chapter we theoretically and 
analytically distinguish between educational and skill mismatches: results 
presented so far suggest that the two phenomena—even though correlated—
represent two different features of the more general concept of overeducation, and 
theoretical considerations that are going to be discussed indicate that they are 
likely to have been differently affected by the reform. 
The following paragraph describes the main features of the reform and 
presents the hypotheses guiding our analyses. Then, the selected case-study—
Italy—is presented: this country is chosen for the analyses for both 
methodological and substantive reasons. On the one side, the peculiar way in 
which the reform has been implemented in this country and the existence of large 
nationally representative datasets on tertiary graduates allow us to adopt a 
counterfactual approach to evaluate the effect of the reform on graduates’ risks of 
educational and skill mismatch. On the other side, Italy represents an interesting 
case study per se, since it combines comparatively low graduation rates with a 
high incidence of overeducation. Section 5.4 presents the analysed data and the 
counterfactual approach adopted to estimate the effect of the reform. Section 5.5 
presents the main findings and 5.6 concludes. 
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5.2 The Bologna reform: main features and expected effects 
The 1999 Bologna Agreement has paved the way for the creation of an 
integrated European Higher Education Area, with the aim of making European 
HE institutions attractive and competitive worldwide. The main instrument 
through which this goal has been pursued is the development of a European 
system of comparable academic titles: the structure of university programmes has 
been harmonised throughout European countries and a credit system that should 
facilitate mutual recognition of degrees has been introduced. Despite the 
complexity of the Bologna Process, a lot of attention has been devoted to the 
changes it has entailed in the degree structure of many European countries. 
Indeed, with the signature of the Bologna Agreement many member states of the 
EU agreed to reform their unitary structure of HE towards the Anglo-Saxon 
system, consisting of a three/four-year Bachelor’s degree (BA) plus a one/two-
year Master’s degree (MA). Even though this structure—which is typical of 
countries as the UK, the US, Canada and Australia—is known to guarantee a high 
level performance
23
 (Jacobs and van der Ploeg, 2006), its implementation has led 
to some controversy. On the one hand, such a system reduces the length of studies 
and the number of exams required to get a first cycle degree. Since both these 
elements can, in principle, reduce the cost of investing in tertiary education, the 
reform may have impacted on human capital investment. Moreover, the wider 
menu of available degree and the possibility to prolong education in order to 
obtain a second cycle degree might also have increased the expected returns to 
tertiary education, by allowing a better match between demand and supply of HE. 
On the other hand, however, concern has been raised about both the academic 
contents of the new curricula and the adequacy of the skills acquired in a shorter 
period for the labour market.  
Soon after the implementation of the reform, a huge body of research started 
addressing the question of the effects of the Bologna Process on participation to 
HE. Evidence from these studies is mixed, as it indicates that these effects vary 
across countries. On the one side, for example, Hortschräer and Sprietsma (2015) 
                                                 
23
 In the list of top 50 universities of the Times Higher Education World University Ranking 2015, 
which judges universities on the basis of teaching, research, knowledge transfer and international 
outlook, 41 institutions have an Anglo-Saxon system of HE. 
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estimate the short-term impact of the reform in Germany and do not find 
significant effects on college enrolment and drop-out rates. On the other side, a 
positive impact of the reform on enrolment rates has been found both in Portugal 
(Cardoso et al., 2008; Portela et al., 2009) and in Italy (Cappellari and Lucifora, 
2009; Di Pietro, 2012; Trivellato and Triventi, 2011), even though this effect is 
arguably declining in the long run (Schizzerotto and Vergolini, 2015). Additional 
evidence from Italy suggests that the reform has succeeded in reducing the 
number of dropouts (Di Pietro and Cutillo, 2008; Cappellari and Lucifora, 2009), 
in incrementing the number of graduates at the same time reducing age at 
graduation (Cammelli, 2010), and in favouring participation to HE of students 
from low social origins and from non-academic tracks, such as vocational and 
technical institutes (Argentin e Triventi, 2011; Trivellato and Triventi, 2011). 
These results suggest the relevance of an in-depth analysis of the impact of 
the reform on graduates’ employability. If the supply of qualified labour force has 
increased and the composition of the population of tertiary graduates has changed 
in terms of age, education, and length of studies, it becomes relevant to 
understand how these new graduates respond to the needs of specific skills and 
competencies expressed by the labour market. These aspects of the reform have 
been in fact widely debated. On the one side, supporters of the reform interpreted 
the shortening of the first cycle as a means to increase enrolment, reduce drop-out 
rates, improve equality of opportunities for access to university and, finally, to 
allow a faster entry into the labour market. On the other side, criticisms have been 
raised about both the academic content and the actual market value of the new 
shorter cycle. Indeed, even though the basic idea of the reform was that BA 
degree could be fully considered a tertiary degree and that BA graduates should 
have a background and a profile tailored to the needs of economic growth and 
innovation, some studies suggest that this is not the case. Bratti and colleagues 
(2010), for instance, analyse the effect of the reform on Italian students’ 
performance comparing pre-reform and BA courses and outline three main 
results, namely a reduction of course workload, a certain degree of grade inflation 
and an increase in the probability of passing exams. Thus, the authors conclude 
that obtaining a degree has become easier, which might devaluate tertiary degrees 
and hence worsen graduates’ occupational outcomes. The few studies directly 
addressing the effect of the reform on graduates’ occupational outcomes confirm 
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this hypothesis. Even though BA graduates are found to have higher probabilities 
of employment with respect to pre-reform graduates, they are more likely to end 
up in temporary jobs (Bosio and Leonardi, 2011) and in clerical occupations (De 
Paoli, 2010), and to earn lower wages (Bosio and Leonardi, 2011; Bratti and 
Cappellari, 2012). These could be counted among the reasons why a big portion 
of BA graduates, especially those from high social origins, is found to continue 
studying in order to obtain a MA degree (Bratti and Cappellari, 2012). 
To the best of our knowledge no study has assessed so far the effect of the 
reform on the match between graduates’ jobs and education. However, if the 
reform has enhanced the already increasing number of graduates, while the 
corresponding demand has not followed this trend, we can reasonably expect to 
observe an overall increment in overeducation rates. Following the growth in the 
number of graduates, the competition for the available vacancies may have 
increased overall worsening graduates’ occupational chances. Thus, graduates 
would more often be forced to accept non-graduate jobs, which require neither 
their qualifications nor the skills they have acquired at university. Therefore we 
could expect that the risks of both educational and skill mismatches have overall 
increased after the implementation of the reform, as a result of the gap between 
demand and supply of qualified labour force. 
The new two-tier system created by the university reform requires, however, 
a more detailed analysis. BA and MA graduates differ with respect to several 
observable and unobservable characteristics—attained credential and amount of 
education above all. Thus, when comparing pre- and post-reform graduates, we 
cannot simply ignore the existence of two levels of tertiary education. Rather, 
from both theoretical and policy-oriented points of view, it becomes relevant to 
investigate the conceivably twofold effect of the reform. For these reasons, we are 
going to elaborate different and separate hypotheses on the effect of the reform for 
BA and MA graduates. 
Taking the move from the former, various elements suggest that BA 
graduates are more exposed to the risk of both educational and skill mismatches 
with respect to pre-reform graduates. These disadvantages, however, are likely to 
descend from different mechanisms. As we have discussed in the previous 
chapters, theories looking at education as a positional good predict that an 
increment in the number of graduates will challenge the validity of the educational 
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credential as a screening device. According to this view, employers may decide to 
rely on other signals of job applicants’ unobserved productivity, thus increasing 
graduates’ risk of educational mismatch. This scenario is even more plausible 
since, after the reform, the social base of participation to tertiary education has 
expanded. If the heterogeneity of graduates (in terms of skills, motivation, and 
productivity) has consequently increased, it could result in a further devaluation of 
the educational credential. Thus, we can hypothesise (Hypothesis 1) that BA are 
more exposed to the risk of educational mismatch than pre-reform graduates, 
since their educational degree has lost part of its signaling value, due to a) an 
increase in the number of individuals holding this degree, and b) an increase in 
graduates’ heterogeneity. 
At the same time, other elements suggest that the risk of skill mismatch has 
also increased for new BA graduates. In particular, according to the existing 
literature, these graduates do not seem to have been provided with skills and 
competencies actually required in the labour market. The reform does not seem to 
have reached the goal of making graduates more competitive in the labour market 
and prepared to meet the needs of innovation expressed by the economic systems. 
The possibility of developing three-year vocational courses has not been fully 
exploited; on the contrary, some scholars highlight that, while the reform has 
reduced the number of years necessary to gain a tertiary degree, universities have 
mainly continued to provide a generalist training (Trombetti and Stanchi, 2006). 
Additionally, results discussed above (Bratti et al., 2010) highlight a 
simplification of educational contents and a reduction of students’ workload. 
Adopting a Human Capital approach, we can expect these elements—BA 
graduates having lower, inadequate and not marketable skills—to have negative 
consequences on employers’ hiring decision. Thus, we hypothesise (Hypothesis 2) 
that BA are more exposed to the risk of skill mismatch than pre-reform graduates, 
since tertiary education does not appear to have been reformed according to the 
needs expressed by labour market. 
On the contrary, there is no reason—neither theoretical nor empirical—to 
expect MA graduates to differ, in terms of educational and skill mismatches, from 
pre-reform graduates. Indeed, we can expect the new MA degree to maintain the 
same value of the pre-reform degree, not only in terms of skills transmitted to 
students, but also in terms of signaling value of the educational credential. The 
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creation of two levels might have even enhanced the value of the MA degree, as 
employers do no longer compare it with upper secondary degrees, but rather with 
another tertiary degree of a lower level. Thus, we hypothesize (Hypothesis 3) that 
MA graduates differ neither in terms of educational mismatch nor in terms of 
skills mismatches from pre-reform graduates. Their risk of educational mismatch 
could even be lower, if the signaling value of the MA degree is higher than the 
one of the pre-reform tertiary degree. 
It is especially in terms of fields of study differentials that we expect the 
reform to have differently impacted on educational and skill mismatches. 
According to the social closure theory, discussed in previous chapters, graduates 
from fields of study that are intended to prepare for highly regulated professions 
(e.g. Engineering, Architecture, Law, etc.) can be more protected than others from 
the risks of educational and skill mismatches, if the regulation of the access to 
these professions helps in maintaining the competition for job vacancies low. In 
these cases, professions require very specific educational credentials and skills 
that only the corresponding fields of study can provide. For example, in order to 
become an architect, a student has to obtain a tertiary degree in Architecture. The 
reverse is also true: graduates in Architecture often become architects. This tight 
link might have been damaged by the reform. The question we should answer is 
what kind of job will be held by a BA graduate in Architecture. It might be useful 
to stress that we are not wondering whether a BA, a MA and a pre-reform 
graduate will do the same job, but rather, whether their educational credential and 
their skills will be equally required in the labour market. This is exactly the 
convenience of using subjective indicators: we do not have to impose that two 
graduates have the same job in order to test if they are at risk of educational and 
skill mismatches. Thus, the point is to understand whether graduates have—both 
at the BA and MA levels—credentials and skills required in the labour market. 
This issue seems particularly relevant when we deal with the above-mentioned 
fields of study that prepare for specific and regulated professions, by providing 
students with very specific skills that cannot be substituted by on-the-job training. 
The problem is to understand whether these new BA graduates are actually 
required in the labour market. Thus, we hypothesised (Hypothesis 4) that the 
reform has especially affected the risk of educational mismatch of BA graduates 
from fields that are intended to prepare for specific highly regulated professions. 
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Whether this effect is positive or negative remains to be established, since it 
probably depends on the capacity of the corresponding professional groups to 
adapt their regulation to the introduction of the new BA level. 
In terms of skill mismatch, instead, we do not expect that these fields of study 
have been affected more than others by the reform. As we have seen, educational 
mismatch does not necessarily imply skill mismatch and there are no reasons to 
believe that these graduates will have more difficulties in employing the skills 
they have acquired at university. Thus, we hypothesise (Hypothesis 5) that the 
reform has not differentially impacted on BA graduates’ risk of skill mismatch. 
Finally, neither theoretical nor empirical reasons indicate that the reform 
might have enhanced or reduced fields of study differentials among MA 
graduates, in terms of both educational and skill mismatches.  
5.3 Italy: too few or too many graduates? 
In the following sections the effect of the reform on Italian graduates’ risks of 
educational and skill mismatch is estimated. Low graduation rates combined with 
below-average returns to tertiary education make the Italian case particularly 
interesting. Recent estimates by OECD (2012) show a delay of Italy with respect 
to other industrialized countries. Within each age group, the portion of graduates 
is found to be lower than the average of OECD countries. Only 20% of the Italian 
population aged between 25 and 34 achieved a tertiary qualification, which is well 
below the figures found, for example, in Spain (27%), France (26%), and Great 
Britain (38%) (OECD 2012). We could expect that fewer graduates compete for 
job vacancies, the better their employment prospects. Yet, it does not seem to be 
the case. In Italy, the unemployment rate recorded among tertiary graduates three 
years after graduation has increased from 10.4% in 2001 to 17.5% in 2011, 
following a trend of continuous growth (Istat 2012)
24
. Moreover, a decrease in the 
economic return to education has been recorded, both over time and in the 
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 Istat (2012) reports that the unemployment rate of tertiary graduates three years after graduation 
has increased from 10.4% in 2001, to 12.6% in 2004, to 15.6% in 2007, to 17.5% in 2011. The 
worsening labour market opportunities for tertiary graduates seem, thus, not to be fully due to the 
explosion of the economic crisis (even though it surely has had a negative impact). It rather seems to be 
a negative trend consolidated in the last decade. 
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international comparison. Almalaurea (2012) observed a significant reduction of 
tertiary graduates’ wages between 2007 and 2010: -11% for BA graduates, -13% 
for MA graduates
25
. Additionally, the wage premium for tertiary graduates with 
respect to individuals with upper secondary education is lower in Italy (+50%) 
than in other OECD countries (on average: +65%), such as US (+84%), Germany 
(+81%), the UK (+78%) and France (+65%) (OECD 2012)
26
. Finally, the most 
interesting datum for this dissertation is that Italy is one of the European countries 
with the highest incidence of overeducation among tertiary graduates (Barone and 
Ortiz, 2011; Cainarca and Sgobbi, 2009; Verhaest and van der Velden, 2013). 
Figure 5.1 reports the main findings from the most recent comparative analyses, 
which have all been conducted on REFLEX and HEGESCO data (Barone and 
Ortiz, 2011; Ferrante et al. 2010; Humburg et al. 2012; Verhaest and van der 
Velden 2013). 
Fig. 5.1 The incidence of overeducation among European graduates, existing evidence 
 
                                                 
25
 As for the unemployment rate, also wages have started to reduce before the 2008 economic 
crisis (AlmaLaurea 2012). 
26
 Worth to say that this lower premium is not due to individuals with secondary education earning 
higher wages in Italy than in the other mentioned countries (OECD 2012). 
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Despite the differences among the estimates reported in the graph, results 
highlight that Italy ranks among the countries with the highest incidence of 
overeducated graduates, along with Spain, Hungary and the United Kingdom. 
Five years after graduation the rate of overeducation among Italian tertiary 
graduates lies between 11% and 19%. Thus, the overeducation risk is found to be 
high not only soon after graduation (23% six months after graduation according to 
Ferrante et al. [2010], 38% according to Verhaest and van der Velden [2013]), but 
also in the long run. It is especially this long-term figure that raises concern: a 
temporary experience of overeducation can be considered as physiological at the 
very beginning of the job career, but the phenomenon acquires more relevance if 
it lasts over time (Groot and Maassen van den Brink 2000). Also the most recent 
Italian literature has highlighted a major mismatch between demand and supply of 
skilled labour, resulting in a high incidence of overeducation. In one of the most 
recent studies, Terraneo (2010) analyses data on graduates of 2004 interviewed in 
2007 and finds that about one graduate out of four is overeducated. Among 
graduates of the same cohort, but interviewed five years after graduation, Ferrante 
and colleagues (2010) estimate that the rate of overeducation is around 11%. 
Caroleo and Pastore (2013), using data from graduates of 2005, estimate the 
incidence of the phenomenon to rank between 13.2% and 16.5% one year after 
graduation, and between 8% and 11.5% at five years. 
These two apparently conflicting results—the low share of tertiary graduates 
and the high incidence of overeducation—can be reconciled if we take into 
account not the absolute number of graduates, but rather the ability of the 
economic system to take advantage of this highly skilled workforce. We have to 
consider, indeed, that the demand for qualified labour force in Italy is traditionally 
hampered by a rigid labour market, lack of innovation, low investments in 
research and development, and the prevalence of a traditional economy which 
above all requires low-skilled workers (Di Pietro, 2002). In order to compare the 
evolution over time of demand and supply of qualified labour, Figure 5.2 depicts 
the trend in graduation rates and in the diffusion of highly skilled jobs
27
. Although 
the definition of the latter might be debated, for the sake of simplicity we consider 
                                                 
27
 The datum refers to individuals’ first job, which is the only information comparable across 
cohorts. 
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them to coincide with the first two categories of the scheme proposed by Erikson 
and Goldthorpe (1992), including the upper and service class (Barone, 2012b). 
Fig. 5.2  Percentage of tertiary graduates and of service class by birth cohort 
 
Source: ISTAT, Indagine Statistica Multiscopo sulle Famiglie (2009) 
 
As shown in the figure, a major part of the twentieth century has been 
characterized by a significant gap between demand and supply of skilled labour. 
This trend has started to reverse when workers born in the ‘40s entered the labour 
market, while the number of skilled jobs stopped increasing
28
. At the same time, 
figure 5.2 suggests that graduation rates have inexorably continued to grow. This 
huge increase has followed the more general trend of growing educational 
                                                 
28
 Looking at Figure 5.2, it could be argued that we are not observing a substantial stability of the 
ratio of qualified jobs over time. On the contrary, it might be hypothesized that, due to technological 
innovation, the category of highly qualified jobs has expanded, up to include, nowadays, not only the 
upper classes depicted in the graph, but also, for example, the one immediately below, namely that of 
qualified employees (Büchel et al., 2003). However, scholars who addressed the distinction between 
overeducation and upgrading of skills have outlined that, in Italy, the first phenomenon seems to prevail 
over the second one (Naticchioni et al., 2010). Among the determinants, the peculiarity of the Italian 
productive structure—characterized by the prevalence of SMEs specialized in traditional low-
technology sectors (Trombetti and Stanchi, 2006)—, the labour market rigidity (Di Pietro and Urwin 
2006) and the low investment in R&D are counted. The same reasons are also advanced to explain the 
large incidence of undereducation in Italy, that is to say, of individuals holding a lower level of 
education than the one required by their jobs. Cainarca and Sgobbi (2009) suggest that this evidence 
supports the hypothesis that in Italy workers tend to learn occupation-specific skills on the job rather 
than at school. Consequently, in their hiring decisions, employers would reward job applicants’ 
professional experience more than their educational credentials. This hypothesis has been also 
confirmed in a recent study, which has outlined that Italian firms tend to hire workers with less skill 
than those required to do the job, in order to be able to train them on the job (Centro Studi Unioncamere 
2010).  
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attainment: CNVSU data show that the number of upper secondary degree holders 
has increased in the last three decades, both in absolute terms and as a percentage 
of individuals aged 19 (which is the typical age at diploma). Along with this 
phenomenon, we also observe an increase in the number of students enrolled at, 
and graduated from, university, notwithstanding the well-known high level of 
drop-out that characterizes the Italian Higher Education system. 
According to the literature this pre-existing trend has been further stimulated 
and accelerated by the introduction of the so-called «3+2» reform of Higher 
Education Starting from the Academic Year 2000/2001
29
, indeed, Italy complied 
with the European guidelines of the Bologna Process and replaced the former 
unitary system—in which student could enrol into either four- or five-years 
degrees
30—with a two-tier system made of a three-year degree (BA) and an 
additional two-year degree (MA)
31
. Only students from Medicine and Veterinary 
have not been systematically affected by the reform, since for these courses no 
BA degree exists.  
The Italian government particularly stressed the remedial role of the Bologna 
Process to some long-standing problems of tertiary education: the comparatively 
low participation (especially of students from low social origins), the high level of 
graduation delay and the high drop-out rate. With the new two-tier system, a 
reduction of time required to obtain a (first) tertiary degree and the consequent 
decrease of the direct and indirect costs of education were intended to contribute 
to the achievement of relevant social goals, such as the expansion of the 
participation to tertiary education, the reduction of the drop-out rate, the decline in 
the average age at graduation and the increase of graduation rates. As previously 
discussed, a huge body of research has investigated the effects of the Bologna 
Process on enrolment and students’ academic performance, indeed finding that the 
reform has promoted an increase in the number of graduates, mainly by expanding 
the social base of participation in HE. However, its impact on labour market 
                                                 
29
 D.M. 509/1999. 
30
 In the pre-reform system, students could also choose to enrol into another kind of short course, 
with a two- or three-years duration, called «diploma universitario». This option was, however, scarcely 
diffused. Moreover, data on students from these courses are not available, so that they cannot be 
compared with graduates pre- or post-reform. 
31
 Other innovations include the introduction of the system of credits (ECTS), intended as a 
measure of the commitment required to achieve the degree, and the expansion of university in terms of 
numbers of faculty, courses and teachers. 
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entrance of graduates still needs to be examined in depth: the few studies 
addressing this issue, indeed, indicate that post-reform graduates have higher 
probabilities of employment with respect to pre-reform graduates, but more often 
hold temporary jobs and earn lower wages (Bosio and Leonardi, 2011; Bratti and 
Cappellari, 2012). 
5.4 Empirical strategy 
5.4.1 Data 
The analyses are conducted on the six waves of the Istat survey on work 
careers of tertiary graduates «Inserimento professionale dei laureati». Starting 
from 1995 the survey has been conducted every third year, interviewing graduates 
three years after graduation. The only exception is the last wave (2011), in which 
data have been collected four years after graduation. A total of 186,987 graduates 
have been included in the six waves of the survey. Some individuals have been 
excluded from the analyses, in particular: 
 10,133 BA graduates from 2004 who have obtained (or have 
continued studying in order to obtain) a MA degree. As already 
discussed in Chapter 3, these individuals are not comparable with 
other graduates from the same cohort: neither with BA graduates, 
because of a different educational history (three vs. five years of 
tertiary education), nor with MA graduates, because of a (presumably) 
different amount of work experience. 
 16,158 BA graduates from 2007 who have obtained (or have 
continued studying in order to obtain) a MA degree (for the same 
reason discussed above). 
Moreover, since our outcome variables are conditional on employment, 
unemployed graduates are excluded from the analysis. 
The final sample includes 119.272 observations, as described in the following 
table. 
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Tab. 5.1  Sample size by graduation cohort and year of the survey 
Year of the survey Graduation cohort N 
1995 1992 9,251 
1998 1995 12,638 
2001 1998 15,782 
2005 2001 18,517 
2007 2004 28,186 
2011 2007 34,898 
Total  119,272 
5.4.2 Variables 
Following the discussion of previous chapters on the validity of various 
indicators of overeducation, also in the following analyses we distinguish between 
educational and skill mismatches. The former is measured by a SAg indicator, 
based on individuals’ self-assessment of the necessity of a tertiary degree as an 
entry requirement for their job: «Was a tertiary degree necessary to get your 
current job?» 
32
. EM occurs when individuals answer «No». 
SM is measured through a SAp indicator which refers to the effective 
necessity of the tertiary degree to do the job. The wording of this question has 
slightly changed throughout the six waves. The construction of the indicator is 
summarized in Table 5.2. 
Tab. 5.2 Construction of the SAp indicator of skill mismatch 
Year of the survey Question Possible answers Definition of SM 
1995 How much do you make 
use of your university 
education to perform your 
current job?33 
A lot; quite a lot; scarcely; 
not at all. 
SM occurs if individuals 
answer ‘Scarcely’ or ‘Not at 
all’. 
1998 
2001 
With respect to your current 
job do you think that having 
a tertiary degree is...?34 
Too much, necessary, 
inadequate 
SM occurs when 
individuals answer ‘Too 
much’ 
2004 
2007 
2011 
And to do your current job, 
do you think that having a 
tertiary degree is effectively 
necessary?35 
Yes; No SM occurs if individuals 
answer ‘No’ 
 
                                                 
32
 The original Italian question is «Per accedere al suo attuale lavoro, possedere una laurea era un 
requisito necessario?». The wording of the question is partially different only in the 1995 wave: «La 
laurea è un titolo di studio necessario per l’attività lavorativa attuale?». 
33
 ‘Utilizza la formazione universitaria? a) in maniera importante; b) in maniera soddisfacente; c) 
in maniera ridotta; d) per niente’. 
34
 ‘Rispetto al lavoro che svolge, ritiene che avere una laurea sia…? a) eccessivo; b) necessario; c) 
insufficiente’ 
35
 ‘E per svolgere il suo lavoro, secondo lei, possedere una laurea è effettivamente necessario?’ 
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The following table describes the distribution of the two dependent variables 
in the six waves of the survey. 
Tab. 5.3 Incidence of educational and skill mismatches by graduation cohort 
Graduation cohort Educational mismatch  Skill mismatch N 
1992 0.26 0.35 9,251 
1995 0.33 0.26 12,638 
1998 0.31 0.18 15,782 
2001 0.32 0.31 18,517 
2004 0.31 0.30 28,186 
2007 0.36 0.33 34,898 
 
The following analyses investigate the evolution over time of the 
phenomenon, before and after the implementation of the reform, among graduates 
from different fields of study, by controlling for a number of relevant individual 
characteristics. The main independent and control variables that will be used in 
the subsequent analyses are described in Table 5.4.  
5.4.3 Methods 
The main aim of this chapter is to evaluate the impact of the «3+2» reform on 
graduates’ risks of educational and skill mismatches, both overall and across 
fields of study. Several elements have been emphasized in the literature, showing 
how problematic it is to accurately evaluate the effects of the reform (Fondazione 
Giovanni Agnelli 2012). First of all, the existence of a huge population of 
graduates who enrolled before the implementation of the reform but who have 
then shifted to a new three-year course (the so-called hybrid graduates) makes it 
difficult to clearly identify the pre- and the post-reform populations. Moreover, 
the near introduction of other reforms, designed to enhance the contractual 
flexibility in the labour market (such as the so-called «pacchetto Treu»
36
 and 
«Biagi law»
37
), and the emergence of the economic crisis might conceal the 
eventual effect of the university reform. 
  
                                                 
36 Law 196/1997. 
37 Law 30/2003. 
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Tab. 5.4 Description of the main independent and control variables 
Variable Description Categories 
Sex Sex of respondent Male 
Female 
Geographic Area It refers to the location of the Athenaeum  North 
Centre 
South and Islands 
Age Age at graduation Less than 30 
30 or more 
Parents’ Education Level of education of parents (dominance 
criterion: the highest one is selected) 
Primary or less 
Lower secondary 
Upper secondary 
Tertiary 
Parents’ occupation Occupational class of parents (dominance 
criterion: the highest one is selected)  
Managers and Professionals 
Entrepreneurs 
Non manual employees 
Self-employed 
Manual workers 
Unemployed 
Upper secondary education Type of upper secondary education Classical lyceum 
Scientific lyceum 
Other lyceum 
Technical school 
Vocational school 
Matriculation year Year of first matriculation (available only in the 
2007 and 2011 surveys) 
1998/99 or before 
1999/2000 or after 
Field of study Field of study individuals graduated from Scientific 
Medicine 
Engineer 
Agriculture 
Economics 
Social and political sciences 
Law 
Humanities 
Medical professions 
Tertiary graduation mark Tertiary graduation mark 66-90 
91-100 
101-105 
106-110 
110 cum laude 
Graduation delay Years of graduation delay No delay 
One year 
Two years 
Three years 
Four years or more 
Type of tertiary degree Type of tertiary degree obtained Pre-reform (or post-reform single-tier 
courses) 
Bachelor 
Master 
Graduation cohort Graduation cohort (defined by Istat sampling 
procedures) 
1992 
1995 
1998 
2001 
2004 
2007 
2011 
Further education Further education after graduation No 
Yes 
Work experience during HE Work experience while enrolled at university No experience 
Temporary experience 
Permanently employed during 
university 
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Finally, since the new graduates are just at the very beginning of their job 
careers, any detectable effect will be, by definition, only a short-run effect and it 
will not provide a satisfactory answer to questions relating to long-term returns to 
education. 
In the next section, fundamentals of counterfactual approach are briefly 
described and techniques adopted so far in the literature to evaluate the causal 
effect of the university reform are critically presented. Then, the methods 
employed for the analyses, namely propensity score matching and Difference-in-
Differences will be introduced. 
5.4.3.1 General problem of assessing the causal effect 
We define the outcome of interest as Yi, namely educational and skill 
mismatches. We want to estimate the causal effect on this outcome of the 
treatment Di, namely graduating under the new regime (Di=1) instead of under the 
older one (Di=0). The causal effect of an intervention for an individual i can be 
defined as the difference between the two potential outcomes that the individual 
would experience being exposed to the treatment or excluded from it: 
 
𝜏𝑖 = 𝑌𝑖
1 − 𝑌𝑖
0 
 
where 𝑌𝑖
1 represents the outcome of individual i when receiving the treatment 
(Di=1, post-reform graduates) and 𝑌𝑖
0 represents the outcome of individual i when 
he does not receive it (Di=0, pre-reform graduates).  
The problem is that we can observe graduate i and his outcome only in one of 
the two possible regimes, while we cannot observe the other outcome (i.e. the 
counterfactual outcome). 
A feasible approach to overcome this «fundamental problem of causal 
inference» (Holland, 1986, p. 947) is to focus on the identification of causal 
parameters, that is to say, of specific features of the distribution of the causal 
effect 𝑌1 − 𝑌0 for (a subset of) the reference population. Typically, an interesting 
causal parameter is a mean. 
We focus our attention on the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) 
which is defined as follows: 
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𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸[𝑌1 − 𝑌0|𝐷 = 1] = 𝐸[𝑌1|𝐷 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑌0|𝐷 = 1] 
 
The last term in the equation is a counterfactual, unobservable by definition, 
since the outcome Y
0
 is never observed on individuals exposed to the treatment. 
We can observe the mean value of Y
0
 only among non-treated individuals, that is 
𝐸[𝑌0|𝐷 = 0]. If we contrast it with the outcome experienced by the treated group 
we obtain: 
 
𝐸[𝑌1|𝐷 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑌0|𝐷 = 0] 
= {𝐸[𝑌1|𝐷 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑌0|𝐷 = 1]} + {𝐸[𝑌0|𝐷 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑌0|𝐷 = 0]} 
 
The term 𝐸[𝑌1|𝐷 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑌0|𝐷 = 1] is the ATT, which consists of the 
difference between the factual outcome for the treated after the treatment and their 
counterfactual outcome, i.e. the outcome we would observe for the treated, did 
they have not been exposed to the treatment. 
The term 𝐸[𝑌0|𝐷 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑌0|𝐷 = 0] represents the selection bias term, 
that is to say, the difference we would observe between participants and non-
participants if the programme were not implemented. This bias depends on pre-
existing differences between the two groups; in other words, it captures any 
eventual differences between treated and non-treated that cannot be attributed to 
the programme. 
Finally, the term 𝐸[𝑌1|𝐷 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑌0|𝐷 = 0] is the observed mean 
difference between treated and non-treated. Giving this term causal interpretation 
requires having no selection bias. The magnitude of selection bias, in turn, 
depends on the selection process, that is to say, to the set of rules according to 
which some members of the population are exposed to the intervention while 
some others are not. 
Thus, the possibility to estimate the causal effect of the intervention rests on 
our capacity to disentangle the selection bias term and to nullify it, by making the 
treated group equal to the non-treated group, with the only exception of being 
exposed to or excluded from the treatment. Formally, we need to characterize 
𝐷(𝑋, 𝑈, 𝑍), where D is the binary treatment state, X is a set of observable 
characteristics not affected by the intervention and possibly correlated to the 
outcome Y
0
, U is a set of unobservable characteristics not affected by the 
138 
 
intervention and possibly correlated to the outcome Y
0
, and Z is the binary result 
of a random draw, that is by definition independent of the potential outcomes. 
Various strategies have been adopted by scholars aiming at identifying the 
impact of the reform on graduates’ occupational outcomes. The simplest strategy 
adopted in the literature is a before-after comparison. This is what can be found in 
Argentin and Triventi (2011) and in De Paoli (2010). The former analyse the same 
data that are being used for the following analyses, with the only—but relevant—
exception of the 2011 wave. Pre-reform graduates are those who graduated in 
2001 or before, while 2004 is the post-reform graduation cohort. Let’s notice that 
this cohort includes, by definition, only BA graduates: thus, it is not possible for 
the authors to assess any eventual effect of the reform on MA graduates. De Paoli 
(2010), instead, investigates changes in graduates’ occupational opportunities by 
recurring to Excelsior data on Italian firms. In this survey employers are asked 
about the characteristics of future employees. Data from 2001 to 2003 (pre-
reform) and from 2007 to 2009 (post-reform) are analysed in order to assess 
whether employers’ preferences for hiring graduates or non-graduates job 
applicants have changed with the introduction of the reform. The major drawback 
of the before-after approach is that it relies on the assumption that there are not 
time-varying unobservable factors affecting both the treatment and the outcome. It 
is particularly unlikely that this assumption holds in our case, since we are 
observing also the 2007 cohort. These are graduates that entered the labour market 
just before the economic crisis, which under no doubt has affected their 
occupational outcomes. 
In order to tackle this problem Bratti and Cappellari (2012) restrict the 
analyses to graduates of the 2004 cohort only. In 2004, in fact, graduates from 
both the old and the new regime obtained a degree. The former are the last cohort 
of students enrolled before the introduction of the reform, while the latter are the 
former enrolled after the reform. In order to compare similar individuals, the 
authors dropped older graduates and those who graduated with delay. This way, 
the authors argue, they are able to observe similar individuals, who are not 
exposed to different business cycles, which is a typical problem with before-after 
comparisons. In this case, the identification strategy rests upon the assumption 
that no unobservable factor plays a relevant role in enrolling decisions and thus 
that, conditioning on a set of observable Xs, the students of the two groups will 
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differ only with respect to the type of degree. Even if we assume that this 
assumption holds, we have to bear in mind that the argument of the authors is 
restricted, by definition, to the very beginning of the new university regime. 
An alternative strategy is adopted by Bosio and Leonardi (2011), which is 
based on variation in the timing of the reform. The reform was first introduced in 
1999 and, as discussed above, reached its full implementation in 2001. Thanks to 
its autonomy, each university could decide when to introduce the new degrees. 
Thus, the first 3+2 graduates appeared in 2002. Using data from the Italian Labour 
Force Survey 1998-2007, the authors have been able to use this variation between 
universities in the introduction of the reform, in order to identify changes in the 
supply of college graduates and to investigate its effect on employment 
probability and on wages. Unfortunately, this identification strategy does not 
allow to measure the effect of the full implementation of the reform, since, by 
definition, no control group does exist anymore starting from 2001, when each 
and every university has been compelled to adapt to the new rules. 
Thus, the following analyses are based on identification strategies different 
from those employed so far in the literature. In the following paragraphs, two 
alternative strategies are discussed that allow us to assess the impact of the 3+2 
reform on graduates’ risks of educational and skill mismatches, namely propensity 
score matching and Difference-in-Differences. 
5.4.3.2 Propensity score matching 
In the first part of the analysis, we assume that the probability to participate in 
the intervention—that is to say, the probability to obtain a degree under the new 
regime—depends on a set of observable characteristics plus unobservable 
characteristics that are independent of the potential outcomes. Formally: 
 
𝐷(𝑋, 𝑈, 𝑍) = 𝐷(𝑋, 𝑈) 
 
In the case of selection on observables, the enforcement of the ceteris paribus 
condition only requires conditioning on X, in order to make the composition of the 
two groups equivalent with respect to X. In other words, if we assume that all 
differences between treated and non-treated individuals relevant for the outcome 
of interest are captured by the observable variables X, controlling for these 
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variables in the analysis is sufficient to eliminate the selection bias. This is 
formally called Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA): 
 
𝑌0 ⊥ 𝐷 | 𝑋 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑋 ∊ 𝑆 
 
A further condition that must be fulfilled is that we observe both participants 
and non-participants with the same characteristics. This common support 
condition can be expressed by: 
 
0 < 𝑃(𝐷 = 1|𝑋) < 1 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑋 ∊ 𝑆 
 
If we accept these assumptions, we can use the observed mean outcome of the 
non-treated to estimate the mean counterfactual outcome the treated would have 
experienced had they not been treated. 
A very popular method to analyse the causal effect of an intervention under 
the assumptions described above is that of propensity score matching (PSM, 
hereafter), which allows to highlights eventual problems of common support and 
to reduce the curse of dimensionality, that is the problem that arises when the list 
of variables is too large to allow a match on each treated unit separately. 
The propensity score is expressed by: 
 
𝑝(𝑋) = 𝑃{𝐷 = 1|𝑋} 
 
that is, the probability of being exposed to the treatment (D=1) conditioning on a 
set of observable characteristics X. 
Adopting this approach, our treatment variable D can be constructed by 
combining information on a) graduation cohort and b) type of obtained degree, as 
described in the Table 5.5. 
Tab. 5.5 Construction of the treatment variable 
 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 
Pre-reform or post-reform single-tier D=0 D=0 D=0 D=0 D=0 D=0 
Post-reform, Bachelor     D=1 D=1 
Post-reform, Master      D=1 
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Then the propensity score
38
 is computed for a set of observable 
characteristics. These are all relevant variables preceding the treatment status: sex, 
age, geographical area, parents’ education and occupation, type of upper 
secondary education, and field of study. We have some fields of study that 
univocally predict the treatment status: graduates from Medicine are non-treated 
by definition, since the reform has not impacted on this course. Graduates from 
Medical Profession are, instead, always treated, since degrees in this field did not 
exist before the reform. For these reasons, graduates from these two fields are 
excluded from this set of analyses. 
Finally, the effect of the reform on graduates’ risks of educational and skill 
mismatch is estimated. In order to have an insight on differential effects for BA 
and MA graduates, we start from a baseline specification, in which the effect is 
estimated on all treated graduates, as reported in the table above. Then, we restrict 
the analysis to the comparisons a) between Pre-reform and BA graduates, and b) 
between Pre-reform and MA graduates. Moreover, as robustness checks, we 
alternatively specify in a more or less restrictive way the groups of treated and 
controls. For what concerns the former, we estimate the effect of the reform a) on 
all post-reform graduates; b) on post-reform graduates of the 2004 cohort; c) on 
post-reform graduates of the 2007 cohort
39
. With respect to the latter, instead, we 
alternatively specify the models a) including, or b) excluding non-treated 
graduates of 2004 and 2007 (highlighted in grey in the table above) since, due to 
data constraints we are not able to distinguish graduates of non-reformed courses 
from students that simply have delayed the attainment of a pre-reform degree. 
5.4.3.3 Difference-in-differences 
The previous approach relies on the assumption that the groups of treated and 
controls graduates remain comparable over time. If it were not the case, changes 
due to factors occurred contemporaneously with the implementation of the 3+2 
reform and affecting graduates’ occupational outcomes would be wrongly 
attributed to the reform. To account for this problem, we adopt a DiD method. 
                                                 
38
 The employed methods is caliper matching: units are randomly sorted and then treated i is 
matched to the closest non-treated j in terms of the propensity score, but only if the control’s propensity 
score is within a certain radius, that we setted at 0.01. 
39
 Obviously, this distinction is meaningful only when we compare pre-reform with BA graduates. 
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This method can be used when the selection to the treatment status is a 
function of unobservable characteristics, which are associated with the potential 
outcome under non-treatment Y
0
, but are independent with the variation of Y
0
 
over time. 
The DiD method consists in comparing the changes in outcomes over time 
between the treatment group and the control group. In other words, it combines 
two before-after, one for the treated group and one for the control group. The 
difference in the before-after outcomes for the treated group controls for factors 
that are constant over time in that group. The second difference, which is 
computed for the control group, not affected by the program but exposed to the 
same set of environmental conditions, allows to capture time-varying factors. If 
we subtract this second difference to the former, we eliminate the main source of 
bias that we have to face with simple before-after comparison. 
The causal parameter of interest is, again, the average treatment effect on the 
treated, that is: 
 
𝐴𝑇𝑇 = {𝐸(𝑌𝑡+1
1 |𝐷 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑡
0|𝐷 = 1)} − {𝐸(𝑌𝑡+1
0 |𝐷 = 0) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑡
0|𝐷 = 0)} 
 
It is important to stress that the treatment and control groups do not 
necessarily need to have the same pre-intervention conditions. But for DiD to be 
valid, the control group must accurately represent the change in outcomes that the 
treatment group would have experienced in the absence of the treatment. 
Our intuition is that, since the 2001 reform has not affected, by design, the 
group of graduates in Medicine, these individuals can be used as the control 
group, while graduates from other fields of study are included in the treatment 
group
40
. The main assumption underlying our analysis is that, while the former 
group has not been exposed to the reform, occupational outcomes of both the 
treatment and control groups have been similarly influenced by other time-varying 
factors. Hence, to estimate the effect of the «3+2» reform on graduates’ risk of 
educational and skill mismatches, our strategy is to track occupational outcomes 
                                                 
40
 It could be argued in this respect that, even though the structure of courses in Medicine and 
Veterinary has remained the same, the reform may have indirectly affected graduates from this field of 
study, for example by altering the composition of this group. Data at our disposal reassure us about this 
eventuality. Selection into these courses was, and still is, very tight, given the traditionally low number 
of available places. Perhaps for this reason the composition of graduates from this field is far more 
stable over time than in reformed fields, as depicted in the figures reported in the Appendix. 
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for graduates in Medicine before and after the reform, and then compare these 
changes with the corresponding changes for graduates from other fields of study, 
exposed to the reform. 
The DiD estimate can be therefore computed with a standard logit regression 
model specified as follows: 
 
logit(p̂i) = α + β1Pi + β2Di + δPiDi + εi 
 
where P is a dummy variable for the individuals graduating pre- or post-reform; D 
is a dummy for the treatment status which assumes value 0 for graduates in 
Medicine and value 1 for graduates from all the other fields; and the DiD 
coefficient δ provides an estimate of the effect of the reform. In the following, 
average marginal effects computed from the logit models are presented. In the 
following analyses, this approach is employed to assess the impact of the reform 
on graduates’ risk of overeducation both overall and across fields of study. In 
order to evaluate the heterogeneity of the effect, separate models are estimated by 
field of graduation. 
It is worth noting that, in the DiD framework the control group is specified in 
a different fashion: it does not include anymore all pre-reform graduates, but only 
graduates in Medicine. Thus, treatment and control groups, before and after the 
reform are defined as described in the following table. 
Tab. 5.6 Definition of the treatment (D=1) and control (D=0) groups, before (t) and after 
(t+1) the reform 
  Medicine Other fields Medical Professions 
1992    
Pre-reform D=0, t D=1, t - 
1995    
Pre-reform D=0, t D=1, t - 
1998    
Pre-reform D=0, t D=1, t - 
2001    
Pre-reform D=0, t D=1, t - 
2004    
Pre-reform or single-tier D=0, t+1 Excluded - 
Bachelor - D=1, t+1 Excluded 
2007    
Pre-reform or single-tier D=0, t+1 Excluded - 
Bachelor - D=1, t+1 Excluded 
Master - D=1, t+1 Excluded 
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As described in the table, graduates in Medical Professions are excluded from 
the analysis, since degrees in this field did not exist before the reform. Again, we 
exclude from the analyses the group of pre-reform or single-tier graduates of 2004 
and 2007 since, due to data constraints we are not able to distinguish graduates of 
non-reformed courses from students that simply have delayed the attainment of a 
pre-reform degree. 
Since we have data on four cohorts of graduates before the implementation of 
the reform (from 1992 to 2001), pre-programme tests can be used to test the 
plausibility of the assumption of parallelism on which our DiD approach relies 
(Heckman and Hotz 1989). Hence, the following equation is estimated using only 
pooled data on the 1992, 1995, 1998 and 2001 cohorts: 
 
logit(p̂i) = α + β195i + β298i + β301i + β4Di + δ195iDi + δ298iDi + δ301iDi + εi 
 
In this equation the three dummies for graduation cohort (1992 is the 
reference category) are entered as long as a dummy for the treatment status. The δ 
coefficients for the interaction terms between cohort and treatment status measure 
the differential time trend for treated and control graduates in the absence of the 
reform. If these coefficients turned out not to be statistically different from zero, 
this would imply that the time trend in the risk of educational and skill 
mismatches is similar for graduates in Medicine and in other fields in the pre-
reform period. 
5.5 Results  
5.5.1 The evolution over time of overeducation 
The following table describes the distribution of overeducation among 
graduates from the six analysed cohorts by the main socio-demographic and 
education-related variables, namely sex, geographical area, age, parental 
education, field of study and type of tertiary degree. Overall, the estimates 
reported in the table do not suggest the existence of a clear trend of increasing or 
decreasing incidence of educational and skill mismatches. 
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Tab. 5.7 Rates of educational and skill mismatches by graduation cohort and main socio-
demographic and education-related variables 
 
Educational mismatch 
 
Skill mismatch 
 
1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 
 
1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 
Gender 
             Male 0.23 0.25 0.29 0.28 0.29 0.39 
 
0.33 0.22 0.15 0.30 0.29 0.34 
Female 0.31 0.40 0.33 0.35 0.32 0.34 
 
0.38 0.30 0.20 0.33 0.31 0.31 
Geographic Area 
             North 0.28 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.31 0.34 
 
0.35 0.27 0.16 0.33 0.33 0.33 
Centre 0.26 0.33 0.31 0.33 0.32 0.38 
 
0.37 0.25 0.19 0.33 0.30 0.32 
South and Islands 0.22 0.31 0.27 0.29 0.30 0.39 
 
0.35 0.24 0.20 0.26 0.26 0.32 
Age 
             Less than 30 0.26 0.33 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.30 
 
0.36 0.26 0.17 0.32 0.31 0.32 
30 or more 0.27 0.31 0.32 0.37 0.35 0.55 
 
0.34 0.26 0.20 0.31 0.29 0.33 
Parents' Education 
             Primary or less 0.25 0.38 0.34 0.36 0.34 0.50 
 
0.34 0.31 0.21 0.34 0.31 0.33 
Lower secondary 0.29 0.35 0.33 0.35 0.34 0.40 
 
0.36 0.28 0.19 0.33 0.31 0.33 
Upper secondary 0.29 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.35 
 
0.36 0.26 0.17 0.33 0.32 0.33 
Tertiary 0.23 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.29 
 
0.34 0.20 0.16 0.26 0.27 0.30 
Field of study 
             Scientific 0.17 0.23 0.21 0.18 0.20 0.29 
 
0.35 0.23 0.14 0.24 0.24 0.31 
Medicine 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 
 
0.16 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.06 
Engineer 0.14 0.16 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.22 
 
0.33 0.19 0.13 0.23 0.24 0.28 
Agriculture 0.17 0.38 0.31 0.29 0.31 0.41 
 
0.28 0.33 0.19 0.30 0.31 0.37 
Economics 0.35 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.48 
 
0.37 0.29 0.19 0.41 0.41 0.45 
Social and political Sciences 0.59 0.57 0.52 0.54 0.53 0.58 
 
0.61 0.37 0.24 0.48 0.49 0.50 
Law 0.25 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.38 
 
0.30 0.20 0.17 0.25 0.27 0.31 
Humanities 0.42 0.58 0.41 0.46 0.42 0.50 
 
0.42 0.36 0.22 0.38 0.35 0.41 
Medical professions - - - - 0.06 0.23 
 
- - - - 0.07 0.13 
Type of tertiary degree 
    
   
    
  Pre-reform o single cycle 0.26 0.33 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.35 
 
0.35 0.26 0.18 0.32 0.31 0.31 
Bachelor 
    
0.31 0.44 
     
0.29 0.33 
Master 
     
0.29 
      
0.34 
Total 0.26 0.33 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.36 
 
0.35 0.26 0.18 0.31 0.30 0.33 
 
However, what is more interesting for the aim of this study is that while we 
observe a stable incidence of skill mismatch in the last three cohorts (namely, the 
one immediately before the implementation of the «3+2» reform and the 
subsequent two), an increase of educational mismatch is found among graduates 
of the last cohort.  
Results reported in Table 5.7 inform us also on the distribution of educational 
and skill mismatches by the main socio-demographic and education-related 
variables. Even though the magnitude of the gender gap is generally small, both 
kinds of mismatch seem to have been more widespread among women at least 
until 2007: among graduates of the last cohort the rates of educational and skill 
mismatches among males overcome that of females. Also results concerning the 
distribution of the phenomenon across geographical areas do not seem to follow a 
univocal pattern. Differences between Northern and Southern regions are found to 
be generally modest in size, and they do not seem to significantly increase or 
decrease over time. Only in 2007 we observe a relevant increase of educational 
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mismatch in the Centre and in the South of Italy. A similar result is found for age: 
no relevant difference is found between younger and older graduates, with the 
only exception of the last cohort, where we observe a 25 percentage points 
difference in the risk of educational mismatch. Finally, parents’ education is 
found to be associated mainly with the risk of educational mismatch. The greatest 
difference is generally found between the two extreme categories: individuals 
with tertiary educated parents are less at risk of educational mismatch. This 
difference is found to increase over time: it is almost null in the first cohort, it 
then ranges around 10 percentage points from the 1995 to the 2004 cohort, and it 
finally reaches the level of 20 percentage points among 2007 graduates. 
When it comes to the distribution of educational and skill mismatches among 
graduates from different fields of study, three results are worth noting. The former 
is that field of study seems to be a crucial determinant of the risks of both 
educational and skill mismatches. Similar to what we found in the previous 
chapters, we observe that fields of study can be ranked according to their 
corresponding levels of mismatch, even though the gaps in terms of skill 
mismatch are generally a little bit smaller. Graduates from Medicine and Medical 
Professions are the best performing ones, followed, first, by the group of 
Scientific fields and Engineering, second, by graduates of Economics and Law, 
and finally, by graduates from the Humanities and Social Sciences. The second 
relevant result is that, for each and every field of study, we observe that the rates 
of educational and skill mismatches are more or less stable across cohorts, with 
the only relevant exception of the last one. Among graduates of 2007, indeed, we 
observe an overall increment in the risks of both educational and skill 
mismatches. However—and this is the third interesting results—while the 
increase of skill mismatch is homogenous across fields of study (meaning that 
field differentials remain more or less constant), some fields present a larger 
increase of educational mismatch than others. Actually, it results in a reduction of 
fields differentials, since fields that register the hugest increase are those who 
started from lower level of educational mismatch. 
Finally, descriptive results suggest that skill mismatch is not relevantly 
affected by the type of attained degree. On the contrary, we observe that BA 
graduates are more exposed to the risk of educational mismatch, in comparison 
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with both pre-reform and MA graduates. Again, we observe a substantial 
worsening of BA conditions in 2007. 
Two main issues emerge from these descriptive results. First, it is confirmed 
that, as already discussed in the previous chapters, educational and skill 
mismatches are two distinct phenomena: evidence is provided for diverging 
incidence and pattern of determinants, which are also shown to differently evolve 
over time. Second, the hugest variations in the overall incidence of educational 
and skill mismatches and in their differential occurrence across groups are 
registered in the last analysed cohort.
41
.  
The aim of the next paragraph is to assess whether these huge variations can 
be ascribed to the implementation of the «3+2» reform. It could be argued, in this 
respect, that any eventual effect of the reform should be detected already in the 
2004 cohort. However, we have to consider that BA graduates of 2004 are the 
former who graduated without delay under the new regime. Thus, we can expect 
them to be a highly selected group of more motivated (and maybe able) 
individuals. Hence, it comes with no surprise that descriptive analyses do not 
record any relevant difference between pre-reform graduates and BA of the 2004 
cohort. We will try to assess, however, if the impact of the reform can be 
evaluated by recurring to appropriate methods. Of course the huge variations that 
have been observed within the last cohort might be also due to the occurrence of 
the 2008 economic crisis. It is for this reason that the analyses that will be 
presented in the next paragraph have also been conducted separately on each post-
reform graduation cohort. 
5.5.2 The impact of the reform on the risks of educational and skill mismatches 
We have seen, so far, that the incidence of educational and skill mismatches 
is far from stable across graduation cohorts, and that also the influence of the 
various identified determinants of the phenomena varies over time. 
The aim of the following analyses is to assess whether this modifications can 
be somehow attributed to the implementation of the 3+2 reform. In particular, in 
                                                 
41
 The same results are found with a multivariate analysis. In order to assess whether the 
determinants of educational and skill mismatches have changed over time, a series of logit regression 
models controlling for the variables described above have been computed separately by graduation 
cohort.Findings from these models are reported in the Appendix. 
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this section we investigate whether the reform has impacted on both the overall 
incidence of educational and skill mismatches, while, in the next one, we analyse 
its effect on the differential risks for graduates from different fields of study. 
Table 5.8 reports the PSM estimates of the effect of the reform. ATT 
estimates are presented in the table as the mean difference between treated and 
control individuals. Results are reported for several model specifications. On the 
one side, the impact of the reform is estimated, first, on average and, then, 
separately for BA and MA graduates. On the other side, in order to have more 
robust result we gradually restrict the observation window, by excluding part of 
the treated and control groups. Let’s notice that, for each model specification, 
these estimates of the effects of the reform have been calculated using almost the 
entire set of available observations: the proportion of cases off-support closely 
approaches zero in all the models presented, indicating that the results are highly 
generalizable.  
Tab. 5.8 Propensity score matching results 
 
Educational Mismatch  Skill Mismatch 
  
ATT 
(Treated – Controls) 
Off 
Support 
On 
support 
 ATT 
(Treated – Controls) 
Off 
Support 
On 
support 
Pre vs Post 
   
 
   D=0 all cohorts 0.073*** 0 82,917  0.092*** 1 86,335 
D=0 until 2001 0.083*** 1 60,720  0.125*** 1 63,969 
Pre vs BA 
   
 
   D=0 all cohorts 0.190*** 1 72,963  0.155*** 1 76,213 
D=1 only 2004 0.131*** 2 57,139  0.146*** 2 60,121 
D=1 only 2007 0.215*** 1 57,039  0.170*** 1 60,293 
D=0 until 2001 0.200*** 5 50,763  0.186*** 4 53,844 
D=1 only 2004 0.130*** 3 43,986  0.171*** 2 46,972 
D=1 only 2007 0.231*** 1 47,995  0.189*** 2 51,075 
Pre vs MA 
   
 
   D=0 all cohorts -0.048*** 0 73,366  0.033*** 0 76,691 
D=0 until 2001 -0.035*** 0 51,170  0.064*** 0 54,325 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
If we overall compare pre- and post-reform graduates we observe that the 
latter are more exposed to both the risks of educational and skill mismatches. 
However, if we split post-reform graduates in the two groups of BA and MA 
graduates, results dramatically change. On the one side, we observe that BA 
graduates have a higher probability of educational mismatch then pre-reform 
graduates, with a difference of about 20 percentage points. However, the same 
does not hold for MA graduates, who are found to have a small advantage (around 
4 percentage points) with respect to pre-reform graduates. On the other side, we 
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observe that the reform has increased the risk of skill mismatches for both BA and 
MA graduates: the difference with the group of pre-reform graduates is around 15 
percentage points in the former case, between 3 and 6 in the latter. 
It is worth noting, however, that results slightly change when we observe the 
effect of the reform on Bachelor graduates: the impact is smaller if we solely 
observe BA of the 2004 cohort. This result is probably due to these graduates 
being a highly selected group, whose characteristics are not being fully captured 
by observable predictors used in the matching algorithm: they are in fact the 
former students who graduated, without delay, under the new regime. 
Results do not substantially change when we estimate the impact of the 
reform with a DiD estimator. Table 5.9 reports the DiD estimates for the impact of 
the reform on educational and skill mismatches for various model specifications.  
Tab. 5.9 Difference-in-differences estimates 
 
Educational Mismatch  Skill Mismatch 
 
DiD estimates N  DiD estimates N 
 
Without control variables 
Pre vs Post -0.001 69,544  0.162*** 73,276 
Pre vs BA 0.117*** 59,591  0.210*** 63,154 
D=1 only 2004 0.129*** 51,196  0.302*** 54,626 
D=1 only 2007 0.083** 54,862  0.138*** 58,426 
Pre vs MA -0.123*** 59,901  0.101*** 63,539 
 
With control variables 
Pre vs Post -0.020 67,453  0.159*** 70,833 
Pre vs BA 0.086** 57,500  0.206*** 60,711 
D=1 only 2004 0.102** 49,105  0.304*** 52,183 
D=1 only 2007 0.042 52,879  0.133*** 56,091 
Pre vs MA -0.125*** 57,902  0.102*** 61,188 
 
With propensity score 
Pre vs Post -0.021 67,443  0.159*** 70,823 
Pre vs BA 0.093** 57,484  0.204*** 60,695 
D=1 only 2004 0.119** 49,095  0.306*** 52,173 
D=1 only 2007 0.050 52,861  0.129*** 56,070 
Pre vs MA -0.137*** 57,892  0.101*** 61,178 
 
With propensity score and control variables 
Pre vs Post -0.020 67,443  0.159*** 70,823 
Pre vs BA 0.086** 57,484  0.206*** 60,695 
D=1 only 2004 0.102** 49,095  0.304*** 52,173 
D=1 only 2007 0.042 52,861  0.133*** 56,070 
Pre vs MA -0.125*** 57,892  0.101*** 61,178 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As we did before, we first account for the overall difference between the 
treated and control groups, and we then split the post-reform graduates in the two 
groups of BA and MA graduates. Again, we gradually restrict the group of treated 
individuals, first to the sole 2004 cohort, and second to the sole 2007 cohort. Also 
in this case, DiD estimates are to be read as differences in probabilities. 
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As additional robustness checks, we run models with and without control 
variables. These are sex, age, geographic area, parents’ education and occupation, 
and type of secondary degree. Finally, we combine the DiD with the matching 
method. First, we compute a propensity score for the probability to be treated 
(namely, to graduate in a field different from Medicine), and then we introduce 
the propensity score as a regressor in the DiD model. In the last set of analyses, 
we include as control variables both the propensity score and the list of variables 
that are used to compute the propensity score itself. 
Results are found to be robust over different model specifications, and 
confirm what has been outlined in the previous analyses. First of all, we find that, 
on average, the reform has not significantly impacted on treated graduates’ risk of 
educational mismatch. However, results vary when we separately observe BA and 
MA. Among the former, we find an increase of about 10 percentage points in the 
risk of educational mismatch. Among the latter, instead, this risk has significantly 
decreased (of approximately 13 percentage points). This finding might be the 
result of an increased competition among BA graduates: as long as the reform has 
enhanced graduation rates at the first level, a higher number of job seekers with a 
BA degree compete for job vacancies, thus lowering the individual probability of 
obtaining a graduate job. However, this could also be an expression of the 
competition having moved to the higher level: employers might prefer to hire MA 
graduates to cover graduate-job vacancies rather than BA graduates. This could 
also explain why the effect of the reform is found to be positive (i.e. higher risk of 
educational mismatch) for BA and negative (i.e. lower risk of mismatch) for MA. 
Our results suggest, however, that formal (mis)match does not necessarily 
imply a proper utilisation of skills. Results on the risk of skill mismatch are, 
indeed, definitely different. The probability of incurring in this phenomenon has 
increased for both BA (of approximately 20 percentage points) and MA (of 10 
percentage points) graduates. The pre-programme tests employed to challenge the 
assumption of parallel trends, however, suggest caution when interpreting these 
results. This condition is, in fact, found to hold for educational mismatch, but not 
for skill mismatch. Results from these tests are reported in the Appendix. 
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5.5.3 Heterogeneity of the effect across fields of study 
So far, we have analysed the overall effect of the 3+2 reform. In this 
paragraph results are presented separately by field of study. The aim of these 
analyses is to assess whether the reform has heterogeneously impacted on 
graduates’ risks of educational and skill mismatches. First, PSM estimates are 
reported, which are obtained by computing separately the propensity score on 
each field. In other words, graduates are matched within field according to their 
probability of being pre- or post-reform graduates. The set of covariates used for 
the estimation of the propensity score is the same as before, with the only obvious 
exception of field of study. Then, the effect of the reform is estimated on matched 
graduates. As we did before, we start from a baseline specification in which the 
impact of the reform is estimated by roughly comparing pre- and post-reform 
graduates. Then, the analyses are refined, and BA and MA graduates are 
separately observed. Table 5.10 reports the estimation results
42
. 
In the previous analyses, we found that, overall, post-reform graduates are 
more exposed to both the risks of educational and skill mismatches. This result 
holds also when the impact is estimated separately on graduates from each field of 
study. However, we have a first clue of the heterogeneity of the reform’s effect: 
among graduates from social and political sciences and from the Humanities we 
do not find, indeed, a statistically significant difference between pre- and post-
reform graduates in terms of educational mismatch. Another effect of the reform 
seems to have been the increment in the risk of skill mismatch: this increase is 
observed among graduates from all fields of study. Once again, graduates from 
the Humanities and Social Sciences are, however, found to be the less 
disadvantaged from the reform, meaning that the effect—even if positive and 
significant—is smaller than the one we detect among graduates from other fields. 
When we separately estimate the impact of the reform on BA and MA 
graduates, two main results catch our attention. The former is that, even if BA 
graduates are always found to be more at risk of educational mismatch, the 
smallest differences (between 5 and 10 percentage points) with pre-reform 
                                                 
42 Since results presented in the previous section have been found to be robust over different 
model specifications, here we use the simplest one, in which all pre-reform graduates are compared to 
all post-reform graduates (that is to say, all cohorts are employed without any exception). 
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graduates are found among graduates of weaker fields, that is to say, Social and 
Political Sciences and the Humanities. 
Tab. 5.10 PSM estimation of the effect of the 3+2 reform by field of study 
 
Educational Mismatch  Skill Mismatch 
 
ATT 
(Treated – Controls) 
Off 
Support 
On 
support 
 ATT 
(Treated – Controls) 
Off 
Support 
On 
support 
Scientific 
   
 
   Pre vs Post 0.127*** 1 13,424  0.105*** 1 13,750 
Pre vs BA 0.265*** 2 12,243  0.185*** 3 12,536 
Pre vs MA -0.008 1 12,170  0.026 1 12,483 
Engineer 
   
 
   Pre vs Post 0.081*** 1 19,981  0.095*** 1 20,372 
Pre vs BA 0.275*** 2 17,294  0.186*** 1 17,662 
Pre vs MA -0.018 0 18,568  0.046** 0 18,953 
Agriculture 
   
 
   Pre vs Post 0.150*** 0 2,563  0.111*** 1 2,619 
Pre vs BA 0.218*** 0 2,341  0.304*** 0 2,395 
Pre vs MA 0.058 1 2,230  0.053 1 2,286 
Economics 
   
 
   Pre vs Post 0.055*** 3 15,449  0.105*** 2 15,945 
Pre vs BA 0.197*** 0 13,606  0.159*** 0 14,083 
Pre vs MA -0.088*** 1 13,546  0.052*** 1 14,032 
Soc. and Pol. sciences 
   
 
   Pre vs Post -0.006 2 7,323  0.056*** 4 7,845 
Pre vs BA 0.054*** 1 5,911  0.097*** 1 6,397 
Pre vs MA -0.073*** 2 5,748  0.025 3 6,251 
Law 
   
 
   Pre vs Post 0.155*** 1 7,494  0.111*** 1 7,818 
Pre vs BA 0.342*** 1 6,865  0.206*** 0 7,184 
Pre vs MA -0.104*** 0 6,641  -0.043*** 0 6,953 
Humanities 
   
 
   Pre vs Post 0.019 0 16,675  0.064*** 2 17,975 
Pre vs BA 0.097*** 1 14,697  0.114*** 1 15,951 
Pre vs MA -0.073*** 2 14,456  0.006 2 15,725 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
On the contrary, among graduates from other fields we observe differences 
that range between 20 and 30 percentage points. We observe the same pattern of 
results looking at skill mismatch, even if, in this case, we do not observe such 
striking differences among fields. BA graduates in Social sciences and 
Humanities have, in fact, a probability of skill mismatch of 10 percentage points 
higher than the corresponding pre-reform graduates. The difference between BA 
and pre-reform graduates from other fields of study, instead, lays around 20 
percentage points (with the only exception of Agriculture). The other relevant 
result is that MA graduates seem not to run a higher risk of educational mismatch 
than pre-reform graduates. The difference is not statistically significant for 
graduates from Scientific fields and Engineering, while it is even negative and 
significant for graduates in Economics, Law, Social and Political Sciences and the 
Humanities. The picture is not so optimistic when it comes to results on skill 
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mismatch. The difference between MA and pre-reform graduates is found to be 
negative only among graduates in Law; it is statistically not significant among 
graduates from scientific fields, Social and Political Sciences and the Humanities; 
finally, it is positive (even though not huge) among graduates in Engineering and 
Economics. 
PSM results are confirmed by DiD estimation
43
 (Table 5.11). Looking at its 
impact on BA graduates, we find, again, that the reform as not altered the risk of 
educational mismatch for graduates from soft fields, such as Social Sciences and 
the Humanities, nor from Economics and Agriculture. However, it has 
significantly increased the probability of mismatch for graduates from Scientific 
fields, Engineering and Law. 
Tab. 5.11 DiD estimation of the effect of the 3+2 reform by field of study 
 
Educational Mismatch  Skill Mismatch 
 
DiD estimate N  DiD estimate N 
Scientific 
  
 
  Pre vs Post 0.014 16,545 
 
0.103*** 16,948 
Pre vs BA 0.074*** 15,365 
 
0.142*** 15,736 
Pre vs MA -0.063*** 15,291 0.048*** 15,681 
Engineer 
  
 
  Pre vs Post -0.001 20,665 
 
0.106*** 21,133 
Pre vs BA 0.091*** 17,979 0.147*** 18,423 
Pre vs MA -0.071*** 19,251  0.069*** 19,713 
Agriculture 
     Pre vs Post 0.007 8,434 
 
0.068*** 8,579 
Pre vs BA 0.023 8,213 0.079*** 8,355 
Pre vs MA -0.017 8,102  0.041*** 8,246 
Economics 
  
 
  Pre vs Post -0.05 18,178 
 
0.137*** 18,760 
Pre vs BA 0.037 16,332 0.157*** 16,896 
Pre vs MA -0.133*** 16,273  0.101*** 16,846 
Social and Political Sciences 
     Pre vs Post -0.067*** 11,859 
 
0.103*** 12,462 
Pre vs BA -0.028 10,446 
 
0.109*** 11,011 
Pre vs MA -0.084*** 10,284 
 
0.072*** 10,867 
Law 
    Pre vs Post 0.011 11,555 
 
0.088*** 11,959 
Pre vs BA 0.092*** 10,926 
 
0.138*** 11,324 
Pre vs MA -0.099*** 10,701 
 
0.004 11,093 
Humanities 
     Pre vs Post -0.073** 18,510 
 
0.103*** 19,783 
Pre vs BA -0.020 16,533 
 
0.128*** 17,758 
Pre vs MA -0.122*** 16,293 
 
0.062*** 17,533 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
On the contrary, the risk of skill mismatch is found to have increased among 
graduates from each and every field of study. Again, the smallest increase is 
                                                 
43 Since the DiD estimates have been previously found to be robust over different model 
specifications, here we only employ the specification which includes control variables. 
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found among graduates from the Humanities and Social Sciences, but fields of 
study differentials are small in size.  
Similarly to PSM, Did estimates indicate that the reform has also impacted on 
MA graduates’ risk of both educational and skill mismatches: the former has 
reduced after the reform, while the latter has increased. These results are found to 
be valid for all graduates, with modest field of study differentials. 
Summing up, both PSM and DiD estimates lead to the same conclusion, 
namely that graduates who have been traditionally more protected from the risk of 
overeducation—such as graduates in scientific fields and engineering—are those 
who have been more negatively affected by the reform, both in terms of 
educational and skill mismatch
44
, especially at the BA level. Interestingly, these 
are the fields that provide graduates with more specific and job-oriented skills, 
preparing them for very specific and highly regulated professions. It is worth 
mentioning that, after the university reform, in these professional areas (for 
instance, Engineer, Architecture and Natural Sciences) new professional orders of 
a lower level (level «B») have been created, that can be accessed by BA graduates 
after having passed a national examination
45
. Our results suggest, however, that so 
far labour market has not well-absorbed these new professional figures. 
Furthermore, these findings are in line with data publicized by professional 
orders, which indicate that very few BA graduates access these professional 
orders of «B» level. For example, the professional register of engineers has 
signalled that in 2007 about 70% of MA graduates passed the national 
examination and obtained the license to access the profession. On the contrary, 
only 8% of BA graduates achieved the same result.  
5.6 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter the phenomena of educational and skill mismatches among 
Italian graduates have been analysed. Italy is an interesting case-study since, 
compared with other developed countries, it displays both low graduation rates 
                                                 
44 Pre-programme tests suggest, however, caution when interpreting results on skill mismatch, 
since the trends before the implementation of the reform are found not be parallel. Results are reported 
in the appendix. 
45
 DPR 328/2001. 
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and a high incidence of overeducation. A huge body of literature has suggested 
that the reasons of this contradiction should be searched for in peculiar traits of 
the Italian economic system: the rigid labour market, the scarce economic 
dynamism, the prevalence of traditional sectors requiring low-skilled work, and 
the poor investment in research and development can be counted among the 
determinants of the inability to absorb an increasing highly qualified labour force. 
This issue may have acquired more relevance as the Italian university system 
has been recently reformed, following the guidelines of the Bologna Process. The 
so-called «3+2» reform has stimulated the already increasing trend of graduation 
rates, also by opening the doors to Higher Education for strata of the population 
traditionally excluded from university, such as students from lower social origin 
and vocational secondary education. The existing literature suggests that both the 
signaling value of the educational degree and graduates’ level of human capital 
might have worsened due to the reform. Of course, these arguments apply to BA 
graduates, while it has remained almost unexplored the effect of the reform on 
MA graduates, mostly because of data unavailability. 
Hence, in this chapter we have assessed whether the university reform has 
impacted—both overall and across fields of study—on graduates’ risks of 
educational and skill mismatches. A first descriptive result suggests that the risks 
of both educational and skill mismatches have increased for graduates of the last 
cohort: by means of PSM and DiD techniques, this chapter aimed at isolating the 
specific contribution of the reform from other contingent factors.  
Our findings, that are robust across different model specifications and various 
identification strategies, suggest some tentative conclusions on the impact of the 
«3+2» reform on graduates’ risks of educational and skill mismatches, which also 
confirms that the two phenomena are loosely correlated. The first interesting 
result—which is consistent with our expectations—is that BA graduates are more 
exposed to the risks of educational and skill mismatches than pre-reform 
graduates. In terms of educational mismatch BA seem to be outclassed by MA 
graduates, which indeed perform better than pre-reform graduates. However, the 
oddish result that we did not expect is that the same does not hold true for skill 
mismatch: also among MA we detected a higher incidence of the phenomenon 
than among pre-reform graduates. This finding would surely deserve being further 
explored. It remains, indeed, unknown the mechanism underlying this result. A 
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possible explanation deals with MA graduates having higher expectations than 
pre-reform graduates maybe due to the introduction of a new lower level that 
makes MA graduates comparing themselves with BA graduates rather than with 
individuals with secondary education. Alternatively, employers might rely in their 
credentials but not assigning them with tasks that are up to the skills they brought 
from their education. If this were the case, it would remain to be established 
whether this is an effect of the university reform or the result of other cyclical or 
structural factors. As will be stresses below, indeed, our DiD approach is not free 
from shortcomings, and the adopted overidentification strategies suggest 
carefulness in the interpretation of results on skill mismatch. 
Moreover, we have found that, while the increase in the risk of skill mismatch 
is more or less homogenous across fields of study both at the BA and MA levels, 
the reform has differently impacted on the risk of educational mismatch of BA 
graduates from different fields of study. Indeed, we observed that the risk of 
educational mismatch has remained substantially unvaried among BA from soft 
fields. On the contrary, the risk has increased for graduates from Scientific and 
job-oriented fields which, as discussed above, are intended to prepare for specific 
professions. Various concurring mechanisms are likely to produce this effect, and 
they would need to be tested. For instance, it seems reasonable to hypothesise, in 
this respect, that BA graduates from soft fields are more versatile in terms of other 
occupations not strictly fitting the training they received than graduates from more 
technical and job-oriented fields. Thus, employers might prefer hiring the former 
since they coult be retrained less expensively than the latter. 
The analyses presented have limitations and shortcomings, which suggest 
caution when interpreting results as the impact of the reform. The adopted DiD 
approach should allow us to disentangle the effect of the reform from the effect of 
time-varying factors that exerted a similar influence on graduates’ labour market 
opportunities. However, data being collected every third year inevitably produce 
gaps in the trend that cannot be detected. Thus, in our analyses we may partially 
confound the effect of the reform with the effect of other factors, for example the 
labour market reforms which, starting from the late 1990s, has increased 
employment flexibility. In other words, our DiD results could be biased by 
unobserved factors having differently impacted on our treated and control groups. 
The implemented pre-programme tests should reassure us about this eventuality—
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and they actually did it with respect to the trend of educational mismatch—but we 
cannot ignore that they only capture eventual differences every third year. Thus, 
we cannot be completely sure that trends continued to be parallel between 2001 
and 2004. Particular caution must be employed when interpreting results on skill 
mismatch, since the overidentification strategies adopted to test the parallelism 
assumption underlying the DiD approach suggest that the detected differences 
between treated and controls could be anterior to the implementation of the 
reform. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, we are pretty confident in arguing that the 
reform has been, if not the cause, at least one determinant of a devaluation of 
tertiary degrees. While graduates who decide to continue studying to obtain a MA 
degree are still protected from the risk of overeducation, at least in terms of 
educational mismatch, BA are definitely disadvantaged with respect to pre-reform 
graduates. If we consider that one aim of the reform was to give the possibility to 
students of accessing labour market in a shorter time but with a profile tailored to 
the needs expressed by the economic system, we can argue that this has been a 
failure of the reform itself. Another robust result is that, after the reform, we 
observe a process of equalization of graduates’ occupational outcomes. However, 
what makes this finding discouraging is that the alignment in graduates’ risk of 
educational mismatch, rather than being the result of an improvement of the job 
match for graduates from soft fields—that are those who generally present the 
highest incidence of overeducation—, derives from a down-leveling of the 
occupational condition of graduates typically more protected from the risk of 
mismatch, namely those from scientific, technical or highly job-oriented fields of 
study. 
The results presented in this Chapter shed new light on the relevance of the 
Bologna reform in shaping tertiary graduates’ occupational opportunities at labour 
market entrance. However, the mechanism(s) through which the university reform 
affects labour market opportunities remain to be explored. Further research 
employing up-to-date data would probably strengthen our knowledge. For 
example, a possible explanation for the result of MA having benefitted from the 
reform in terms of educational mismatch could deal with supply-demand 
disequilibria, if the number of MA graduates is smaller than the number of pre-
reform graduates. If this were the case, this could be only a temporary effect of 
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the reform, and its long-term impact would remain to be assessed. Moreover, 
external validity of our results, that is to say the extent to which we can apply 
these conclusions to different times and contexts, is by definition limited to the 
first decade of the 21
st
 century in Italy. Differentiation of European countries 
along several institutional axes, macroeconomic conditions, and historical 
configurations makes it hazardous to apply these conclusions even to the other 
Mediterranean countries, such as Spain and Portugal, which are by far the most 
similar to Italy. Thence, before drawing comparatively valid lessons from this 
case-study, other evaluations of the reform should be conducted elsewhere. 
Results from other countries would be relevant per se to evaluate how the reform 
has affected labour market chances for tertiary graduates. Moreover, in a 
comparative fashion, they would provide additional evidence on the structuring 
effect of interconnections between educational systems and labour market 
configurations on occupational opportunities for new entrants. 
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Conclusions 
In this dissertation we have analysed the phenomenon of overeducation, 
which is widely considered as a possible drawback of an uncontrolled process of 
educational expansion taking place especially at the higher levels. «Studying too 
much?» is of course intended to be a provocative title: it is not our aim to question 
the positive economic and extra-economic effects of education, nor the legitimacy 
of educational choices guided by expressive—and not merely instrumental—
motivations. However, a huge body of literature has demonstrated that, if the 
supply of qualified labour force outpaces the corresponding demand, 
overeducation becomes a real risk, which in turn has negative consequences on 
individuals, firms and economic systems. 
Following the most recent strand of literature on this topic, we have focussed 
on the incidence of the phenomenon among tertiary graduates and separately 
analysed educational and skill mismatches. The existing literature (Ch. 2) and 
original analyses here provided (Ch. 3) suggest, indeed, that they are distinct 
features of the more general concept of overeducation. The former refers to the 
formal (mis)match between acquired and required education, while the second 
deals with the effective use on the job of skills and knowledge acquired at school. 
The main aim of this work has been to investigate the heterogeneity of the 
risks of educational and skill mismatches by assessing how (much) field of study 
affects occupational opportunities for graduates entering the labour market. It is 
widely acknowledged that occupational outcomes vary depending on the field of 
graduation: the Humanities and Social and Political Sciences lead to the worst 
results, whilst scientific, technical and job-oriented fields guarantee better 
occupational chances. However, we argue that the magnitude of these differentials 
is not stable, neither over time nor across countries, since it is inevitably shaped 
by structural and cyclical factors referring both to the demand and supply sides of 
qualified labour force. 
Variations in fields of study differentials have been investigated with two 
different perspectives. First, in Chapter 4, we have comparatively assessed 
whether they vary according to some labour market institutions that are known to 
affect both the quantity and the quality of job vacancies. In particular, the role of 
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employment protection, of regulation of the access to liberal professions and of 
the capacity of welfare state to hire skilled workers have been taken into account 
as possible factors affecting the gap in educational and skill mismatches between 
fields of study. Chapter 5 has then investigated the evolution of the phenomena 
over six cohorts of Italian graduates, covering the last two decades, with the aim 
of estimating the effect of the recent reform of the university system—which has 
promoted the increase in graduation rates mainly by weakening the association 
between social origins and educational background with participation to higher 
education—on the occupational destinations of graduates from different fields. 
Even though the conclusions drawn from the analyses presented in Chapter 5 are 
by definition restricted to the Italian case, assessing the impact of the university 
reform on graduates’ risk of overeducation can be of real interest also in a 
comparative perspective, since all European countries have been involved in the 
Bologna Process.  
The analyses presented in the previous chapters confirm that neither 
educational nor skill mismatch are negligible phenomena: even though with 
important variations across countries and over time, they affect a big portion of 
the population of tertiary graduates. Also the detected differences between fields 
of study cannot be disregarded. It comes with no surprise that graduates from 
generalist fields of study are more exposed to both risks of mismatch. It is worth 
noting that the two phenomena, even though correlated, are not completely 
overlapping, and that skill mismatch is found to be a relevant phenomenon also 
among graduates from scientific fields, which are traditionally considered more 
remunerative. However, there is evidence enough, so far, to argue that individuals 
who have studied «too much» are mainly those who graduated from the so-called 
«soft» fields—the Humanities and the Social and Political Sciences in primis. 
They are indeed more often found to work in jobs which require neither their 
educational credentials nor their knowledge and skills. 
These results depict a twofold evaluation of tertiary degrees in the labour 
market, that contrasts «stronger» fields—that ensure a smoother entrance in the 
labour market—with the «weaker» ones—that often compel graduates to work in 
non-matching jobs. The striking stability of this dualism across time and contexts 
needs a structural response able to reduce, if not nullify, the gap. The question 
which is definitely more challenging than the one we asked in the title is, thus, 
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«What can we do about it?». Are these graduates doomed to renounce to see their 
educational investment repaid at least in terms of a good match? It is worth 
stressing, however trivial, that it is not equalisation per se that should be pursued, 
but the improvement of job opportunities for graduates that actually suffer from a 
devaluation of their credentials and competences. In fact, our findings suggest that 
equalisation can appear as the result of an increase in educational and skill 
mismatches among graduates from fields that usually register lower incidence of 
the phenomena. This is, for example, what we found in Italy after the 
implementation of the university reform: fields of study differentials—especially 
in terms of educational mismatch—have reduced, since the incidence of the 
phenomenon has remained stable among graduates from Social Sciences and the 
Humanities, but has increased among graduates from scientific and job-oriented 
fields. 
It is surely not an easy task—and goes beyond the scope of this dissertation—
to identify policy instruments able to reach this goal. However some reflections 
can be made in order to identify possible areas of research and intervention, both 
on the demand and supply sides of qualified labour force. 
Results presented in previous chapters indicate that, even though the ranking 
of fields of study in terms of educational and skill mismatches remains unvaried, 
the magnitude of fields of study differentials is, as expected, not stable. Indeed, 
the gap is found to be positively correlated with the level of labour market 
regulation and negatively associated with the share of public employment. These 
findings suggest that labour market institutions can play a relevant role in shaping 
the pattern of horizontal inequality. Results from our comparative analyses also 
confirm that flexible labour markets requiring a highly skilled workforce are a 
prerequisite for a reduction of overeducation and for a decrease of fields of study 
differentials. These findings also support the idea that low dynamism, 
entrepreneurial dwarfism and underdevelopment of innovative sectors requiring 
highly skilled workers are among the reasons of the pervasive diffusion of 
overeducation among Italian graduates. 
Labour market rigidities represent, thus, relevant macro level factors affecting 
employers’ hiring decisions. By altering the transaction costs employers have to 
bear, the variables we have considered in the previous chapters are likely to affect 
the pattern of horizontal inequalities between graduates, since they play a relevant 
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role in determining the marketability of credentials acquired in different 
disciplinary areas. However, also the supply side cannot be disregarded and 
several considerations can be made on the drivers of students’ choice of field of 
study. The distribution of students across fields is directly linked to both the 
number of graduates and the level of heterogeneity within each field, that are 
factors proven to affect the individual risk of mismatch. A huge body of recent 
research indeed suggests that students make educational choices—especially that 
of field of study—under great uncertainty, on the basis of partial and imperfect 
information on costs and returns connected to their investments (Avery and Kane, 
2004; Barone, 2012a; Ikenberry and Hartle, 2004). In Italy, for example this is in 
part due to guidance activities being often left to universities and faculties, which 
obviously have good reasons to promote their courses even by promising illusory 
occupational chances to prospective students. This is, by definition, a problem that 
especially concerns fields that are weaker in the labour market. Letting students 
know real labour market prospects guaranteed by the field of study they are going 
to choose does not mean at all to foment choices merely guided by instrumental 
motivations. However, informed choices would probably result—and there exists 
experimental evidence pointing in this direction (Argentin et al., 2015b)—in a 
redistribution of graduates among fields, due to a self-selection of motivated 
students within these fields and a self-exclusion of unmotivated students, who are 
those more at risk of bad performances in the labour market. 
Finally, university study programme would also deserve more attention. A 
deep knowledge of which skills and credentials are required by employers, and an 
adjustment of educational curricula to these labour market needs could be a 
feasible strategy to tackle graduates’ overeducation, especially for those coming 
from soft fields. For example, in a recent study of occupational destinations of 
Italian graduates from Sociology (Argentin et al., 2015a)—which are among those 
who register the highest incidence of educational and skill mismatches—it has 
been found that they often work in high level clerical jobs that, at the state of the 
art, do not match their credentials and their knowledge, since they require skills 
actually not provided by any field of study. Thus, the authors suggest, it would be 
a good investment for the discipline and for its graduates to enlarge its operating 
area in order to embrace these occupational opportunities. In other words, future 
research and educational policies aiming at maximising graduates’ labour market 
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opportunities, could contemplate the idea that  not only labour markets should be 
reformed to employ graduates, but also graduates should be instructed to meet the 
needs expressed by the labour market. 
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Appendix A - Questionnaire from the Survey on Professions, Section B 
Information on the necessary skills to perform job’s tasks. 
1. Impresa e gestione di impresa 
Conoscenza dei principi e dei metodi che regolano l’impresa e la sua gestione relativi alla 
pianificazione strategica, all’allocazione delle risorse umane, finanziarie e materiali, alle 
tecniche di comando, ai metodi di produzione e al coordinamento delle persone e delle 
risorse 
 
A. Quanto è importante quest’area di conoscenza nello svolgimento della sua attuale 
professione? 
[1] Non importante    passare all’area di conoscenza successiva 
[2] Appena importante 
[3] Importante 
[4] Molto importante 
[5] Di assoluta importanza 
 
B. A quale livello, fra quelli indicati, sono necessarie queste conoscenze per lo svolgimento 
della sua attuale professione? 
[1] 
[2] Firmare un mandato di pagamento 
[3] 
[4] Controllare l’andamento di un progetto per assicurare la sua realizzazione nei tempi 
previsti 
[5] 
[6] Gestire un’azienda con un fatturato da 10 milioni di euro  
[7] 
 
 
2. Lavoro d’ufficio. 
Conoscenza delle procedure amministrative e d’ufficio, dei programmi di elaborazione di 
testi, delle tecniche di gestione di archivi e di basi di dati oppure della stenografia e delle 
regole di trascrizione o di altre procedure e linguaggi previsti dal lavoro di ufficio. 
 
A. Quanto è importante quest’area di conoscenza nello svolgimento della sua attuale 
professione? 
[1] Non importante    passare all’area di conoscenza successiva 
[2] Appena importante 
[3] Importante 
[4] Molto importante 
[5] Di assoluta importanza 
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B. A quale livello, fra quelli indicati, sono necessarie queste conoscenze per lo svolgimento 
della sua attuale professione? 
[1] 
[2] Archiviare lettere in ordine alfabetico 
[3] Battere sulla tastiera alla velocità di 30 parole al minuto 
[4] 
[5] Organizzare un archivio sistematico di tutti i documenti di un’impresa 
[6] 
[7] 
 
 
3. Economia e contabilità 
Conoscenza dei principi e delle pratiche di economia e contabilità, dei mercati finanziari, 
bancari e delle tecniche di analisi e di presentazione di dati finanziari. 
 
A. Quanto è importante quest’area di conoscenza nello svolgimento della sua attuale 
professione? 
[1] Non importante    passare all’area di conoscenza successiva 
[2] Appena importante 
[3] Importante 
[4] Molto importante 
[5] Di assoluta importanza 
 
B. A quale livello, fra quelli indicati, sono necessarie queste conoscenze per lo svolgimento 
della sua attuale professione? 
[1] 
[2] Fornire informazioni sul conto ad un cliente in possesso di carta di credito 
[3] 
[4] Definire programmi individualizzati di investimenti finanziari per i clienti 
[5] 
[6] Tenere la contabilità di una Multinazionale 
[7] 
 
 
4. Commercializzazione e vendita 
Conoscenza dei principi e dei metodi per presentare, promuovere, vendere e valutare gli 
andamenti delle vendite di prodotti o servizi  
 
A. Quanto è importante quest’area di conoscenza nello svolgimento della sua attuale 
professione? 
[1] Non importante    passare all’area di conoscenza successiva 
[2] Appena importante 
[3] Importante 
[4] Molto importante 
[5] Di assoluta importanza 
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B. A quale livello, fra quelli indicati, sono necessarie queste conoscenze per lo svolgimento 
della sua attuale professione? 
[1] 
[2] Vendere dolci in una festa di beneficenza 
[3] 
[4] Telefonare ad un elenco di clienti per presentare loro una nuova linea di prodotti 
[5] 
[6] Mettere a punto un piano commerciale nazionale per una società telefonica 
[7] 
 
 
5. Servizi ai clienti e alle persone 
Conoscenza dei principi e delle procedure per fornire servizi ai clienti e alle persone, 
valutarne i bisogni e la soddisfazione e definire standard di qualità 
 
A. Quanto è importante quest’area di conoscenza nello svolgimento della sua attuale 
professione? 
[1] Non importante    passare all’area di conoscenza successiva 
[2] Appena importante 
[3] Importante 
[4] Molto importante 
[5] Di assoluta importanza 
 
 
B. A quale livello, fra quelli indicati, sono necessarie queste conoscenze per lo svolgimento 
della sua attuale professione? 
[1] 
[2] Smacchiare a secco l’abito di un cliente 
[3] 
[4] Occuparsi per l’intera giornata di 10 bambini nello stesso tempo 
[5] 
[6] Rispondere alle richieste di aiuto dei cittadini dopo un evento catastrofico 
[7] 
 
 
6. Gestione del personale e delle risorse umane 
Conoscenza dei principi e delle procedure per il reclutamento, la selezione, la formazione, la 
retribuzione del personale per le relazioni e le negoziazioni sindacali e per la gestione di 
sistemi informativi del personale. 
 
A. Quanto è importante quest’area di conoscenza nello svolgimento della sua attuale 
professione? 
[1] Non importante    passare all’area di conoscenza successiva 
[2] Appena importante 
[3] Importante 
[4] Molto importante 
[5] Di assoluta importanza 
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B. A quale livello, fra quelli indicati, sono necessarie queste conoscenze per lo svolgimento 
della sua attuale professione? 
[1] 
[2] Compilare un modulo di denuncia di incidente sul lavoro 
[3] Intervistare candidati ad un posto di segretario 
[4] 
[5] 
[6] Elaborare un nuovo sistema di selezione e di avanzamento di carriera del personale militare 
[7] 
 
 
7. Produzione e processo 
Conoscenza delle materie prime, dei processi di produzione, delle tecniche per il controllo di 
qualità, per il controllo dei costi e di quanto sia necessario per massimizzare la produzione e 
la distribuzione di beni e servizi 
 
A. Quanto è importante quest’area di conoscenza nello svolgimento della sua attuale 
professione? 
[1] Non importante    passare all’area di conoscenza successiva 
[2] Appena importante 
[3] Importante 
[4] Molto importante 
[5] Di assoluta importanza 
 
B. A quale livello, fra quelli indicati, sono necessarie queste conoscenze per lo svolgimento 
della sua attuale professione? 
[1] 
[2] Imballare un Computer 
[3] 
[4] Supervisionare una linea di assemblaggio automatizzata 
[5] 
[6] Dirigere un centro internazionale di una società di distribuzione merci 
[7] 
 
 
8. Produzione alimentare 
Conoscenza delle tecniche e delle attrezzature necessarie alla semina, alla coltivazione e alla 
raccolta di prodotti alimentari (vegetali ed animali) destinati al consumo, comprese quelle 
relative alla conservazione/stoccaggio 
 
A. Quanto è importante quest’area di conoscenza nello svolgimento della sua attuale 
professione? 
[1] Non importante    passare all’area di conoscenza successiva 
[2] Appena importante 
[3] Importante 
[4] Molto importante 
[5] Di assoluta importanza 
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B. A quale livello, fra quelli indicati, sono necessarie queste conoscenze per lo svolgimento 
della sua attuale professione? 
[1] 
[2] Conservare delle spezie in cucina 
[3] 
[4] 
[5] Comandare un peschereccio 
[6] Condurre una azienda agricola di 10.000 ettari 
[7] 
 
 
9. Informatica ed elettronica 
Conoscenza dei circuiti elettronici, dei processori, dei chips delle attrezzature elettroniche, 
dell’hardware e dei software dei computer, compresa la conoscenza dei pacchetti applicativi 
e dei linguaggi di programmazione 
 
A. Quanto è importante quest’area di conoscenza nello svolgimento della sua attuale 
professione? 
[1] Non importante    passare all’area di conoscenza successiva 
[2] Appena importante 
[3] Importante 
[4] Molto importante 
[5] Di assoluta importanza 
 
B. A quale livello, fra quelli indicati, sono necessarie queste conoscenze per lo svolgimento 
della sua attuale professione? 
[1] 
[2] Far funzionare un DVD o CD 
[3] Usare un Wordprocessor 
[4] 
[5] 
[6] Realizzare un programma per verificare la presenza di virus sul disco 
[7] 
 
 
10. Ingegneria e tecnologia 
Conoscenza delle applicazioni pratiche delle scienze ingegneristiche e della tecnologia. 
Comprende l’applicazione di principi, di tecniche, di procedure e l’uso di strumenti per 
progettare e produrre diversi beni o servizi 
 
A. Quanto è importante quest’area di conoscenza nello svolgimento della sua attuale 
professione? 
[1] Non importante    passare all’area di conoscenza successiva 
[2] Appena importante 
[3] Importante 
[4] Molto importante 
[5] Di assoluta importanza 
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B. A quale livello, fra quelli indicati, sono necessarie queste conoscenze per lo svolgimento 
della sua attuale professione? 
[1] 
[2] Montare una serratura su una porta 
[3] 
[4] Disegnare un carrello per la spesa più stabile 
[5] 
[6] Determinare l’impatto degli agenti atmosferici nella progettazione di un ponte 
[7] 
 
 
11. Progettazione tecnica 
Conoscenza delle tecniche di progettazione, degli strumenti e dei principi utilizzati nella 
esecuzione di progetti tecnici di precisione, di progetti di dettaglio, di disegni e di modelli  
 
A. Quanto è importante quest’area di conoscenza nello svolgimento della sua attuale 
professione? 
[1] Non importante    passare all’area di conoscenza successiva 
[2] Appena importante 
[3] Importante 
[4] Molto importante 
[5] Di assoluta importanza 
 
B. A quale livello, fra quelli indicati, sono necessarie queste conoscenze per lo svolgimento 
della sua attuale professione? 
[1] 
[2] Tracciare una linea retta di 1,8 cm 
[3] 
[4] Disegnare schizzi per ristrutturare una cucina 
[5] 
[6] Realizzare la progettazione tecnica di dettaglio di un grattacielo per uffici 
[7] 
 
 
12. Edilizia e costruzioni 
Conoscenza dei materiali, dei metodi e degli strumenti usati nella costruzione e nella 
riparazione di case, edifici o altre strutture come autostrade e strade 
 
A. Quanto è importante quest’area di conoscenza nello svolgimento della sua attuale 
professione? 
[1] Non importante    passare all’area di conoscenza successiva 
[2] Appena importante 
[3] Importante 
[4] Molto importante 
[5] Di assoluta importanza 
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B. A quale livello, fra quelli indicati, sono necessarie queste conoscenze per lo svolgimento 
della sua attuale professione? 
[1] 
[2] Scegliere il legno adatto per aggiungere una trave in una casa 
[3] 
[4] Sistemare una perdita dal soffitto dell’impianto idraulico 
[5] 
[6] Costruire un grattacielo per uffici 
[7] 
 
 
13. Meccanica 
Conoscenza delle macchine e delle attrezzature, compresa la loro progettazione, il loro uso, 
la loro riparazione e manutenzione 
 
A. Quanto è importante quest’area di conoscenza nello svolgimento della sua attuale 
professione? 
[1] Non importante    passare all’area di conoscenza successiva 
[2] Appena importante 
[3] Importante 
[4] Molto importante 
[5] Di assoluta importanza 
 
B. A quale livello, fra quelli indicati, sono necessarie queste conoscenze per lo svolgimento 
della sua attuale professione? 
[1] 
[2] Sostituire i filtri di una fornace 
[3] 
[4] Sostituire una valvola di una conduttura di vapore 
[5] 
[6]  
[7] Revisionare un motore jet di un aeromobile 
 
 
14. Matematica 
Conoscenza dell’aritmetica, dell’algebra, della geometria, del calcolo, della statistica e delle 
loro applicazioni. 
 
A. Quanto è importante quest’area di conoscenza nello svolgimento della sua attuale 
professione? 
[1] Non importante    passare all’area di conoscenza successiva 
[2] Appena importante 
[3] Importante 
[4] Molto importante 
[5] Di assoluta importanza 
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B. A quale livello, fra quelli indicati, sono necessarie queste conoscenze per lo svolgimento 
della sua attuale professione? 
[1] Sommare due Numeri 
[2] 
[3] 
[4] Analizzare dei dati per individuare le aree con maggiori vendite 
[5] 
[6] Derivare una equazione matematica complessa 
[7] 
 
 
15. Fisica 
Conoscenza dei principi e delle leggi della fisica, delle loro interrelazioni e delle loro 
applicazioni per capire la dinamica dei fluidi, dei materiali e dell’atmosfera e le strutture e i 
processi meccanici, elettrici, atomici e subatomici 
 
A. Quanto è importante quest’area di conoscenza nello svolgimento della sua attuale 
professione? 
[1] Non importante    passare all’area di conoscenza successiva 
[2] Appena importante 
[3] Importante 
[4] Molto importante 
[5] Di assoluta importanza 
 
 
B. A quale livello, fra quelli indicati, sono necessarie queste conoscenze per lo svolgimento 
della sua attuale professione? 
[1] Usare una leva per forzare una cassa 
[2] 
[3] 
[4] Calcolare la pressione dell’acqua in una condotta 
[5] 
[6] Progettare un motore a gasolio meno inquinante 
[7] 
 
 
16. Chimica 
Conoscenza della composizione, della struttura e delle proprietà delle sostanze, dei processi e 
delle trasformazioni chimiche sottostanti; ciò comprende l’uso dei prodotti chimici, la 
conoscenza delle loro interazioni, dei segnali di pericolo, delle tecniche di produzione dei 
prodotti chimici e dei metodi di bonifica 
 
A. Quanto è importante quest’area di conoscenza nello svolgimento della sua attuale 
professione? 
[1] Non importante    passare all’area di conoscenza successiva 
[2] Appena importante 
[3] Importante 
[4] Molto importante 
[5] Di assoluta importanza 
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B. A quale livello, fra quelli indicati, sono necessarie queste conoscenze per lo svolgimento 
della sua attuale professione? 
[1] 
[2] Usare un comune insetticida domestico 
[3] 
[4] Usare la giusta dose di cloro per purificare dell’acqua 
[5] 
[6] Realizzare un detergente commerciale sicuro 
[7] 
 
 
17. Biologia 
Conoscenza degli organismi animali e vegetali, dei loro tessuti, delle cellule, delle loro 
funzioni, interdipendenze e delle loro interazioni con l’ambiente 
 
A. Quanto è importante quest’area di conoscenza nello svolgimento della sua attuale 
professione? 
[1] Non importante    passare all’area di conoscenza successiva 
[2] Appena importante 
[3] Importante 
[4] Molto importante 
[5] Di assoluta importanza 
 
B. A quale livello, fra quelli indicati, sono necessarie queste conoscenze per lo svolgimento 
della sua attuale professione? 
[1] Dar da mangiare ad un animale domestico 
[2] 
[3] 
[4] 
[5] Studiare gli effetti dell’inquinamento sulla flora e sulla fauna marina 
[6] 
[7] Isolare ed identificare un nuovo virus 
 
 
18. Psicologia 
Conoscenza del comportamento e delle prestazioni umane, delle differenze individuali nelle 
attitudini, nella personalità e negli interessi, dei meccanismi di apprendimento e di 
motivazione, dei metodi della ricerca psicologica e della valutazione e del trattamento dei 
disordini comportamentali ed affettivi 
 
A. Quanto è importante quest’area di conoscenza nello svolgimento della sua attuale 
professione? 
[1] Non importante    passare all’area di conoscenza successiva 
[2] Appena importante 
[3] Importante 
[4] Molto importante 
[5] Di assoluta importanza 
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B. A quale livello, fra quelli indicati, sono necessarie queste conoscenze per lo svolgimento 
della sua attuale professione? 
[1] 
[2] Badare a diversi bambini su un campo da gioco 
[3] 
[4] Comprendere gli effetti dell’alcool sulle reazioni umane 
[5] 
[6] Curare una persona con una grave malattia mentale 
[7] 
 
 
19. Sociologia e antropologia 
Conoscenza del comportamento e delle dinamiche di gruppo, delle influenze e tendenze 
sociali, delle migrazioni umane, dell’etnicità, delle culture e della loro storia e origine 
 
A. Quanto è importante quest’area di conoscenza nello svolgimento della sua attuale 
professione? 
[1] Non importante    passare all’area di conoscenza successiva 
[2] Appena importante 
[3] Importante 
[4] Molto importante 
[5] Di assoluta importanza 
 
B. A quale livello, fra quelli indicati, sono necessarie queste conoscenze per lo svolgimento 
della sua attuale professione? 
[1] 
[2] Individuare due diverse culture in un racconto 
[3] 
[4] 
[5] Scrivere un pamphlet sulle differenze culturali 
[6] 
[7] Elaborare una nuova teoria sulla evoluzione della civilizzazione 
 
 
20. Geografia 
Conoscenza dei principi e dei metodi per descrivere e rappresentare la terra, il mare e le 
masse d’aria, comprese le loro caratteristiche fisiche, le collocazioni, le interrelazioni e la 
distribuzione di piante, animali e gli insediamenti umani 
 
A. Quanto è importante quest’area di conoscenza nello svolgimento della sua attuale 
professione? 
[1] Non importante    passare all’area di conoscenza successiva 
[2] Appena importante 
[3] Importante 
[4] Molto importante 
[5] Di assoluta importanza 
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B. A quale livello, fra quelli indicati, sono necessarie queste conoscenze per lo svolgimento 
della sua attuale professione? 
[1] 
[2] Conoscere la Capitale d’Italia 
[3] 
[4] Individuare la Turchia su una carta geografica del mondo 
[5] 
[6] Elaborare una carta geografica del mondo mostrando montagne, deserti e fiumi 
[7] 
 
 
21. Medicina e odontoiatria 
Conoscenza delle informazioni e delle tecniche necessarie a diagnosticare e a curare ferite, 
malattie e deformità del corpo umano, compresa la conoscenza dei sintomi, delle cure 
alternative, delle proprietà e delle interazioni dei farmaci e delle cure preventive 
 
A. Quanto è importante quest’area di conoscenza nello svolgimento della sua attuale 
professione? 
[1] Non importante    passare all’area di conoscenza successiva 
[2] Appena importante 
[3] Importante 
[4] Molto importante 
[5] Di assoluta importanza 
 
B. A quale livello, fra quelli indicati, sono necessarie queste conoscenze per lo svolgimento 
della sua attuale professione? 
[1] Usare un cerotto 
[2] 
[3] 
[4] 
[5] Riempire la cavità di un dente 
[6] 
[7] Effettuare un’operazione chirurgica a cuore aperto 
 
 
22. Terapia e consulenza psicologica 
Conoscenza dei principi, dei metodi e delle procedure per la diagnosi, il trattamento e la 
riabilitazione delle disfunzioni mentali e fisiche e per la consulenza e la guida nelle carriere 
 
A. Quanto è importante quest’area di conoscenza nello svolgimento della sua attuale 
professione? 
[1] Non importante    passare all’area di conoscenza successiva 
[2] Appena importante 
[3] Importante 
[4] Molto importante 
[5] Di assoluta importanza 
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B. A quale livello, fra quelli indicati, sono necessarie queste conoscenze per lo svolgimento 
della sua attuale professione? 
[1] 
[2] Consolare un bambino che è caduto 
[3] 
[4] Dare una consulenza per la ricerca del lavoro ad un disoccupato 
[5] 
[6] Seguire un bambino che ha subito abusi sessuali 
[7] 
 
 
23. Istruzione e formazione 
Conoscenza dei principi e dei metodi per la progettazione formativa e curricolare, per 
l’insegnamento e l’addestramento collettivo ed individuale, per la misurazione degli effetti 
della formazione 
 
A. Quanto è importante quest’area di conoscenza nello svolgimento della sua attuale 
professione? 
[1] Non importante    passare all’area di conoscenza successiva 
[2] Appena importante 
[3] Importante 
[4] Molto importante 
[5] Di assoluta importanza 
 
B. A quale livello, fra quelli indicati, sono necessarie queste conoscenze per lo svolgimento 
della sua attuale professione? 
[1] 
[2] Mostrare a qualcuno come giocare a bocce 
[3] 
[4] Tenere un seminario sul miglioramento della qualità 
[5] 
[6] Progettare un programma di formazione per neoassunti 
[7] 
 
 
24. Lingua italiana 
Conoscenza della struttura e dei contenuti della lingua italiana oppure del significato e della 
pronuncia delle parole, delle regole di composizione e della grammatica 
 
A. Quanto è importante quest’area di conoscenza nello svolgimento della sua attuale 
professione? 
[1] Non importante    passare all’area di conoscenza successiva 
[2] Appena importante 
[3] Importante 
[4] Molto importante 
[5] Di assoluta importanza 
 
  
189 
 
B. A quale livello, fra quelli indicati, sono necessarie queste conoscenze per lo svolgimento 
della sua attuale professione? 
[1] 
[2] Scrivere un biglietto di Ringraziamento 
[3] 
[4] Pubblicare un articolo su un quotidiano locale 
[5] 
[6] Insegnare Italiano in un Liceo 
[7] 
 
 
25. Lingua straniera 
Conoscenza della struttura e dei contenuti di una lingua straniera oppure del significato e 
della pronuncia delle parole, delle regole di composizione e della grammatica 
 
A. Quanto è importante quest’area di conoscenza nello svolgimento della sua attuale 
professione? 
[1] Non importante    passare all’area di conoscenza successiva 
[2] Appena importante 
[3] Importante 
[4] Molto importante 
[5] Di assoluta importanza 
 
 
B. A quale livello, fra quelli indicati, sono necessarie queste conoscenze per lo svolgimento 
della sua attuale professione? 
[1] Saper dire “prego” e “grazie” in una lingua straniera 
[2] 
[3] Chiedere indicazioni su una strada in una città straniera 
[4] 
[5] Scrivere in italiano una recensione di un libro scritto in una lingua straniera 
[6] 
[7] 
 
 
26. Arte 
Conoscenza della teoria e delle tecniche necessarie a comporre, produrre e realizzare musica, 
danza, arti visuali, drammi e sculture 
 
A. Quanto è importante quest’area di conoscenza nello svolgimento della sua attuale 
professione? 
[1] Non importante    passare all’area di conoscenza successiva 
[2] Appena importante 
[3] Importante 
[4] Molto importante 
[5] Di assoluta importanza 
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B. A quale livello, fra quelli indicati, sono necessarie queste conoscenze per lo svolgimento 
della sua attuale professione? 
[1] Assistere ad un concerto di musica pop 
[2] 
[3] Recitare una parte secondaria in una rappresentazione di una filodrammatica locale 
[4] 
[5] Disegnare la scenografia di una grande manifestazione fieristica 
[6] 
[7] 
 
 
27. Storia e archeologia 
Conoscenza degli eventi storici e delle loro cause, degli indicatori e degli effetti sulle 
civilizzazioni e sulle culture 
 
A. Quanto è importante quest’area di conoscenza nello svolgimento della sua attuale 
professione? 
[1] Non importante    passare all’area di conoscenza successiva 
[2] Appena importante 
[3] Importante 
[4] Molto importante 
[5] Di assoluta importanza 
 
B. A quale livello, fra quelli indicati, sono necessarie queste conoscenze per lo svolgimento 
della sua attuale professione? 
[1] 
[2] 
[3] Frequentare un corso di storia italiana 
[4] Insegnare storia locale in una scuola elementare 
[5] 
[6] Determinare l’età di reperti ossei per collocarli nella storia fossile 
[7] 
 
 
28. Filosofia e teologia 
Conoscenza dei diversi sistemi filosofici e delle diverse religioni, dei principi di base, dei 
valori, dell’etica, dei modi di pensare, dei costumi, delle pratiche e del loro impatto sulla 
cultura 
 
A. Quanto è importante quest’area di conoscenza nello svolgimento della sua attuale 
professione? 
[1] Non importante    passare all’area di conoscenza successiva 
[2] Appena importante 
[3] Importante 
[4] Molto importante 
[5] Di assoluta importanza 
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B. A quale livello, fra quelli indicati, sono necessarie queste conoscenze per lo svolgimento 
della sua attuale professione? 
[1] 
[2] Guardare una trasmissione televisiva sui valori familiari 
[3] 
[4] Capire le pratiche religiose di un’altra cultura 
[5] 
[6] Comparare gli insegnamenti dei maggiori filosofi 
[7] 
 
 
29. Protezione civile e sicurezza pubblica 
Conoscenza delle più importanti attrezzature, delle politiche, delle procedure e delle 
strategie per promuovere effettive operazioni di sicurezza locale e nazionale per la 
protezione delle persone, delle informazioni, della proprietà e delle istituzioni 
 
A. Quanto è importante quest’area di conoscenza nello svolgimento della sua attuale 
professione? 
[1] Non importante    passare all’area di conoscenza successiva 
[2] Appena importante 
[3] Importante 
[4] Molto importante 
[5] Di assoluta importanza 
 
B. A quale livello, fra quelli indicati, sono necessarie queste conoscenze per lo svolgimento 
della sua attuale professione? 
[1] Usare una cintura di Sicurezza 
[2] 
[3] 
[4] Ispezionare un edificio per accertare violazioni delle norme di sicurezza 
[5] 
[6] Comandare una operazione militare 
[7] 
 
 
30. Legislazione e istituzioni 
Conoscenza delle leggi, delle procedure legali, dei regolamenti, delle sentenze esecutive, del 
ruolo delle istituzioni e delle procedure politiche di una democrazia 
 
A. Quanto è importante quest’area di conoscenza nello svolgimento della sua attuale 
professione? 
[1] Non importante    passare all’area di conoscenza successiva 
[2] Appena importante 
[3] Importante 
[4] Molto importante 
[5] Di assoluta importanza 
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B. A quale livello, fra quelli indicati, sono necessarie queste conoscenze per lo svolgimento 
della sua attuale professione? 
[1] 
[2] Chiedere un certificato elettorale sostitutivo per una elezione politica 
[3] 
[4] Preparare documenti e atti di proprietà per l’acquisto di una nuova casa 
[5] 
[6] Fare il giudice in un Tribunale 
[7] 
 
 
31. Telecomunicazioni 
Conoscenza delle trasmissioni, della radiodiffusione e delle modalità di connessione e 
controllo dei sistemi di telecomunicazioni 
 
A. Quanto è importante quest’area di conoscenza nello svolgimento della sua attuale 
professione? 
[1] Non importante    passare all’area di conoscenza successiva 
[2] Appena importante 
[3] Importante 
[4] Molto importante 
[5] Di assoluta importanza 
 
B. A quale livello, fra quelli indicati, sono necessarie queste conoscenze per lo svolgimento 
della sua attuale professione? 
[1] Fare una telefonata 
[2] Installare una antenna satellitare 
[3] 
[4] 
[5] 
[6] 
[7] Progettare una nuova rete mondiale di telecomunicazioni 
 
 
32. Comunicazione e media 
Conoscenza della produzione dei mezzi di comunicazione, delle tecniche e dei metodi per 
diffondere informazioni, dei mezzi alternativi per informare e intrattenere in modo scritto, 
orale e visivo 
 
A. Quanto è importante quest’area di conoscenza nello svolgimento della sua attuale 
professione? 
[1] Non importante    passare all’area di conoscenza successiva 
[2] Appena importante 
[3] Importante 
[4] Molto importante 
[5] Di assoluta importanza 
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B. A quale livello, fra quelli indicati, sono necessarie queste conoscenze per lo svolgimento 
della sua attuale professione? 
[1] 
[2] Scrivere una lettera di ringraziamento 
[3] 
[4] Fare il disk jokey in una radio 
[5] Scrivere un racconto 
[6] 
[7] 
 
 
33. Trasporti 
Conoscenza dei principi e dei metodi per trasportare persone o beni con mezzi aerei, 
ferroviari, navali o stradali; comprende le conoscenze necessarie per calcolare i costi e i 
benefici dei mezzi di trasporto 
 
A. Quanto è importante quest’area di conoscenza nello svolgimento della sua attuale 
professione? 
[1] Non importante    passare all’area di conoscenza successiva 
[2] Appena importante 
[3] Importante 
[4] Molto importante 
[5] Di assoluta importanza 
 
B. A quale livello, fra quelli indicati, sono necessarie queste conoscenze per lo svolgimento 
della sua attuale professione? 
[1] 
[2] Prendere un treno per andare al lavoro 
[3] 
[4] 
[5] Guidare una nave da carico in un porto affollato 
[6] Controllare il traffico aereo di un aeroporto affollato 
[7] 
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Appendix B - The determinants of overeducation, additional analyses 
Tab. B.1 The determinants of overeducation among BA graduates. Logit models, average marginal effects 
 
 SAg SAhm SAp RMmd JA 
Sex Male Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Female 0.005 0.005 0.020* 0.006 0.048*** 
 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) 
Age  0.004*** 0.004*** -0.001 -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Parents’ Education Primary or Less Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Lower secondary 0.000 -0.001 -0.02 0.014 -0.001 
 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.016) (0.017) 
 
Upper secondary -0.016 -0.007 -0.017 0.031 0.016 
 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) -0.017 (0.017) 
 
Tertiary -0.02 -0.011 -0.03 0.017 -0.012 
 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.020) (0.020) 
 
NA -0.06 -0.071 -0.069 -0.092 -0.08 
 
 (0.058) (0.057) (0.059) (0.055) (0.052) 
Social Origin Entrepreneurs Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Professionals -0.008 -0.004 0.024 -0.043* 0.08 
 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.021) (0.021) 
 
Managers -0.060* -0.03 -0.016 -0.089*** -0.017 
 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.025) (0.024) 
 
Clerks -0.003 -0.002 0.003 -0.052** 0.019 
 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) 
 
Self-Employed -0.01 0.001 0.004 -0.037* 0.014 
 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) 
 
Executive workers -0.032 -0.032 -0.005 -0.05** 0.009 
 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) 
 
Manual workers -0.03 -0.024 -0.002 -0.051** 0.008 
 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.017) 
 
NA -0.03 -0.015 -0.048 -0.027 0.033 
 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.041) (0.044) 
Geographic Area North Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Centre 0.019 0.012 0.026* 0.028** 0.025** 
 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) 
 
South and Islands 0.038*** 0.036*** 0.021 0.025** 0.027** 
    
   
 
 (continue) 
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 SAg SAhm SAp RMmd JA 
Type of secondary degree Scientific Lyceum Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Classical Lyceum -0.006 -0.009 -0.026 -0.02 -0.006 
 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) 
 
Other Lyceum 0.006 0.009 -0.01 0.009 -0.014 
 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) 
 
Technical school 0.013 0.013 0.005 0.026** 0.007 
 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) 
 
Vocational school 0.011 0.007 -0.015 0.034* 0.033* 
 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.016) 
Secondary graduation mark  0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Matriculation year 1999-2000 or later Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
1998-1999 or before 0.02 0.017 -0.016 -0.017 -0.013 
 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.014) (0.015) 
Field of study Mathemantics Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
ICT and Engineering -0.163*** -0.197*** -0.133** -0.085 -0.163*** 
 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.046) (0.046) 
 
Natural Sciences 0.022 0.014 -0.009 0.205*** 0.244*** 
 
 (0.052) (0.051) (0.052) (0.047) (0.050) 
 
Pharmacy, Veterinary -0.203*** -0.215*** -0.148* -0.056 0.066 
 
 (0.061) (0.061) (0.062) (0.061) (0.062) 
 
Medical Professions -0.476*** -0.523*** -0.410*** -0.569*** -0.336*** 
 
 (0.045) (0.044) (0.045) (0.043) (0.044) 
 
Architecture -0.002 -0.029 -0.05 0.110* 0.083 
 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.055) (0.051) (0.054) 
 
Business, Administration, Statistics -0.051 -0.055 -0.02 0.195*** 0.363*** 
 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) (0.044) (0.045) 
 
Social sciences 0.01 0.035 0.033 0.109* 0.262*** 
 
 (0.048) (0.047) (0.048) (0.045) (0.047) 
 
Law 0.026 0.05 0.012 0.209*** 0.386*** 
 
 (0.050) (0.049) (0.050) (0.046) (0.047) 
 
Arts and Humanities 0.137*** 0.141** 0.124* 0.215*** 0.357*** 
 
 (0.047) (0.048) (0.049) (0.045) (0.047) 
 
Education, Psychology -0.105 -0.121* -0.133** -0.012 -0.124** 
 
 (0.049) (0.048) (0.049) (0.047) (0.047) 
Tertiary graduation  mark 66-90 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
91-100 -0.022 -0.028* -0.006 -0.006 0.001 
 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) 
 
101-105 -0.050** -0.051*** -0.006 -0.01 -0.016 
 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014) 
      
(continue) 
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 SAg SAhm SAp RMmd JA 
 
106-110 -0.023 -0.03 -0.023 -0.013 -0.003 
 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) 
 
110 cum laude -0.070*** -0.074*** -0.073*** -0.048** -0.044* 
 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.018) 
Years of graduation delay  0.003 0.006 0.011* 0.001 0.000 
 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Other formative activities No Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Yes -0.049*** -0.046*** -0.042*** -0.038*** -0.029*** 
 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) 
Current job started Before graduation Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
After graduation -0.211*** -0.201*** -0.110*** -0.038** 0.000 
 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.014) (0.014) 
Pseudo R2  0.245 0.272 0.187 0.425 0.364 
N  9,144 9,144 9,217 9,217 9,217 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Tab. B.2 The determinants of overeducation among MA graduates, average marginal effects 
 
 SAg SAhm SAp RMmd JA 
Sex Male Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Female -0.002 0.000 0.018* 0.023** 0.040*** 
 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
Age  0.003** 0.004** -0.055*** -0.005*** -0.006*** 
 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Parents’ Education Primary or Less Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Lower secondary -0.005 -0.001 0.014 -0.01 -0.008 
 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) 
 
Upper secondary -0.003 0.001 0.022 -0.006 -0.003 
 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) 
 
Tertiary -0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.015 -0.01 
 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) 
 
NA 0.037 0.072 -0.026 0.055 0.081 
 
 (0.062) (0.065) (0.062) (0.067) (0.063) 
Social origin Entrepreneurs Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Professionals -0.077*** -0.074*** -0.045* -0.096*** -0.045** 
 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) 
 
Managers -0.076*** -0.065** -0.024 -0.051* -0.001 
 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019) 
 
Clerks -0.053*** -0.050** -0.001 -0.046** 0.003 
 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) 
 
Self-Employed -0.035* -0.037* 0.014 -0.043* 0.005 
 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) 
 
Executive workers -0.034* -0.032 0.004 -0.025 0.017 
 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) 
 
Manual workers -0.047** -0.047** 0.015 -0.025 0.011 
 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) 
 
NA -0.021 -0.018 0.064 -0.032 -0.005 
 
 (0.037) (0.039) (0.042) (0.041) (0.037) 
Geographic Area North Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Centre 0.012 0.004 0.005 -0.020* -0.017* 
 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
 
South and Islands -0.001 -0.011 -0.019* -0.048*** -0.036*** 
 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Type of secondary degree Scientific Lyceum Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Classical Lyceum -0.014 -0.004 0.000 -0.032** -0.021* 
 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
 
Other Lyceum -0.016 -0.019 -0.009 0.052*** -0.017 
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 SAg SAhm SAp RMmd JA 
 
Technical school 0.011 0.015 0.021* 0.010 0.003 
 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
 
Vocational school 0.024 0.028 0.039 0.041* 0.032 
 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019) 
Secondary graduation mark  -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Matriculation Year 1999-2000 or later Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
1998-1999 or before 0.014 0.002 0.009 0.002 -0.005 
 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
Field of study Mathematics Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
ICT and Engineering 0.027* 0.024 0.060*** 0.01 0.006 
 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.013) 
 
Natural Sciences 0.172*** 0.191*** 0.131*** 0.184*** 0.189*** 
 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.019) 
 
Pharmacy, Veterinary -0.083*** -0.106*** -0.119*** -0.262*** -0.120*** 
 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.015) 
 
Medicine -0.106*** -0.128*** -0.149*** -0.303*** -0.146*** 
 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.012) 
 
Medical Professions 0.068* 0.061* 0.036 -0.228*** -0.079*** 
 
 (0.029) (0.031) (0.034) (0.025) (0.023) 
 
Architecture 0.033* 0.017 -0.004 -0.105*** -0.036* 
 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.014) 
 
Business and Administration, Statistics 0.192*** 0.222*** 0.196*** 0.338*** 0.443*** 
 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.015) 
 
Social sciences 0.367*** 0.432*** 0.289*** 0.326*** 0.398*** 
 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) 
 
Law 0.073*** 0.075*** 0.011 0.025 0.139*** 
 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.017) 
 
Arts and Humanities 0.356*** 0.395*** 0.255*** 0.261*** 0.323*** 
 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.018) 
 
Education, Psychology 0.138*** 0.147*** 0.034 0.233*** -0.041** 
 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.015) 
Tertiary graduation mark 66-90 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
91-100 -0.01 -0.021 -0.01 -0.018 -0.023 
 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015) 
 
101-105 -0.017 -0.022 -0.016 -0.041* -0.044** 
 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
 
106-110 -0.056*** -0.064*** -0.029 -0.061*** -0.050** 
 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) 
 
110 cum laude -0.072*** -0.077*** -0.058** -0.077*** -0.068*** 
 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) 
(continue) 
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 SAg SAhm SAp RMmd JA 
Years of graduation delay  0.022*** 0.025*** 0.009* 0.015*** 0.010** 
 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Other formative activities No Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Yes -0.071*** -0.075*** -0.061*** -0.079*** -0.062*** 
 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Current job started Before graduation Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
After graduation -0.161*** -0.144*** -0.091*** -0.064*** -0.005 
 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) 
Pseudo R2  0.131 0.14 0.072 0.147 0.183 
N  16,374 16,374 16,594 16,594 16,594 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix C - The effects of overeducation, additional analyses 
Tab. C.1 The effect of overeducation on earnings among BA graduates. OLS models 
 
 SAg SAhm SAp RMmd JA 
SAg  -0.075***     
  (0.008)     
SAhm   -0.072***    
   (0.008)    
SAp    -0.093***   
    (0.007)   
RMmd     -0.072***  
     (0.009)  
JA      -0.056*** 
      (0.009) 
Sex Male Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Female -0.087*** -0.087*** -0.086*** -0.088*** -0.086*** 
 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Age  0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Parents’ Education Primary or Less Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Lower secondary 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.007 
 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
 
Upper secondary -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 
 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
 
Tertiary 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.005 0.004 
 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) 
 
NA 0.018 0.016 0.023 0.015 0.019 
 
 (0.049) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049) (0.048) 
Social Origin Entrepreneurs Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Professionals -0.005 -0.005 -0.007 -0.013 -0.011 
 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
 
Managers 0.034 0.037 0.039 0.031 0.035 
 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
 
Clerks -0.042** -0.042** -0.041** -0.047** -0.043** 
 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
(continue) 
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 SAg SAhm SAp RMmd JA 
 
Self-Employed -0.050** -0.049** -0.050** -0.054*** -0.052*** 
 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
 
Executive workers -0.042** -0.042** -0.041** -0.046** -0.043** 
 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
 
Manual workers -0.055*** -0.054*** -0.053*** -0.058*** -0.055*** 
 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
 
NA -0.058 -0.057 -0.062 -0.059 -0.057 
 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Geographic Area North Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Centre -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.044*** -0.044*** 
 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
 
South and Islands -0.085*** -0.085*** -0.086*** -0.085*** -0.085*** 
 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Type of Secondary degree Scientific Lyceum Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Classical Lyceum 0.017 0.017 0.019 0.022 0.022 
 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
 
Other Lyceum 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001 
 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
 
Technical school -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 
 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
 
Vocationalschool -0.018 -0.018 -0.019 -0.014 -0.015 
 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Secondary graduation mark  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Matriculation Year 1999-2000 or later Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
1998-1999 or before -0.015 -0.015 -0.017 -0.017 -0.018 
 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) 
Field of study Mathematics Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
ICT and Engineering 0.069* 0.066* 0.065* 0.069* 0.066* 
 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) 
 
Natural Sciences -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.016 0.016 
 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) 
 
Pharmacy, Veterinary 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.009 0.017 
 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
 
Medical Professions 0.117*** 0.115*** 0.114*** 0.108*** 0.130*** 
 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) 
 
Architecture -0.058 -0.06 -0.064 -0.053 -0.057 
 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
(continue) 
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 SAg SAhm SAp RMmd JA 
 
Business and Administration, Statistics 0.059* 0.059* 0.060* 0.075** 0.082** 
 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
 
Social sciences 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.008 0.015 
 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
 
Law 0.028 0.03 0.026 0.038 0.045 
 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
 
Arts and Humanities -0.015 -0.014 -0.012 -0.009 -0.003 
    (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
 
Education, Psychology -0.010 -0.011 -0.015 -0.005 -0.009 
 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.005) 
Tertiary graduation mark 66-90 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
91-100 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
 
101-105 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
 
106-110 -0.005 -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 -0.005 
 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
 
110 cum laude -0.005 -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 -0.005 
 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Years of graduation delay  -0.010** -0.010** -0.009** -0.010** -0.010** 
 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Other formative activities No Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Yes -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 
 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Current job started Before graduation Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
After graduation 0.013 0.015 0.021 0.029* 0.032* 
 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Type of contract Stable Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Unstable -0.083*** -0.083*** -0.081*** -0.082*** -0.084*** 
 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Working time Full time Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Part time -0.478*** -0.479*** -0.480*** -0.484*** -0.484*** 
 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Constant  7.138 7.138 7.153 7.157 7.123 
 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.049) (0.050) (0.050) 
 
 
     R2  0.379 0.378 0.384 0.376 0.374 
N  7,669 7,669 7,731 7,731 7,731 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Tab. C.2 The effect of overeducation on earnings among MA graduates. OLS models 
 
 SAg SAhm SAp RMmd JA 
SAg  -0.052***     
  (0.007)     
SAhm   -0.035***    
   (0.007)    
SAp    -0.034***   
    (0.006)   
RMmd     0.013*  
     (0.006)  
JA      0.01 
      (0.007) 
Sex Male Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Female -0.095*** -0.095*** -0.094*** -0.095*** -0.095*** 
 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Age  0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Parents’ education Primary or Less Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Lower secondary -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 
 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) 
 
Upper secondary 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.003 
 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
 
Tertiary 0.015 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.014 
 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
 
NA -0.011 -0.01 -0.023 -0.025 -0.026 
 
 (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) 
Social origin Entrepreneurs Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Professionals -0.039* -0.037* -0.035* -0.033* -0.034* 
 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
 
Managers 0.02 0.021 0.021 0.023 0.022 
 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
 
Clerks -0.034* -0.032* -0.029* -0.028* -0.029* 
 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
 
Self-Employed -0.021 -0.021 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 
 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
 
Executive workers -0.058*** -0.057*** -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.055*** 
 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
 
Manual workers -0.039* -0.038* -0.036* -0.036* -0.036* 
 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
(continue) 
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 SAg SAhm SAp RMmd JA 
 
NA -0.009 -0.008 0.011 0.007 0.007 
 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Geographic area North Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Centre -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.050*** 
 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
 
South and Islands -0.103*** -0.104*** -0.104*** -0.103*** -0.103*** 
 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Type of secondary degree Scientific Lyceum Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Classical Lyceum -0.015 -0.014 -0.013 -0.012 -0.013 
 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
 
Other Lyceum 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.021 
 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
 
Technical school -0.015* -0.015* -0.015* -0.016* -0.016* 
 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
 
Vocational school -0.037* -0.037* -0.034* -0.036* -0.036* 
 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Secondary graduation mark  0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001** 
 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Matriculation Year 1999-2000 or later Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
1998-1999 or before -0.007 -0.008 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) 
Field of Study Mathematics Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
ICT and Engineering 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.049*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 
 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
 
Natural Sciences -0.121*** -0.123*** -0.125*** -0.131*** -0.131*** 
 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
 
Pharmacy, Veterinary -0.032 -0.03 -0.033 -0.024 -0.026 
 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
 
Medicine 0.212*** 0.213*** 0.212*** 0.220*** 0.218*** 
 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
 
Medical Professions 0.054 0.054 0.05 0.052 0.049 
 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
 
Architecture -0.143*** -0.144*** -0.144*** -0.143*** -0.144*** 
 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
 
Business and Administration, Statistics 0.013 0.011 0.009 -0.002 -0.002 
 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
 
Social sciences -0.061*** -0.064*** -0.069*** -0.083*** -0.082*** 
 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
(continue) 
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 SAg SAhm SAp RMmd JA 
 
Law -0.150*** -0.151*** -0.154*** -0.158*** -0.158*** 
 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
 
Arts and Humanities -0.133*** -0.136*** -0.144*** -0.156*** -0.156*** 
 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
 
Education, Psychology -0.100*** -0.101*** -0.101*** -0.104*** -0.101*** 
 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Tertiary graduation mark 66-90 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
91-100 0.021 0.021 0.023 0.024 0.024 
 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
 
101-105 0.028 0.028 0.030* 0.031* 0.031* 
 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
 
106-110 0.035* 0.035* 0.038** 0.040** 0.040** 
 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
 
110 cum laude 0.059*** 0.060*** 0.061*** 0.064*** 0.063*** 
 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Years of graduation delay  -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.027*** -0.027*** 
 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Other formative activities No Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Yes -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.019** -0.016** -0.017** 
 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Current job started Before graduation Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
After graduation -0.014 -0.01 -0.011 -0.007 -0.008 
 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Type of contract Stable Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Unstable -0.073*** -0.073*** -0.072*** -0.072*** -0.072*** 
 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Working time Full time Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Part time -0.452*** -0.454*** -0.459*** -0.460*** -0.460*** 
 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Constant  7.001 6.995 6.993 6.96 6.965 
 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
 
 
     R2  0.311 0.31 0.311 0.31 0.31 
N  13,248 13,248 13,437 13,437 13,437 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Tab. C.3 The effect of overeducation on job satisfaction among BA graduates. OLS models 
 
 SAg SAhm SAp RMmd JA 
SAg  -0.294*** 
    
 
 (0.024) 
    SAhm  
 
-0.288*** 
   
 
 
 
(0.024) 
   SAp  
  
-0.418*** 
  
 
 
  
(0.023) 
  RMmd  
   
-0.152*** 
 
 
 
   
(0.027) 
 JA  
    
-0.223*** 
 
 
    
(0.026) 
Sex Male Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Female -0.076*** -0.076*** -0.070*** -0.076*** -0.066*** 
 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Age  -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.011*** 
 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Parents’ Education Primary or Less Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Lower secondary 0.010 0.010 0.004 0.014 0.012 
 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) 
 
Upper secondary 0.034 0.037 0.035 0.046 0.045 
 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
 
Tertiary 0.032 0.034 0.029 0.045 0.039 
 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
 
NA 0.188 0.115 0.115 0.130 0.127 
 
 (0.131) (0.131) (0.130) (0.132) (0.132) 
Social Origin Entrepreneurs Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Professionals -0.107 -0.105 -0.093 -0.113* -0.103 
 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.056) (0.057) (0.057) 
 
Managers -0.056 -0.045 -0.052 -0.060 -0.049 
 
 (0.067) (0.067) (0.066) (0.067) (0.067) 
 
Clerks -0.166*** -0.165*** -0.167*** -0.177*** -0.164*** 
 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
 
Self-Employed -0.136** -0.132** -0.135** -0.143** -0.134** 
 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048) 
 
Executive workers -0.184*** -0.184*** -0.181*** -0.189*** -0.179*** 
 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048) 
 
Manual workers -0.147** -0.144** -0.141** -0.149** -0.139** 
 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047) 
(continue) 
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 SAg SAhm SAp RMmd JA 
 
NA -0.141 -0.137 -0.171 -0.159 -0.147 
 
 (0.102) (0.102) (0.100) (0.102) (0.101) 
Geographic Area North Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Centre -0.122*** -0.124*** -0.121*** -0.125*** -0.124*** 
 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
 
South and Islands -0.150*** -0.150*** -0.154*** -0.156*** -0.153*** 
 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) 
Type of Secondary degree Scientific Lyceum Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Classical Lyceum -0.026 -0.027 -0.031 -0.024 -0.022 
 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.039) 
 
Other Lyceum 0.063* 0.064* 0.053 0.060 0.056 
 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
 
Technical school 0.030 0.030 0.027 0.029 0.026 
 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
 
Vocational school 0.011 0.010 0.001 0.012 0.014 
 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
Secondary graduation mark  0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 
 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Matriculation Year 1999-2000 or later Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
1998-1999 or before -0.001 -0.002 -0.007 -0.005 -0.006 
 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) 
Field of study Mathematics Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
ICT and Engineering -0.035 -0.043 -0.044 -0.006 -0.031 
 
 (0.088) (0.088) (0.086) (0.088) (0.087) 
 
Natural Sciences -0.029 -0.031 -0.040 -0.008 0.014 
 
 (0.096) (0.096) (0.094) (0.096) (0.096) 
 
Pharmacy, Veterinary 0.109 0.107 0.106 0.157 0.181 
 
 (0.116) (0.116) (0.114) (0.116) (0.116) 
 
Medical Professions 0.075 0.064 0.042 0.118 0.129 
 
 (0.085) (0.085) (0.083) (0.085) (0.084) 
 
Architecture -0.108 -0.115 -0.132 -0.096 -0.094 
 
 (0.100) (0.100) (0.099) (0.101) (0.100) 
 
Business and Administration, Statistics 0.097 0.095 0.103 0.135 0.187* 
 
 (0.086) (0.086) (0.084) (0.086) (0.086) 
 
Social sciences -0.108 -0.101 -0.106 -0.104 -0.061 
 
 (0.088) (0.088) (0.087) (0.088) (0.088) 
 
Law 0.100 0.106 0.095 0.116 0.170 
 
 (0.092) (0.092) (0.091) (0.092) (0.093) 
(continue) 
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 SAg SAhm SAp RMmd JA 
 
Arts and Humanities -0.005 -0.004 0.008 -0.006 0.041 
 
 (0.091) (0.091) (0.089) (0.091) (0.091) 
 
Education, Psychology 0.025 0.022 -0.001 0.057 0.031 
 
 (0.091) (0.091) (0.089) (0.090) (0.090) 
Tertiary graduation mark 66-90 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
91-100 0.025 0.023 0.028 0.031 0.033 
 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) 
 
101-105 0.009 0.009 0.021 0.023 0.022 
 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) 
 
106-110 0.057 0.056 0.054 0.063 0.065 
 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) 
 
110 cum laude 0.071 0.070 0.071 0.092* 0.091* 
 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) 
Years of graduation delay  -0.009 -0.008 -0.007 -0.012 -0.012 
 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Other formative activities No Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Yes -0.009 -0.007 -0.013 0.000 -0.000 
 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) 
Current job started Before graduation Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
After graduation 0.026 0.031 0.053 0.098* 0.103** 
 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) 
Type of contract Stable Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Unstable -0.409*** -0.409*** -0.397*** -0.409*** -0.407*** 
 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Working time Full time Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Part time -0.303*** -0.306*** -0.302*** -0.320*** -0.321*** 
 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) 
 
NA -0.267*** -0.272*** -0.253*** -0.283*** -0.293*** 
 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
 
 
     Constant  0.529 0.531 0.600 0.446 0.421 
 
 (0.156) (0.156) (0.152) (0.156) (0.154) 
 
 
     R2  0.126 0.126 0,143 0.114 0.118 
N  9,077 9,077 9,149 9,149 9,149 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Tab. C.4 The effect of overeducation on job satisfaction among MA graduates. OLS models 
 
 SAg SAhm SAp RMmd JA 
SAg  -0.304*** 
    
 
 (0.018) 
    SAhm  
 
-0.283*** 
   
 
 
 
(0.018) 
   SAp  
  
-0.377*** 
  
 
 
  
(0.016) 
  RMmd  
   
-0.107*** 
 
 
 
   
(0.017) 
 JA  
    
-0.168*** 
 
 
    
(0.018) 
Sex Male Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Female -0.146*** -0.145*** -0.140*** -0.143*** -0.139*** 
 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Age  0.003 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.002 
 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Parents’ education  Primary or Less Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Lower secondary -0.034 -0.031 -0.029 -0.036 -0.036 
 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
 
Upper secondary 0.010 0.010 0.016 0.006 0.006 
 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
 
Tertiary -0.021 -0.021 -0.009 -0.021 -0.021 
 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
 
NA -0.002 -0.002 -0.031 -0.022 -0.016 
 
 (0.144) (0.144) (0.141) (0.143) (0.143) 
Social origin  Entrepreneurs Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Professionals -0.032 -0.029 -0.018 -0.011 -0.008 
 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) 
 
Managers -0.014 -0.009 -0.003 0.001 0.006 
 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) 
 
Clerks -0.101** -0.099** -0.083* -0.086* -0.080* 
 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
 
Self-Employed -0.104** -0.104** -0.087* -0.096* -0.091* 
 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) 
 
Executive workers -0.181*** -0.179*** -0.163*** -0.166*** -0.160*** 
 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
 
Manual workers -0.125** -0.124** -0.100** -0.108** -0.103** 
 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
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 SAg SAhm SAp RMmd JA 
 
NA -0.065 -0.063 -0.050 -0.076 -0.072 
 
 (0.088) (0.088) (0.085) (0.086) (0.086) 
Geographic area North Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Centre -0.112*** -0.114*** -0.117*** -0.121*** -0.121*** 
 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
 
South and Islands -0.169*** -0.171*** -0.181*** -0.178*** -0.178*** 
 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) 
Type of secondary degree Scientific Lyceum Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Classical Lyceum -0.018 -0.015 -0.013 -0.016 -0.016 
 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
 
Other Lyceum 0.051 0.050 0.054 0.063* 0.054 
 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
 
Technical school -0.018 -0.017 -0.013 -0.020 -0.021 
 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) 
 
Vocational school 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.008 -0.007 
 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) 
Secondary graduation mark  0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Matriculation Year 1999-2000 or later Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
1998-1999 or before -0.024 -0.028 -0.024 -0.027 -0.028 
 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Field of Study Mathematics Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
ICT and Engineering -0.006 -0.006 -0.012 -0.010 -0.011 
 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
 
Natural Sciences -0.008 -0.004 -0.003 -0.030 -0.019 
 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) 
 
Pharmacy, Veterinary 0.034 0.032 0.019 0.039 0.045 
 
 (0.060) (0.060) (0.059) (0.060) (0.060) 
 
Medicine 0.426*** 0.423*** 0.400*** 0.422*** 0.430*** 
 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.046) (0.047) (0.046) 
 
Medical Professions 0.079 0.079 0.071 0.034 0.048 
 
 (0.075) (0.075) (0.073) (0.074) (0.074) 
 
Architecture -0.230*** -0.234*** -0.235*** -0.244*** -0.239*** 
 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
 
Business and Administration, Statistics 0.158*** 0.164*** 0.179*** 0.141*** 0.179*** 
 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) 
 
Social sciences 0.031 0.044 0.037 -0.035 -0.004 
 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) 
(continue) 
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 SAg SAhm SAp RMmd JA 
 
Law 0.044 0.045 0.029 0.028 0.048 
 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
 
Arts and Humanities 0.011 0.017 0.005 -0.058 -0.032 
 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) 
 
Education, Psychology 0.156*** 0.158*** 0.127** 0.146*** 0.113*** 
 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) 
Tertiary graduation mark 66-90 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
91-100 0.041 0.038 0.039 0.040 0.038 
 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) 
 
101-105 0.033 0.032 0.035 0.036 0.033 
 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
 
106-110 0.025 0.024 0.034 0.038 0.036 
 
 (0.036) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
 
110 cum laude 0.062 0.062 0.063 0.075* 0.072 
 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) 
Years of graduation delay  -0.063*** -0.062*** -0.067*** -0.069*** -0.069*** 
 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Other formative activities No Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Yes -0.039* -0.038* -0.039* -0.024 -0.025 
 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) 
Current job started Before graduation Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
After graduation -0.085** -0.075* -0.064* -0.034 -0.028 
 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Type of contract Stable Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Unstable -0.398*** -0.396*** -0.394*** -0.397*** -0.398*** 
 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Working time Full time Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Part time -0.329*** -0.335*** -0.330*** -0.352*** -0.349*** 
 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
 
NA -0.223*** -0.225*** -0.225*** -0.232*** -0.235*** 
 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) 
 
 
     Constant  0.173 0.165 0.249 0.081 0.085 
 
 (0.136) (0.136) (0.133) (0.135) (0.134) 
 
 
     R2  0.142 0.141 0.155 0.130 0.132 
N  16,224 16,224 16,443 16,443 16,443 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Tab. C.5 The effect of overeducation on job search among BA graduates. Logit model, average marginal effects 
 
 
 SAg SAhm SAp RMmd JA 
SAg  0.047*** 
    
 
 (0.008) 
    SAhm  
 
0.051*** 
   
 
 
 
(0.008) 
   SAp  
  
0.047*** 
  
 
 
  
(0.008) 
  RMmd  
   
0.024** 
 
 
 
   
(0.009) 
 JA  
    
0.034*** 
 
 
    
(0.009) 
Sex Male Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Female 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.009 
 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Age  -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* 
 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Parents’ Education Primary or Less Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Lower secondary 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.007 
 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
 
Upper secondary -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 -0.006 -0.005 
 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
 
Tertiary -0.008 -0.008 -0.006 -0.009 -0.008 
 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
 
NA -0.082* -0.082* -0.080* -0.081* -0.081* 
 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
Social Origin Entrepreneurs Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Professionals 0.037* 0.037* 0.034 0.037* 0.036 
 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
 
Managers 0.068** 0.066** 0.065** 0.068** 0.067** 
 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) 
 
Clerks 0.047** 0.047** 0.045** 0.048*** 0.046** 
 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
 
Self-Employed 0.042** 0.041** 0.041** 0.042** 0.041** 
 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
(continue) 
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 SAg SAhm SAp RMmd JA 
 
Executive workers 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.053*** 0.052*** 
 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
 
Manual workers 0.038** 0.037* 0.037* 0.039** 0.038** 
 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
 
NA 0.053 0.051 0.053 0.054 0.053 
 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Geographic Area North Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Centre 0.016 0.016 0.017* 0.017* 0.017* 
 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
 
South and Islands 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.061*** 0.060*** 
 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Type of Secondary degree Scientific Lyceum Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Classical Lyceum -0.023 -0.023 -0.022 -0.022 -0.022 
 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
 
Other Lyceum 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.008 0.009 
 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
 
Technical school -0.003 -0.003 0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
 
Vocational school -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Secondary graduation mark  -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Matriculation Year 1999-2000 or later Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
1998-1999 or before 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.022 
 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Field of study Mathematics Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
ICT and Engineering 0.004 0.007 0.005 -0.003 0.004 
 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.037) 
 
Natural Sciences -0.041 -0.04 -0.04 -0.049 -0.053 
 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) 
 
Pharmacy, Veterinary -0.044 -0.042 -0.044 -0.054 -0.058 
 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) 
 
Medical Professions -0.099** -0.095** -0.100** -0.109*** -0.111** 
 
 (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) 
 
Architecture 0.005 0.007 0.011 0.003 0.003 
 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) 
 
Business and Administration, Statistics -0.066 -0.064 -0.065 -0.073* -0.081* 
 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) 
(continue) 
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 SAg SAhm SAp RMmd JA 
 
Social sciences -0.031 -0.031 -0.028 -0.032 -0.039 
 
 (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.036) 
 
Law -0.06 -0.06 -0.056 -0.064 -0.072 
 
 (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) 
 
Arts and Humanities -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 -0.012 
 
 (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) 
 
Education, Psychology -0.055 -0.054 -0.05 -0.062 -0.056 
 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) 
Tertiary graduation mark 66-90 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
91-100 -0.004 -0.004 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 
 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
 
101-105 -0.001 0.000 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
 
106-110 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
 
110 cum laude 0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.006 -0.005 
 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Years of graduation delay  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Other formative activities No Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Yes 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 
 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Current job started Before graduation Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
After graduation 0.002 0.003 -0.004 -0.008 -0.009 
 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Type of contract Stable Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Unstable 0.110*** 0.110*** 0.107*** 0.109*** 0.109*** 
 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Working time Full time Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Part time 0.097*** 0.097*** 0.096*** 0.099*** 0.100*** 
 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
 
NA 0.086*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.092*** 0.094*** 
 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
 
 
     R2  0.119 0.119 0.119 0.115 0.116 
N  9,144 9,144 9,217 9,217 9,217 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Tab. C.6 The effect of overeducation on job search among MA graduates. Logit models, average marginal effects 
 
 SAg SAhm SAp RMmd JA 
SAg  0.064*** 
    
 
 (0.007) 
    SAhm  
 
0.065*** 
   
 
 
 
(0.007) 
   SAp  
  
0.086*** 
  
 
 
  
(0.006) 
  RMmd  
   
0.022*** 
 
 
 
   
(0.006) 
 JA  
    
0.040*** 
 
 
    
(0.007) 
Sex Male Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Female 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 
 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Age  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Parents’ education Primary or Less Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Lower secondary 0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 
 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
 
Upper secondary -0.017 -0.018 -0.02 -0.019 -0.019 
 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
 
Tertiary -0.025 -0.025 -0.029 -0.027 -0.027 
 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
 
NA -0.023 -0.026 -0.023 -0.03 -0.031 
 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) 
Social origin Entrepreneurs Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Professionals 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.01 0.01 
 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
 
Managers 0.045* 0.045* 0.044* 0.042* 0.042* 
 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
 
Clerks 0.039** 0.039** 0.037** 0.037** 0.036** 
 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
 
Self-Employed 0.016 0.017 0.014 0.015 0.014 
 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
 
Executive workers 0.022 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.02 
 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
 
Manual workers 0.019 0.019 0.015 0.015 0.015 
 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
(continue) 
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 SAg SAhm SAp RMmd JA 
 
NA -0.014 -0.014 -0.01 -0.006 -0.006 
 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Geographic Area North Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Centre 0.020** 0.021** 0.019* 0.020** 0.020** 
 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
 
South and Islands 0.098*** 0.039*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 
 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Type of secondary degree Scientific Lyceum Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Classical Lyceum 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.012 
 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
 
Other Lyceum -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.039*** -0.040*** -0.039*** 
 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
 
Technical school 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.006 
 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
 
Vocational school -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.001 
 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) 
Secondary graduation mark  -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001** -0.001* 
 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Matriculation Year 1999-2000 or later Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
1998-1999 or before 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Field of study Mathematics Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
ICT and Engineering 0.030* 0.029* 0.024 0.030* 0.031* 
 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
 
Natural Sciences 0.03 0.028 0.03 0.038* 0.034 
 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
 
Pharmacy, Veterinary -0.105*** -0.105*** -0.105*** -0.106*** -0.107*** 
 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) 
 
Medicine -0.118*** -0.118*** -0.113*** -0.115*** -0.117*** 
 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) 
 
Medical Professions -0.108*** -0.108*** -0.112*** -0.103*** -0.106*** 
 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
 
Architecture -0.015 -0.014 -0.013 -0.01 -0.011 
 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) 
 
Business and Administration, Statistics -0.028 -0.030* -0.035* -0.023 -0.034* 
 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
 
Social sciences 0.001 -0.005 -0.004 0.017 0.007 
 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
(continue) 
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 SAg SAhm SAp RMmd JA 
 
Law -0.058*** -0.059*** -0.056*** -0.053*** -0.059*** 
 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
 
Arts and Humanities -0.008 -0.011 -0.011 0.006 -0.002 
 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
 
Education, Psychology -0.085*** -0.086*** -0.089*** -0.089*** -0.085*** 
 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Tertiary graduation mark 66-90 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
91-100 -0.013 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.011 
 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
 
101-105 -0.031 -0.030 -0.030 -0.030 -0.029 
 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
 
106-110 -0.032* -0.031* -0.032* -0.033* -0.032* 
 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
 
110 cum laude -0.052** -0.052** -0.050* -0.054*** -0.052** 
 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Years of graduation delay  -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Other formative activities No Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Yes 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.049*** 0.050*** 
 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Current job started Before graduation Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
After graduation 0.023 0.022 0.02 0.014 0.013 
 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Type of contract Stable Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Unstable 0.111*** 0.110*** 0.108*** 0.109*** 0.109*** 
 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Working time Full time Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Part time 0.112*** 0.114*** 0.116*** 0.122*** 0.122*** 
 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
 
NA 0.107*** 0.103*** 0.105*** 0.107*** 0.108*** 
 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
 
 
     R2  0.078 0.079 0.084 0.074 0.075 
N  16,374 16,374 16,594 16,594 16,594 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix D - The evolution over time of overeducation. Multivariate analyses. 
Tab. D.1 Probability of educational mismatch by graduation cohort. Logit models, average marginal effects 
   1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 
Gender Male Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Female 0.007 0.046*** -0.017** -0.011 0.001 -0.013** 
 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) 
Geographic area North Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Centre -0.004 -0.006 -0.016* 0.009 0.007 0.029*** 
 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) 
 
South and islands -0.045*** -0.042*** -0.045*** -0.027*** -0.010 0.028*** 
 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) 
Age Less than 30 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
30 or more 0.012 -0.009 -0.011 0.021* 0.031*** 0.150*** 
 
 (0.013) (0.020) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.007) 
Parents' education Primary or less Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Lower secondary 0.020 -0.023 -0.017 -0.037*** -0.006 -0.040*** 
 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.009) 
 
Upper secondary 0.020 -0.032** -0.032** -0.048*** -0.008 -0.039*** 
 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010) 
 
Tertiary 0.009 -0.047*** -0.042*** -0.056*** -0.027* -0.056*** 
 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.011) 
Parents’ occupation Managers and professionals Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Entrepreneurs -0.044*** 0.025 0.009 0.002 0.009 0.030*** 
 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.014) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) 
 
Non manual employees -0.010 -0.004 0.019 0.020* 0.008 0.017** 
 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) 
 
Self-employed 0.001 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 0.020* 0.023** 
 
 (0.019) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.012) (0.010) 
 
Manual workers -0.014 -0.013 -0.003 0.016 0.012 0.016* 
 
 (0.021) (0.028) (0.016) (0.014) (0.011) (0.010) 
 
Unemployed -0.074** 0.000 -0.007 0.025 0.015 0.050* 
 
 (0.033) (0.000) (0.050) (0.045) (0.041) (0.027) 
Upper secondary education Classical Lyceum Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Scientific Lyceum 0.030** 0.035** 0.023** 0.002 0.016* -0.002 
 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) 
 
Other lyceum 0.085*** 0.080*** 0.083*** 0.040*** 0.057*** 0.025** 
 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.010) 
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   1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 
 
Technical school 0.039** 0.075*** 0.077*** 0.051*** 0.058*** 0.034*** 
 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) 
 
Vocationa school 0.051 0.089*** 0.044* 0.049** 0.054*** 0.017 
 
 (0.034) (0.031) (0.024) (0.022) (0.018) (0.013) 
Field of study Scientific Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Medicine -0.156*** -0.220*** -0.189*** -0.180*** -0.205*** -0.280*** 
 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
 
Engineer -0.035*** -0.090*** -0.043*** -0.021** -0.025** -0.076*** 
 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) 
 
Agriculture 0.018 0.137*** 0.097*** 0.102*** 0.116*** 0.092*** 
 
 (0.023) (0.041) (0.024) (0.021) (0.023) (0.020) 
 
Economics 0.186*** 0.150*** 0.141*** 0.163*** 0.164*** 0.118*** 
 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) 
 
Social and political sciences 0.402*** 0.340*** 0.291*** 0.332*** 0.304*** 0.207*** 
 
 (0.030) (0.028) (0.018) (0.020) (0.015) (0.012) 
 
Law 0.076*** 0.036* 0.063*** 0.086*** 0.076*** 0.046*** 
 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.012) 
 
Humanities 0.235*** 0.361*** 0.220*** 0.310*** 0.222*** 0.158*** 
 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.010) 
 
Medical professions 
    
-0.168*** -0.123*** 
 
 
    
(0.009) (0.010) 
Tertiary graduation mark 66-90 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
91-100 -0.024 0.012 0.032 -0.035* -0.058*** -0.021** 
 
 (0.025) (0.027) (0.020) (0.019) (0.014) (0.009) 
 
101-105 -0.031 -0.027 -0.002 -0.073*** -0.075*** -0.044*** 
 
 (0.026) (0.028) (0.021) (0.019) (0.015) (0.010) 
 
106-110 -0.025 -0.052* -0.006 -0.081*** -0.100*** -0.053*** 
 
 (0.026) (0.028) (0.021) (0.019) (0.015) (0.010) 
 
110 cum laude -0.034 -0.072** -0.036* -0.131*** -0.123*** -0.087*** 
 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.021) (0.020) (0.016) (0.010) 
Work experience during Higher Education No Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Temporary 0.045*** -0.006 0.004 -0.012 0.008 0.046*** 
 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) 
 
Permanent 0.050** -0.069*** -0.016 -0.008 0.006 0.182*** 
 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.013) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008) 
Graduation delay No delay Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
One year 0.012 0.015 0.017 0.005 0.013* 0.037*** 
 
 (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) 
 
Two years 0.035** 0.042** 0.057*** 0.014 0.016* 0.039*** 
 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.015) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) 
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   1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 
 
Three years 0.058*** 0.055*** 0.078*** 0.031*** 0.039*** 0.025*** 
 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.016) (0.012) (0.011) (0.007) 
 
Four years or more 0.069*** 0.094*** 0.088*** 0.047*** 0.055*** 0.000 
 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.011) (0.011) (0.000) 
Further education No Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Yes -0.053*** -0.063*** -0.111*** -0.083*** -0.075*** -0.064*** 
 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) 
Observations  7,359 7,781 13,629 15,405 21,056 34,319 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Tab. D.2 Probability of skill mismatch by graduation cohort. Logit models, average marginal effects 
   1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 
Gender Male Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Female 0.023* 0.052*** 0.032*** -0.013* 0.018*** -0.003 
 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) 
Geographic area North Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Centre 0.030** -0.010 0.028*** -0.000 -0.007 0.012* 
 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) 
 
South and islands 0.010 -0.042*** 0.038*** -0.057*** -0.038*** 0.001 
 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) 
Age Less than 30 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
30 or more -0.002 -0.036** -0.004 -0.015 -0.009 0.002 
 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.009) (0.012) (0.011) (0.007) 
Parents’ education Primary or Less Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Lower secondary -0.001 -0.027* -0.020* -0.019 -0.003 -0.008 
 
 (0.018) (0.015) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.009) 
 
Upper secondary -0.006 -0.035** -0.025** -0.029** 0.004 -0.001 
 
 (0.019) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.010) 
 
Tertiary 0.011 -0.051*** -0.015 -0.044*** -0.011 -0.004 
 
 (0.022) (0.016) (0.013) (0.016) (0.014) (0.011) 
Parents' occupation Managers and Professionals Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Entrepreneurs -0.042** -0.034** -0.003 -0.021* 0.004 0.005 
 
 (0.018) (0.016) (0.011) (0.013) (0.010) (0.009) 
 
Non manual employees -0.000 0.014 0.019** 0.032*** 0.010 0.018** 
 
 (0.017) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) 
 
Self-employed -0.003 -0.004 0.008 0.000 0.008 0.023** 
 
 (0.022) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.010) 
 
Manual workers -0.022 0.001 0.021 0.016 0.021* 0.020** 
 
 (0.023) (0.025) (0.013) (0.015) (0.012) (0.010) 
 
Unemployed -0.077** -0.071 -0.028 0.044 0.001 0.038 
 
 (0.038) (0.121) (0.035) (0.048) (0.042) (0.028) 
Upper secondary education Lyceum Classical Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Scientific Lyceum 0.047*** 0.016 0.025*** 0.014 0.019** 0.008 
 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) 
 
Other Lyceum 0.103*** 0.004 0.010 0.016 0.028** -0.003 
 
 (0.022) (0.017) (0.011) (0.015) (0.012) (0.010) 
 
Technical school 0.050*** 0.037** 0.046*** 0.036*** 0.046*** 0.026*** 
 
 (0.018) (0.015) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) 
 
Vocational school 0.044 0.008 0.040** 0.044* 0.046** 0.031** 
 
 (0.037) (0.027) (0.019) (0.023) (0.018) (0.014) 
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   1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 
Field of study Scientific Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Medicine -0.198*** -0.195*** -0.093*** -0.225*** -0.236*** -0.248*** 
 
 (0.021) (0.015) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
 
Engineer -0.029 -0.024 -0.024** -0.023** -0.014 -0.043*** 
 
 (0.018) (0.015) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
 
Agriculture -0.078*** 0.117*** 0.032 0.047** 0.076*** 0.059*** 
 
 (0.027) (0.039) (0.020) (0.021) (0.023) (0.021) 
 
Economics 0.020 0.045*** 0.028*** 0.117*** 0.134*** 0.109*** 
 
 (0.018) (0.015) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) 
 
Social and political sciences 0.243*** 0.156*** 0.085*** 0.201*** 0.215*** 0.179*** 
 
 (0.031) (0.024) (0.014) (0.020) (0.015) (0.012) 
 
Law -0.067*** -0.020 0.018 0.013 0.000 -0.008 
 
 (0.023) (0.018) (0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.012) 
 
Humanities 0.047** 0.122*** 0.081*** 0.155*** 0.116*** 0.083*** 
 
 (0.020) (0.018) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013) (0.011) 
 
Medical professions 
    
-0.196*** -0.179*** 
 
 
    
(0.010) (0.010) 
Tertiary graduation mark 66-90 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
91-100 -0.005 0.009 -0.016 -0.031 -0.017 -0.017* 
 
 (0.028) (0.023) (0.017) (0.019) (0.014) (0.009) 
 
101-105 0.016 0.025 -0.023 -0.051*** -0.035** -0.017* 
 
 (0.029) (0.024) (0.018) (0.020) (0.015) (0.010) 
 
106-110 -0.009 -0.006 -0.029 -0.058*** -0.058*** -0.030*** 
 
 (0.029) (0.024) (0.018) (0.020) (0.015) (0.010) 
 
110 cum laude -0.025 -0.033 -0.059*** -0.090*** -0.076*** -0.060*** 
 
 (0.030) (0.025) (0.018) (0.021) (0.016) (0.010) 
Work experience during Higher Education No Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Temporary 0.038*** -0.011 0.009 0.018** 0.018*** 0.041*** 
 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) 
 
Permanent -0.031 -0.025 0.002 -0.002 0.010 0.057*** 
 
 (0.022) (0.015) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.007) 
Graduation delay No delay Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
One year -0.002 0.032** 0.034*** 0.028*** 0.008 0.021*** 
 
 (0.018) (0.016) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) 
 
Two years 0.016 0.058*** 0.053*** 0.025** 0.030*** 0.029*** 
 
 (0.019) (0.017) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) 
 
Three years 0.021 0.049*** 0.068*** 0.033*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 
 
 (0.023) (0.018) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.007) 
 
Four years or more 0.067*** 0.095*** 0.078*** 0.044*** 0.041*** 0.000 
 
 (0.023) (0.017) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.000) 
    
    
 
 (continue) 
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   1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 
    
      Further education No Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 
Yes -0.076*** -0.037*** -0.046*** -0.084*** -0.074*** -0.073*** 
 
 (0.014) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) 
Observations  7,359 9,290 15,168 15,405 21,050 34,898 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix E - Overidentification strategies 
Tab. E.1 Pre-program test, whole sample 
  
Educational Mismatch Skill Mismatch 
Cohort 1992 Ref.  Ref.  
 
1995 0.305 -1.593*** 
  
(0.561) (0.284) 
 
1998 0.561 -1.244*** 
  
(0.521) (0.248) 
 
2001 0.142 -2.078*** 
  
(0.471) (0.223) 
Treatment Status Control Ref. Ref. 
 
Treated 3.421*** 1.213*** 
  
(0.412) (0.128) 
Cohort*Treatment Status 1995*Treated 0.022 1.132*** 
  
(0.562) (0.286) 
 
1998*Treated -0.420 0.215 
  
(0.522) (0.250) 
 
2001*Treated 0.058 1.834*** 
  
(0.473) (0.225) 
N 
 
44,484 47,563 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Controls for: sex, geographic area, age, parents’education, social origin, type of secondary degree 
 
 
Tab. E.2 Pre-program test, Scientific fields and Medicine 
  
Educational Mismatch Skill Mismatch 
Cohort 1992 Ref.  Ref.  
 
1995 0.268 -1.630 
  
(0.562) (0.286) 
 
1998 0.421 -1.329 
  
(0.522) (0.250) 
 
2001 0.22 -2.127 
  
(0.472) (0.225) 
Treatment Status Control Ref. Ref. 
 
Treated 2.760*** 1.135*** 
  
(0.418) (0.139) 
Cohort*Treatment Status 1995*Treated 0.123 1.007*** 
  
(0.570) (0.297) 
 
1998*Treated -0.217 0.121 
  
(0.529) (0.261) 
 
2001*Treated 0.109 1.596*** 
  
(0.480) (0.235) 
N 
 
10,646 10,966 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Controls for: sex, geographic area, age, parents’education, social origin, type of secondary degree 
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Tab. E.3 Pre-program test, Engineer and Medicine 
  
Educational Mismatch Skill Mismatch 
Cohort 1992 Ref.  Ref.  
 
1995 0.428 -1.554*** 
  
(0.562) (0.285) 
 
1998 0.636 -1.244*** 
  
(0.522) (0.250) 
 
2001 0.190 -2.078*** 
  
(0.472) (0.224) 
Treatment Status Control Ref. Ref. 
 
Treated 2.522*** 1.037*** 
  
(0.420) (0.140) 
Cohort*Treatment Status 1995*Treated -0.289 0.908*** 
  
(0.570) (0.295) 
 
1998*Treated -0.272 -0.011 
  
(0.529) (0.260) 
 
2001*Treated 0.305 1.660*** 
  
(0.480) (0.233) 
N 
 
13,100 13,500 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Controls for: sex, geographic area, age, parents’education, social origin, type of secondary degree 
 
 
Tab. E.4 Pre-program test, Agriculture and Medicine 
  
Educational Mismatch Skill Mismatch 
Cohort 1992 Ref.  Ref.  
 
1995 0.328 -1.745*** 
  
(0.565) (0.293) 
 
1998 0.484 -1.411*** 
  
(0.525) (0.257) 
 
2001 0.113 -2.195*** 
  
(0.475) (0.229) 
Treatment Status Control Ref. Ref. 
 
Treated 2.967*** 0.827*** 
  
(0.435) (0.174) 
Cohort*Treatment Status 1995*Treated 0.688 1.770*** 
  
(0.604) (0.350) 
 
1998*Treated 0.113 0.667** 
  
(0.550) (0.302) 
 
2001*Treated 0.446 2.181*** 
  
(0.501) (0.270) 
N 
 
4,424 4,528 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Controls for: sex, geographic area, age, parents’education, social origin, type of secondary degree 
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Tab. E.5 Pre-program test, Economics and Medicine 
  
Educational Mismatch Skill Mismatch 
Cohort 1992 Ref. Ref. 
 
1995 0.313 -1.635*** 
  
(0.561) (0.286) 
 
1998 0.566 -1.2264*** 
  
(0.522) (0.250) 
 
2001 0.155 -2.076*** 
  
(0.472) (0.225) 
Treatment Status Control Ref. Ref. 
 
Treated 3.850*** 1.312*** 
  
(0.416) (0.140) 
Cohort*Treatment Status 1995*Treated 0.104 1.232*** 
  
(0.566) (0.295) 
 
1998*Treated -0.524 0.250 
  
(0.526) (0.261) 
 
2001*Treated -0.014 2.136*** 
  
(0.477) (0.236) 
N 
 
10,959 11,476 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Controls for: sex, geographic area, age, parents’education, social origin, type of secondary degree 
 
 
Tab. E.6 Pre-program test, Social and Political Sciences and Medicine 
  
Educational Mismatch Skill Mismatch 
Cohort 1992 Ref.  Ref.  
 
1995 0.229 -1.647*** 
  
(0.564) (0.288) 
 
1998 0.526 -1.304*** 
  
(0.524) (0.254) 
 
2001 0.099 -2.135*** 
  
(0.473) (0.173) 
Treatment Status Control Ref. Ref. 
 
Treated 4.773*** 2.132*** 
  
(0.428) (0.173) 
Cohort*Treatment Status 1995*Treated -0.249 0.712** 
  
(0.583) (0.320) 
 
1998*Treated -0.886* -0.359 
  
(0.538) (0.284) 
 
2001*Treated -0.336 1.489*** 
  
(0.492) (0.263) 
N 
 
5,406 5,913 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Controls for: sex, geographic area, age, parents’education, social origin, type of secondary degree 
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Tab. E.7 Pre-program test, Law and Medicine 
  
Educational Mismatch Skill Mismatch 
Cohort 1992 Ref.  Ref.  
 
1995 0.0254 -1.761*** 
  
(0.564) (0.290) 
 
1998 0.439 -1.406*** 
  
(0.525) (0.256) 
 
2001 0.059 -2.155*** 
  
(0.474) (0.228) 
Treatment Status Control Ref. Ref. 
 
Treated 3.259** 0.871*** 
  
(0.424) (0.160) 
Cohort*Treatment Status 1995*Treated -0.054 1.285*** 
  
(0.577) (0.313) 
 
1998*Treated -0.296 0.657** 
  
(0.537) (0.280) 
 
2001*Treated 0.255 2.057*** 
  
(0.488) (0.255) 
N 
 
6,607 6,955 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Controls for: sex, geographic area, age, parents’education, social origin, type of secondary degree 
 
 
Tab. E.8 Pre-program test, Humanities and Medicine 
  
Educational Mismatch Skill Mismatch 
Cohort 1992 Ref.  Ref.  
 
1995 0.323 -1.532*** 
  
(0.561) (0.285) 
 
1998 0.565 -1.184*** 
  
(0.521) (0.249) 
 
2001 0.120 -2.080*** 
  
(0.472) (0.224) 
Treatment Status Control Ref. Ref. 
 
Treated 4.092*** 1.473*** 
  
(0.416) (0.141) 
Cohort*Treatment Status 1995*Treated 0.382 1.297*** 
  
(0.567) (0.294) 
 
1998*Treated -0.659 0.249 
  
(0.525) (0.258) 
 
2001*Treated 0.096 1.935*** 
  
(0.477) (0.235) 
N 
 
10,851 12,005 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Controls for: sex, geographic area, age, parents’education, social origin, type of secondary degree 
 
